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This dissertation explores the role of efficiency of redistributive institutions (ERI) 
on redistribution.  The first substantive essay proposes a theoretical model to explain the 
lack of strong empirical evidence in favor of a positive relationship between income 
inequality and redistribution. This chapter first shows that even exogenously given ERI 
affects the relationship between income inequality and redistribution.   Then, it introduces 
three specifications to endogenize ERI.  In these various specifications, increasing 
inequality reduces the ERI when (1) ERI is an increasing function of average income or 
(2) political influence on ERI is positively associated with income or (3) the median voter 
has some prospect of upward mobility.  There is one common element in these various 
specifications.   While income inequality increases the pressure for redistribution it also 
increases the incentive to reduce the efficiency of redistribution in order to constrain 
aggregate redistribution.  Hence, the main conclusion is that one needs consider these 
conflicting effects in order to account for the puzzling lack of strong empirical evidence 
for a positive relationship between income inequality and redistribution.    
The second substantive essay empirically analyzes the role of efficiency of 
redistributive institutions on redistribution in the form of social security and welfare 
spending.   When measures of ERI are incorporated into the existing empirical 
specifications of income inequality and redistribution, cross-sectional and panel data 
regressions show that the ERI significantly increases redistribution.  However, we find 
weaker evidence for the role of income inequality on redistribution.  Income inequality 
does not appear to be strongly significant in various specifications of the redistribution 
equation.  Based on this evidence, this chapter concludes that ERI plays an important role 
in redistribution but this effect does not resolve the fiscal policy puzzle that is 
emphasized in the theoretical chapter.  Moreover, this chapter also explores the 
determinants of ERI.  Our empirical results confirm the theoretical model that an increase 
in GDP per capita and democracy increases ERI.  However, there is less convincing 
evidence for the negative role of income inequality on the ERI.  Among the other 
determinants of ERI, freedom of the press and trade openness improve ERI considerably.  
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1. Chapter 1: Introduction to the Dissertation  
 
Economists have long been interested in the determinants of redistribution.  The 
main focus in the redistribution literature appears to be the effects of income inequality 
on aggregate redistribution.  In spite of both theoretical and empirical contributions to 
investigate the determinants of redistribution, an important gap remains in the literature, 
which is the effect of efficiency of redistributive institutions on redistribution.  This 
dissertation is an attempt to show that the state apparatus with its redistributive 
institutions plays a major role in determining the size of redistribution.  
This dissertation conceptually contributes to the existing literature by first 
differentiating between two types of inefficiency. One is in the process of taxation and 
another is in the redistribution stage.  The first inefficiency occurs in the process of 
taxation due to the disincentive effect of taxation on supplying effort and on the 
accumulation of capital.  This type of inefficiency is widely considered in analyzing 
income inequality and its relationship to redistribution in the literature.  However, this 
dissertation also draws attention to a second type of inefficiency which takes place during 
the process of redistributing tax revenue back to society.  This inefficiency is related to 
the functioning of redistributive institutions.  Since governments implement the 
redistribution, how efficiently governments are run in the process of redistribution 
emerges as a second type of inefficiency.  Interestingly, this distinction has not been 
made in the existing literature and the latter type of inefficiency has been omitted in 
existing studies.   
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The theoretical chapter of this dissertation first points out the lack of consensus 
between empirical and theoretical studies of income inequality and redistribution. While 
theoretical papers show that income inequality increases redistribution, empirical studies 
fail to confirm the same result.  The theoretical chapter later shows that even an 
exogenously given efficiency of redistributive institutions (ERI) affects the relationship 
between income inequality and redistribution.  This chapter also introduces three 
specifications to endogenize ERI.  In these various specifications, increasing inequality 
reduces the ERI when (1) ERI is an increasing function of average income or (2) political 
influence on ERI is positively associated with income or (3) the median voter has some 
prospect of upward mobility.  There is one common element in these various 
specifications.  While income inequality increases the pressure for redistribution, it also 
increases the incentive to reduce the efficiency of redistribution in order to constrain 
aggregate redistribution.  Thus, the main conclusion of the theoretical chapter is that one 
needs to consider these conflicting effects in order to account for the lack of strong 
empirical evidence of a positive relationship between income inequality and 
redistribution.    
The empirical chapter of this dissertation analyzes the role of ERI on 
redistribution.   In this chapter, redistribution is mainly approximated with social security 
and welfare expenditures by the governments.  We utilize the indices of ‘Quality of 
Bureaucracy’ and ‘Control of Corruption’ from the International Country Risk Guide to 
quantify efficiency of redistributive institutions.  When measures of ERI are incorporated 
into the existing empirical specifications of income inequality and redistribution, cross-
sectional and panel data regressions show that ERI significantly increases redistribution.  
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This result is robust to alternative specifications of the empirical model as well as to 
alternative data sets.  However, we find weaker evidence for the role of income inequality 
on redistribution.  Income inequality does not appear to be strongly significant in various 
specifications of the redistribution equation.  Based on this evidence, this chapter 
concludes that efficiency of redistributive institutions plays an important role in 
redistribution but this effect does not resolve the fiscal policy puzzle that is emphasized 
in the theoretical chapter.   
The empirical chapter further explores the determinants of ERI emphasized in the 
theoretical chapter. Our theoretical model shows that income inequality reduces ERI and 
ERI is a positive function of the average income.  It also implies that more democratic 
countries reach a higher level of ERI as long as more democracy indicates more political 
power for the median voter.  A section of the empirical chapter focuses on testing these 
predictions in addition to analyzing some other possible determinants of ERI, such as 
freedom of the press.  Our empirical results in this section confirm the theoretical model 
that increases in GDP per capita and democracy increase ERI.  On the other hand, there is 
less convincing evidence for the negative role of income inequality on ERI.  Among the 
other determinants of ERI, freedom of the press and trade openness improve ERI 
substantially. 
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2. Chapter 2: The Shadowing Role of Redistributive Institutions in the Relationship 
Between Income Inequality and Redistribution 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Italy has a more equal income distribution than the Dominican Republic.  
However, Italy has redistributed 14 percent of its GDP for social security and welfare 
expenditure over the last thirty years, whereas the corresponding figure for Dominican 
Republic is only 0.8 percent.   This observation is quite contrary the predictions of 
economic models.   Existing theoretical models suggest that higher income inequality 
generates more redistribution in favor of the poor.  While a positive relationship between 
income inequality and redistribution has been suggested much earlier (Meltzer and 
Richard 1981), with the advent of endogenous growth models1, a resurgence of interest in 
income inequality and redistribution took place in 1990s.   The main purpose of the 
related endogenous growth papers was to explain the casual relationship between income 
distribution and growth.  In addition, these studies have also implications for income 
inequality and redistribution, given that redistribution typically emerges as the main 
channel from income inequality to growth.  The common theme in these political 
economy models is that higher income inequality leads to higher redistributive pressure 
and redistributive pressure affects growth.   
 Even though there exists a strong theoretical presumption in favor of a positive 
relationship between income inequality and redistribution, empirical studies fail to 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Bertola (1993, 1998), Banarjee and Newman (1993), Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), 
Perotti (1993), Perrson and Tabellini (1994), Galor and Zeira (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Aghion 
and Bolton (1997), Chiu (1998), Benabou (2000), Rigolini (2003). 
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confirm this positive relationship (Benabou 1996, Perotti 1996, Milanovic 2000).   This 
lack of empirical evidence motivates this study to analyze income inequality and 
redistribution relation by considering the efficiency of redistributive institutions (ERI).    
Existing explanations2 for this failure overlook the role of ERI on the relationship 
between income inequality and redistribution.   
This study shows that inefficiency of redistributive institutions can limit the 
aggregate redistribution in the economy.  Furthermore, the current study provides a 
model where income inequality reduces the ERI while increasing the pressure for 
redistribution and thereby presents an explanation for the aforementioned empirical 
puzzle. 
This study also contributes to the literature by distinguishing two types of 
inefficiencies.  The first one occurs at the taxation stage.  Taxing income reduces agent’s 
incentive to supply effort or factors of production and hence generates deadweight losses.  
This case is the main form of inefficiency emphasized in existing studies like McGuire 
and Olson (1996) and Harms and Zink (2003).  This study draws attention to the second 
type of inefficiency, which has been overlooked so far in analyzing the income inequality 
and redistribution relationship.  This type of inefficiency emerges in the process of 
redistributing the tax revenue back to society.  Existing political economy models ignore 
the redistributive institutions in the redistribution process and simply assume that all tax 
revenues are redistributed back to society without any change in the total value.  
However, in reality, governments play an active role in the redistribution process.  Hence, 
                                                 
2 See Harms and Zink (2003) for the detailed literature review. 
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how governments run their redistributive institutions emerges as another form of 
inefficiency and needs to be taken into account. 
Anecdotal evidence from Latin America by De Ferranti et al.  (2004)3 also 
confirms our idea that income inequality reduces government effectiveness by generating 
political inequality, clientelism, and state capture by the elite.  Moreover, inefficiency in 
redistributive institutions in turn adversely affects aggregate redistribution, for instance in 
the Dominican Republic (Keefer 2002).   
The literature on inefficient redistribution is also related here.   The central issue 
in this literature is to explain why most redistribution in practice takes an inefficient 
form.   Coate and Morris (1995) attribute inefficient transfers to imperfect information.  
Politicians exploit the voters’ imperfect information to make transfers to their favorite 
groups.   Acemoglu and Robinson (2001-a) assert that inefficient redistribution is 
employed in order to maintain future political power.   Drazen and Limao (2004) 
emphasize that inefficient transfers increase the bargaining power of the government.  
Finally, the commitment to inefficient forms of redistribution emerges as a way to 
constrain redistribution (Becker and Mulligan 2003).   Similarly, in this current study, the 
inefficiency in redistributive institutions generates inefficient redistribution and thereby 
constrains the redistributive pressure of the poor.    
This chapter is organized as follows.   Section 2.2 introduces the benchmark 
model.  Section 2.3 analyzes a model where ERI is a positive function of average national 
income.   Two stage specifications where the political power is proportional to income 
                                                 
3 The World Bank Publication, “Inequality in Latin America Breaking with History?” provides an extensive 
analysis of the role of income inequality on governance and redistribution especially in chapter 5.   
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and the prospect of upward mobility hypothesis are investigated in Section 2.4.   Finally, 
Section 2.5 concludes.   Detailed proofs, arguments for the political power of the wealthy, 
and some extensions are relegated to the Appendix.   
 
2.2. The Model 
 
In this section, we explain the model in two steps.   First, we take the ERI as 
exogenously given and show that ERI plays an important role in determining aggregate 
redistribution in the economy.   Next, we endogenize ERI in several ways.  First, we use 
the assumption of Azariadis and Lahiri (2002) that ERI is a positive function of average 
income.   In this specification, income inequality increases the prevailing tax rate in the 
economy.  Then, the higher tax rate reduces the average income due to the disincentive 
effect of taxation, and the decline in average income reduces ERI.  This section shows 
that income inequality determines not only the equilibrium tax rate but also the ERI. 
Other explanations of how income inequality can influence the ERI rely on a 
common assumption that ERI are determined prior to the effective tax rate in the 
economy.  We emphasize the same theme across various alternatives.   The common 
element in these alternative explanations is that the decisive voter in determining ERI is 
wealthier or expects to be wealthier than the median voter who chooses the tax rate in the 
second stage.   Moreover, all these explanations share a common motivation: since the 
wealthy disproportionately bear the burden of taxation, they have incentives to constrain 
redistribution by reducing the benefits of redistribution for the poor.   
Among these various mechanisms, we first follow Benabou (1996 and 2000) in 
the first stage, we deviate from standard median voter hypothesis and analyze the 
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possibility that the political power in determining the ERI is proportional to income.   
When political influence in changing institutions is proportional to income, the wealthy 
become more powerful in designing the redistributive institutions.  Since the wealthy 
disproportionately bear the burden of redistributive income tax in the second stage, they 
attempt to manipulate the redistributive institutions in the first stage in order to constrain 
the redistributive taxation in the second stage. 
In other explanations, we do not deviate from the median voter hypothesis but we 
introduce uncertainty about individual’s future income.  Due to this uncertainty, even 
though the aggregate income distribution does not change over time, the median voter in 
the first stage becomes willing to set up a lower ERI.  The median voter in the first stage 
expects to be wealthier in the second stage.  Since income distribution stays the same, the 
median voter of the first stage actually expects not to be the median voter in the second 
stage.  Hence, he/she manipulates ERI in his/her self-interest when he/she has the power 
in the first stage.   
The results here are also established without deviating from median voter 
hypothesis.   The prospect of upward mobility (POUM) offers an alternative.    In the 
POUM hypothesis, when individuals’ expected future income is a concave function of 
their current income, the current median voter expects to be wealthier than the future 
median voter and hence attempts to reduce ERI to constrain future redistribution.   
In all of these different explanations, income inequality also increases the 
incentive to reduce ERI in order to constrain the redistributive pressure that rises with 
income inequality.  In the model, while higher income inequality increases the 
redistributive pressure, it also increases the incentive of the decisive voter to reduce the 
 9
ERI.   Therefore, the final effect of income inequality on redistribution depends on the 
relative magnitude of these two opposite effects.   
 
2.2.1. The Benchmark Model 
 
The economy is populated by a large number of individuals.  Population size is 
normalized to one.   All individuals have identical preferences, and they obtain utility 
only from their own consumption.  The utility function of individual i  is given by 
 
)()()1( TyTTyTU ii α+−=  (1) 
 
where 10 ≤≤T  and 0>α  denote the income tax rate and ERI respectively.  Each 
individual is assumed to be endowed with a different skill level.   When individuals work, 
they receive income, iy  proportional to their skill before taxation.   The individuals pay 
a flat tax rate T  and receive )(TyTα  from redistribution. 
In terms of notation, )(Tyi  differs from iy  and indicates the post tax level of 
income of individual i .  The model incorporates the disincentive effect of taxation as a 
decline in individual income4.  In the model, this disincentive effect of taxation for 
individual i  is characterized as 
                                                 
4 The disincentive effect of taxation is already widely accepted in the literature. Therefore, in the model, we 
do not attempt to endogenize this assumption. However, without going into the details, one can think of the 
most apparent reason why the higher tax rate reduces the taxable income in the economy. People will have 
less incentive to work if they know that some of their earnings are going to be taxed away anyway. Hence, 
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0)( ≤∂
∂
T
Tyi   (2) 
  
Following Benabou (2000), we adopt the following functional relationship 
between tax rates and income to account for the disincentive effect of taxation. 
bT
ii eyTy
−=)(   (3) 
 
Equation 3 indicates that with the introduction of taxation, each individual’s 
income changes in proportion to bTe− where ]1,0[∈b  represents the extent of the 
disincentive effect in the model5.   
Since our main objective is not to explore the adverse effects of taxation on 
individuals’ income, we do not attempt to endogenize disincentive effect in the model.  
Actually, this issue has been already explored by the previous studies as labor-leisure 
trade off by Meltzer and Richard (1981) and consumption-capital accumulation trade off 
by Perrson and Tabellini (1994).  In this study, we prefer to be more general in defining 
the disincentive effects of taxation in order to incorporate these various reasons for 
                                                                                                                                                 
they will substitute working with leisure and their post tax income, which is )(Tyi  will be less than their 
income before taxation, which is iy  [Meltzer and Richard (1981)]. One can also think of alternative 
explanations such as in Perrson and Tabellini (1994)’s model of the distortionary effects of taxation on 
capital accumulation. 
5The restriction which is  1≤b  is required to find an interior solution for ]1,0[∈∗T . Note that when 
0=b  there is no disincentive effect and when 1=b  the disincentive effect reaches its highest level in the 
model. 
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disincentive effect of taxation.  Hence, our formulation of disincentive effect, for 
example, implicitly incorporates labor-leisure trade off in the following manner.  Increase 
in taxation reduces benefit of working due to decline in net income and subsequently 
reduces the utility of an individual.  On the other hand, increasing leisure due to working 
less increases the utility of the individual.  However, as a final outcome, adverse effect of 
working less and making less income dominates the positive effect of increasing labor. 
Moreover, the disincentive effect of taxation has to be in the model.  Otherwise, the 
median voter always chooses an equilibrium tax rate of one as long as he/she has lower 
than mean income (Harms and Zink, 2003).   
Similarly, y  and )(Ty  denote the average income of the economy before and 
after taxation respectively.  Average post-tax income also changes in proportion to bTe−  
and can be written as 
∫
=
−− ==
1
0
)(
i
bTbT
i eydieyTy  (4) 
 
A higher tax rate reduces the tax base, )(Ty  in the economy.  Average income in 
the economy without taxation is denoted as y  and represents the aggregate tax base.   
In Equation 1, each individual's income is taxed at the same rate T .  Aggregate tax 
revenue is then redistributed back to the society equally.  Since the tax burden is 
proportional to income but redistribution is the same for each individual, the wealthy 
disproportionately bear the burden of taxation while the poor benefit from this taxation 
and redistribution process.   
 12
Unlike the existing literature, redistribution in equation 1, )(TyTR α=  also 
depends on the efficiency of redistributive institutions, which is characterized by the 
parameter α .  Hence, Equation 1 incorporates two types of inefficiency from the taxation 
and redistribution process.  The first occurs in the taxation stage, as a positive tax rate 
generates inefficiency by creating a disincentive to work.  The reduction in α  emerges as 
a second type of inefficiency that occurs during the process of redistribution.  In the 
current model, we first want to distinguish these two types of inefficiencies in taxation 
and redistribution stages, and secondly we want to show that inefficiencies in the 
redistribution stage, represented as a reduction in α , also play a role in constraining 
aggregate redistribution6. 
One can think of the following example to motivate variations in the parameterα .   
Suppose that to redistribute tax revenues, a government establishes a social security and 
welfare administration.   This branch of government hires new employees to run the 
redistributive programs.   But due to lack of competency of civil servants or due to 
corruption, suppose the social security and welfare administration wastes some of the 
government revenue in redistributing it back to the society.   For instance, suppose that 
the program constructs a new building to carry out redistribution to the needy, but pays 
more than necessary for the construction of the building due to their incompetence or 
                                                 
6 Existing political economy models ignore efficiency of redistributive institutions and assume that all the 
tax revenue is redistributed back to society. Therefore, they analyze the special case of equation (1) when 
α is equal to one. However, we only require 0>α . When 1>α , there are economies of scale or 
positive externalities in redistribution. For example, one can think of health care expenditure for the poor as 
a form of redistribution. There can be gains from providing health care facilities at the aggregate level, and 
hence α can exceed one.  
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corruption.   This represents a decline in α  because the needy only benefit as much as 
the real value of the building.   The ERI also declines when government officers receive 
their salaries without generating a corresponding benefit to the recipients of 
redistribution.   Actually, the parameter α  can be very broadly considered to capture 
various forms of inefficiencies in redistribution stage.   
 We first assume that individuals take α  as given and then they aim to maximize 
their utility with respect to tax rates.  Each individual has a preferred tax rate, depending 
on their level of income.  Then, the question is who determines the equilibrium tax rate in 
the economy.  In the model here, the median voter is assumed to have decisive power in 
determining equilibrium tax rate.  Hence, the median voter maximizes Equation 1 with 
respect to T  by setting 
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∂=∂
∂
T
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and finds his/her preferred tax rate as 
byy
T
m
1
1
1 +−=
∗
α   (5)  where 10 ≤≤ b  
 
One may also notice that the equilibrium tax rate decided by the median voter 
depends on the aforementioned two types of inefficiency.  First, when the disincentive 
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effect of taxation is high, the median voter reduces his or her preferred tax rate, as 
012 ≤−=∂
∂ ∗
bb
T .  Second, ERI affects the equilibrium tax rate.  Whether ∗T  has an 
interior solution in ]1,0[  depends on α  and b .  The condition  
b
yyb m −≤≤+ 1
11 α   is 
enough to obtain an interior solution for ]1,0[∈∗T .  When b is low and/or α  is high, 
there is a corner solution at 1=∗T .  In this case, the disincentive effect is not big enough 
to deter radical redistribution and/or efficiency of redistribution is so high that the median 
voter benefits from radical redistribution.   
The income inequality in this study is defined as the ratio of mean income to 
median income.  Definitely, this definition has its limitations.  However, it is the most 
common measure of income inequality in existing income inequality and redistribution 
studies.  For example, pioneering work of Meltzer and Richard (1981) uses this definition 
for income inequality.  Other influential papers in this topic such as Saint-Paul and 
Verdier (1993), Perrson and Tabellini (1994) Benabou (2000) also follow Meltzer and 
Richard in their definitions of income inequality.  In spite of this common use of income 
inequality measure, one may define the income inequality in different ways.  Hence, in 
discussing the definition of income inequality, Ray (1998) points out that “it is difficult to 
have complete unanimity in this subject” (p. 174).  However, mean to median income 
ratio satisfy at least three of the four common assumptions which need to be satisfied in 
constructing Kuznet’s curve.  Our definition of income inequality always satisfies the 
unanimity, population and relative income principles.  However, Dalton principle is not 
always satisfied.  For example, even though a regressive transfer worsens the income 
distribution, it may not change the mean and median incomes.  Given the widespread use 
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of this definition, we decide to adopt the mean to median ratio as our measure of income 
inequality in the theoretical model.   
Now we can state a widely accepted conclusion of the political economy literature 
on the income inequality and redistribution relationship.   
 
Proposition 1: 
Income inequality increases both the equilibrium tax rate and the aggregate level of redistribution 
)( ∗∗= TyTR α .  In other words: (i) 0
)(
>∂
∂ ∗
myy
T
 and (ii) 0
)(
>∂
∂
myy
R
. 
 
Proof: 
(i) 0
)(
>∂
∂ ∗
myy
T ; We only consider the case when we have an interior solution 
where ]1,0[∈∗T .  In Equation 5, one can think of income inequality as the difference 
between mean income and median income.  When the median voter’s income is further 
away from the mean income, income inequality, myy  increases.  When we take the 
derivative of equilibrium tax rate with respect to income inequality, we find the following 
expression:  
0
)1()( 2
>−=∂
∂ ∗
mm yyyy
T
α
α .   Hence, income inequality increases the equilibrium tax 
rate QED. 
(ii) 0
)(
>∂
∂
myy
R ;  given that )( ∗∗= TyTR α , one may think that because of the 
disincentive effect, aggregate redistribution may not always increase with higher income 
inequality, while equilibrium tax rate increases.   In other words, ∗T  increases with 
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myy while )(
∗Ty can be declining with higher ∗T .  So redistribution may even decline 
with higher income inequality or there might be some Laffer curve relation between 
income inequality and redistribution.  However, when  1≤b , the increase in ∗T  always 
dominates the decline in )( ∗Ty , and hence aggregate redistribution always increases with 
income inequality. This can be seen with the following expression 
0]1[
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ααα  QED. 
 
Now, we concentrate on how α affects the median voter’s preferred tax rate and 
aggregate redistribution for a given level of income inequality.  In this section, we do not 
attempt to endogenize α  but analyze the effect of exogenously given α  on ∗T , which 
has been ignored in the literature.  Then, our second proposition follows as 
 
Proposition 2: 
An increase in the efficiency of redistributive institutions, α , increases both the equilibrium tax rate  
and the aggregate redistribution;  that is,  (i) 0≥∂
∂ ∗
α
T
 and (ii) 0≥∂
∂
α
R
. 
 
Proof: 
(i) 0≥∂
∂ ∗
α
T ;  when one takes the derivative of ∗T  with respect to α  in Equation 5, the 
following expression, which is always positive, is obtained: 
0
)1( 2
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m
m
yy
yyT
αα .  QED. 
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(ii) 0≥∂
∂
α
R ;  when one takes the derivative of )(TyTR α=  with respect to α , the 
following expression is obtained: 
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This expression is always positive given that ]1,0[∈b  and ]1,0[∈∗T  QED. 
  
Both the equilibrium tax rate and aggregate redistribution decrease for lower 
values of α .  Therefore, one can conclude that ERI plays a role in limiting the amount of 
redistribution, and should be taken into account when considering relationship between 
inequality and redistribution.   
One can think of the following example to see the hazard of ignoring the ERI in 
analyzing the income inequality and redistribution relationship.  Consider two countries 
with the same average tax rates and average incomes but different levels of income 
inequality.   If one ignores the possibility that α  may differ in these two countries, one 
would conclude that redistribution does not have a robust relationship with income 
inequality.  Suppose, however, α  is lower for the country with higher income inequality, 
let’s say for Country 1.  This difference implies lower aggregate redistribution for 
Country 1.  Although tax rates and average incomes are same in the two countries, 
Country 1 will have less aggregate redistribution due to lower values of α , which can be 
seen as 2211 )()( RTyTTyTR =≤= ∗∗∗∗ αα  because 21 αα ≤ . 
This example carries important insights as to why existing literature cannot find a 
robust positive relationship between income inequality and average tax rates.  For 
example, Perotti (1996) attempts to test the implications of political economy models 
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directly by regressing income inequality on average and marginal tax rates.   In this 
paper, the optimal tax rate emerges from Equation 5 as a function of the interaction term 
of α  and a measure of income inequality.   This interaction term is ignored to in existing 
econometric studies and thereby constitutes a potential reason for the failure to confirm 
the prediction that higher inequality should increase redistribution.   
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2.3. Income Inequality and ERI When ERI is a Positive Function of Average Income 
 
So far, the main purpose here has been to show that exogenously given efficiency 
of redistributive institutions plays a significant role in determining the equilibrium tax 
rate and aggregate redistribution.   In this section, we endogenize α  by following 
Azariadis and Lahiri (2002) and assuming that α  increases with average income7.   
Under this assumption, income inequality determines both ∗T  and ∗α , simultaneously8.   
Higher income inequality increases taxation and hence reduces average income due to the 
disincentive effect of taxation, and this reduction in average income also reduces ∗α . 
This assumption appears to be quite reasonable considering that higher income 
countries appear to have better governance in general.  Azariadis and Lahiri (2002) also 
draw attention to this issue.  They provide a model explaining why wealthy countries 
choose better governance.  In Azariadis’ and Lahiri’s model, high ability bureaucrats 
have to be paid a higher wage than their less able counterparts.  However, high ability 
bureaucrats generate better governance, which translates to a higher ∗α  in our context.  
The wages paid to bureaucrats constitute the cost of government.  Azariadis and Lahiri 
show that as long as the cost of government rises less than proportionately with income, 
                                                 
7 North (1981) also states that “as the scale of economic activity expands, better institutions become 
affordable, and hence government performance should improve” (p. 224). In addition, see La Porta et al. 
(1999).  
8 ∗T and ∗α denote the equilibrium tax rate and equilibrium efficiency of redistributive institutions 
prevailing in the economy. 
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then as national income rises, government operations become less expensive and high 
income countries find better governance to be more affordable.     
With this assumption, one can see that income inequality has a direct positive 
effect on equilibrium tax rate. But the loop does not end there.  Since higher income 
inequality leads to higher ∗T  and higher ∗T  simultaneously reduces the average income 
due to a disincentive effect, one expects to see lower ∗α   in more unequal countries.  
Under this framework, income inequality does not directly reduce ∗α  but does so 
indirectly by increasing taxes and simultaneously reducing average income in the 
economy.   
To model this idea, we assume that the disincentive effects holds as in the original 
model, hence bTii eyTy
−=)(  and bTeyTy −=)( .  We further assume that the functional 
relationship between )(Ty  and α  has the following form:  
bTeyaTyaTya −== )(),,(α  where 0>a  
In other words, we assume that  α  is an increasing function of the average 
income.  First, the equilibrium tax rate must be found under this assumption.  Again the 
median voter maximizes his/her utility given in Equation 1 with respect to tax rate, 
impliying: 
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and finds the equilibrium tax rate9 as 
                                                 
9 See the Appendix for derivations. 
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With this background, we can state our third proposition.   
 
Proposition 3: 
When efficiency of redistributive institutions is a positive function of average income, an increase in 
income inequality reduces equilibrium efficiency of redistributive institutions. 
 
Proof:  
The equilibrium tax rate in Equation 6 depends on ∗α , and ∗α  in turn depends on ∗T .  
Hence, one needs to perform comparative static analysis in order to analyze the effects of 
income inequality on ∗T  and ∗α .  Moreover, given that ∗α is a function of y  and my , 
either y  or my  needs to be kept constant, while the other one changes in order to 
represent income inequality.   
 
1-When y  is Constant 
When y  remains constant, a decline in my  increases income inequality given that 
myy > .  Hence, in order to show that income inequality increases ∗T  and reduces ∗α , 
we need to show that the following expressions hold: (i) 0≤∂
∂ ∗
my
T  and  (ii) 0≥∂
∂ ∗
my
α . 
The first order condition above can be rewritten as 
021),,,;,( =−++−−= ∗∗∗∗∗∗ mmm yybTyybTbyybaTF ααα  
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2-When my  is Constant 
When my  is kept constant, an increase in y  increases income inequality, given that 
myy > .  Hence, in order to show that income inequality increases ∗T  and reduces ∗α , 
we need to show that the following expressions hold: (i) 0≥∂
∂ ∗
y
T  and  (ii) 0≤∂
∂ ∗
my
α . 
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Proposition 3 has an interesting implication.  An increase in average income 
improves ERI unless the income distribution becomes more unequal.  This result suggests 
that growth at the expense of increasing inequality can indeed reduce the ERI due to the 
increasing redistributive pressure. 
 
2.4. Income Inequality and Efficiency of Redistributive Institutions in Two Stages 
 
 Considering that institutions are persistent, it seems reasonable to examine two-
stage models in which redistributive institutions are determined prior to taxation.  Hence, 
the second type of explanations rely on the assumption that ∗α  is determined prior to ∗T .  
A common element in this type of models is that the decisive voter in the first stage 
attempts to reduce ∗α  to constrain redistributive taxation in the second stage.   Under this 
alternative setting, we endogenize ∗α  in several ways.   
 First, the wealthy may have more political power in the first stage than in the 
second stage.  We follow Benabou (1996 and 2000) in modeling this idea.  Political 
power is assumed to be proportional to income in the first stage, so that the wealthy have 
disproportionate influence over ∗α .  Since the tax rate will be decided by the median 
voter in the second stage, the decisive voter, being wealthier than the median voter, tends 
to reduce ∗α  in order to constrain redistributive pressure in the second stage.   Hence, 
higher income inequality also implies higher political inequality, and leads to lower ERI.    
An alternative two-stage model relies on the uncertainty about an individual’s 
own income but complete certainty about the income distribution.  We show that income 
inequality can reduce ∗α  when the median voter’s expected future income is a concave 
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function of his/her current income.  Benabou and Ok (2001) explain the lack of 
redistribution by referring to the median voter’s prospect of upward mobility (POUM).  
In Benabou’s and Ok’s model, the only policy variable that affects redistribution is the 
tax rate.  Similar to their model, our model carries the same idea of POUM but with an 
alternative mechanism.  In our model, the POUM affects redistribution through 
influencing the determination of ∗α .  The median voter chooses a lower ∗α  due to his 
POUM in the second stage.  Moreover, income inequality again exaggerates the POUM 
effect and leads to further reduction in ∗α .   
Before exploring these various explanations in detail, we want to draw attention 
to a common motivation of these alternative explanations so that one will not be diverted 
in the remainder of this chapter.  Then, the common underlying motivation in these 
various specifications can be stated as to constrain the future redistributive pressure that 
arises with income inequality.   
 
2.4.1. Institutional Equilibrium in Two Stages 
 
Each individual has a preferred level of α  and T  depending on his/her income.  
Therefore, in each stage, individuals maximize their utility with respect to choice 
parameter of that stage.  It is quite reasonable to assume that ∗α  is determined prior to 
∗T , given that it is harder to change institutions as compared to tax rates.  Since ∗α  is 
chosen in the first stage, the only choice variable left to the individuals in the second 
stage is the tax rate.  Moreover, in the second stage, we assume that median voter 
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hypothesis holds.  Therefore, in the second stage, the median voter’s problem is exactly 
the same as before when α  is given exogenously.   
Determination of ∗α  is more interesting because the decisive voter in the first 
stage knows that his/her choice of α  in the first stage persists in the second stage and 
affects the median voter’s choice of ∗T .  Being aware of this influence, the decisive voter 
maximize his/her utility with respect to α , while considering the effects of his/her choice 
of α  on  ∗T .  Hence, the decisive voter maximizes his/her utility given in Equation 110 
with respect to  α :  
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Given that ∗T  and z  also contain ∗α  in their expression, Equation 7 denotes the 
implicit solution for ∗α .  The model becomes interesting when the decisive voter’s actual 
or expected income in the first stage differs from the median voter’s income.  Since it is 
                                                 
10 The choice of ∗α  becomes enacted in the second stage. Hence, we can just concentrate on the 
individual’s utility function in the second stage. 
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certain that the median voter is decisive in the second stage, the only question is the 
actual or expected income of the decisive voter in the first stage.   
Next, we explore two scenarios in which the decisive voter’s expected or actual 
income may differ from the median income and show that income inequality exaggerates 
the motive to constrain taxation.  However, before explaining these models in detail, we 
introduce a log-normal income distribution to make our results analytically tractable.  We 
conjecture that the implications of the model would be valid for other types of income 
distributions. 
 
2.4.2. Log-Normal Distribution 
 
Let a continuum of agents ]1,0[∈i  have log-normally distributed income iy , so 
that )ln( iy  is normally distributed with mean 0≥μ  and variance 02 ≥σ , 
),(log 2σμnyi ≈ or ),()ln( 2σμNyi ≈ . 
The log-normal distribution of income is a good approximation for the empirical 
income distribution and will lead to analytically tractable results (Benabou and Ok, 
2001).  The log-normal distribution has also nice properties.  First, the log-normal 
distribution has a non-negative range  +∞≤≤ iy0 .  It also allows for an unambiguous 
definition of inequality as increases in 2σ  shifts the Lorenz curve outward.  This variance 
also measures the distance between median income and mean income.  The mean and 
median levels of a log-normal distribution are given by 
2
2
1σμ+
e and μe , respectively and 
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thus  
2
2
1σ
e
y
y
m
= .   A mean preserving spread in a log-normal distribution can be 
characterized when mey =  is kept constant and 
2
2
1σ−= mm ey is declining, due to 
increasing 2σ . 
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2.4.3. When Political Power on ERI is Proportional to Income 
 
When the efficiency of redistributive institutions is determined in the first stage, 
we model the political process by following Benabou (1996 and 2000) and analyze the 
case when political power is proportional to income.  Similar to Benabou (1996 and 
2000), we do not seek to explain the source of wealth biases in political institutions but 
only to model them in a convenient manner11.  Therefore, the model explicitly formalizes 
departures from the one-person, one-vote ideal. 
 Instead of assuming that the voter at the 50th percentile of the income distribution 
is decisive, let the agent located at the  thp  percentile be the decisive voter.  The most 
likely case is when 21≥p  and corresponds to a system biased against the poor due to, 
for instance, wealth restricted franchise or unequal lobbying power.  In the model, each 
agent has political weight in proportion to their income )( ii yw .  When an agent’s weight 
depends on the absolute level of his/her income, the pivotal voter corresponds to the 
income level dy  defined by  p
yd =− ))ln(( 2σ
μφ , where φ  is the cumulative distribution 
function of a standard normal distribution.  Equivalently, one can define 
2
1 )ln()( σ
μλφ −==− dyp   and write 2λσμ+= eyd .  A positive value of λ  corresponds to a 
positive wealth bias in the political institutions.  For example, the case 5.0=λ  
corresponds to a one-dollar, one-vote rule. 
                                                 
11 In the Appendix, we first put forward some arguments and examples for why the wealthy may have more 
political power. Then, we explain why the wealthy may not be able to reduce tax rate directly. 
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 Having identified the decisive voter in the second stage, we can now solve for the 
institutional equilibrium by putting the decisive voter’s income into Equation 7 as 
follows: 
22
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Combining, we have 
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Equation 7-1 implicitly defines ∗α  as a function of income inequality.  We 
simulate the model assuming an interior solution of ]1,0[∈∗T .  Based on simulation 
results, we can state our next proposition as 
 
Proposition 4: 
For positive values ofλ , higher income inequality makes the decisive voter in the first stage wealthier 
and reduces the equilibrium efficiency of redistributive institutions ∗α  
 
One can think of the following intuition to explain the simulation results.  The 
decisive voter in the first stage weighs the marginal cost and benefit of reducing ∗α .  The 
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cost of reducing ∗α  comes from the redistribution side.  Since aggregate redistribution is 
divided equally among the whole population, by reducing ∗α  the decisive voter also 
reduces what he/she receives from redistribution.  The benefit of reducing ∗α  comes 
from the taxation side.  Since the median voter in the second stage is now faced with a 
lower  ∗α , the benefit of redistribution for the median voter declines and he/she tends to 
choose a lower tax rate by considering the disincentive effect of taxation.   
 In the simulation analysis below, an increase in income inequality is measured as 
a rise in 2σ .  We also perform simulations experimenting with various values of 
parameters in the model.   In all these various specifications, income inequality reduces 
the efficiency of redistributive institutions by increasing the gap between the decisive 
voter’s income and median income.  This result confirms our main idea that efficiency of 
redistributive institutions needs to be taken into account in analyzing income inequality 
and redistribution relationship. 
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2.4.4. When There is Uncertainty about an Individual’s Future Income and the 
Prospect of Upward Mobility   
 
The prospect of upward mobility hypothesis enables us to analyze the negative 
effect of income inequality on ERI without deviating from the median-voter hypothesis.  
Benabou and Ok (2001) have shown that the POUM hypothesis is totally consistent with 
rational expectations under certain premises.  In order for the POUM effect to influence 
redistribution, the authors first require some degree of persistence in redistributive 
policies.   In our context, this implies that ∗α  chosen in the first stage will not be changed 
in the second stage.  In this regard, our model is an improvement on Benabou’s and Ok’s 
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model to the extent that ERI are expected to be more persistent than a particular choice of 
tax rate.  Benabou’s and Ok’s second assumption requires that individuals are not too risk 
averse.  Since they also show that for a moderate degree of risk aversion, POUM 
hypothesis still holds, we abstract from risk aversion and assume a linear utility function 
in Equation 1.   The third and key premise is that tomorrow’s expected income is an 
increasing and concave function of today’s income.     
 Concavity of the expected transition function that links today’s income to 
expected future income is a rather natural property of decreasing returns: as current 
income rises, the odds for future income improve, but at a decreasing rate.  Concave 
transition functions are common in economic models and econometric specifications.  
Credit constraints and decreasing returns to capital accumulation, for instance, give rise 
to concave transition functions.  A log-linear AR(1) process of income dynamics, which 
is widely used in theoretical and empirical studies, has this concave transition property.   
In order to keep the aggregate income distribution constant while assuming 
concavity of expected income, Benabou and Ok (2001) add idiosyncratic shocks to the 
model.  Idiosyncratic shocks play a role in offsetting the skewness-reducing effect of a 
concave expected transition functions so as to maintain a positively skewed distribution 
of income realization.  In contrast to concavity of the transition function, skewness of 
idiosyncratic shocks in itself does nothing to reduce the demand for redistribution.  In 
particular, it does not affect the distribution of expected incomes.  The balance between 
concavity of the transition function and skewness of idiosyncratic shocks leads to over-
optimism of the poor about their income prospects.    
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In our model, concavity of expected income with respect to current income leads 
the median voter of the first stage to expect to be wealthier than the median voter of the 
second stage while idiosyncratic shocks keep the aggregate income distribution to remain 
invariant.  Hence, the tax rate chosen in the second stage will be greater than what is 
desired by the median voter of the first stage.  This result can be seen from Equation 5 
byEybyy
T
mm
1
)(1
11
1
1 +−≥+−=
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αα    because   mm yyE ≥)(  
In the first stage, the median voter takes this effect into account and chooses a 
lower ∗α  to reduce the tax rate that will be chosen by a future median voter.   
The more interesting question is whether this tendency of the median voter of the first 
stage to reduce ∗α  increases with income inequality.  The answer is affirmative.  Next, 
we follow Benabou and Ok (1998) to analyze the effects of income inequality on ∗α  
under the POUM framework12.  First, we use a Markov process example to explore the 
effects of income inequality on ERI.  Then, we introduce a log-linear log-normal 
specification. 
 
                                                 
12In terms of motivations, there is similarity between the prospect for upward mobility hypothesis and 
constitutional context of Buchanan and Tullock (1962). We explain their relevance of Buchanan and 
Tullock’s idea to our model extensively in the Appendix. But, we state here that uncertainty about future 
income leads the decisive voter to expect to have mean income when deciding on ∗α  in the first stage 
(constitutional stage). Therefore, in Buchanan and Tullock’s context, even the median voter wants to 
reduce ∗α  with increasing inequality in order to constrain redistribution in the second stage. 
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2.4.4.1. Markovian Example 
 
 We want to find income processes in which stationary distributions are positively 
skewed, but where the median voter nonetheless chooses to reduce ERI in response to 
increasing inequality.  We can demonstrate this result through a simple Markovian 
example.  We use the same Markov process that Benabou and Ok (2001) use in order to 
be compatible with earlier literature.  As an addition to their example, we introduce 
income inequality into the stochastic process by shifting income from the middle class to 
the wealthy and the poor.  This is rather stylized characterization of income inequality, 
and follows existing studies that positively associate the income share of middle class 
with a more equal income distribution (Perotti 1996, Benabou 1996, Milanovic 2000).   
 Income takes one of three values: },{ 32,1 aaaX =   with  321 aaa << .  The 
transition probabilities between those states are independent across agents and given by 
the Markov matrix: 
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−
−−
−
=
qq
spsps
rr
M
10
)1(1
01
 
where 4)1,0(),,,( ∈srqp . The unique probability vector π  that solves ππ =M  gives the 
invariant distribution induced by M over },{ 32,1 aaa  with mean 
3212211 )1( aaay ππππ −−++=  
 Benabou and Ok (2001) aim to show that the median voter’s expected income can 
exceed the mean income so that the median voter would be against redistribution.  They 
derive conditions on the mobility process and the associated steady state such that this is 
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true.  Our model does not require that the median voter’s income exceeds the mean 
income.  The key condition for these results to hold is that the median voter in the first 
stage expects to be wealthier than the median voter of the second stage.  Thus, we can 
relax some of Benabou and Ok’s assumptions.  But, in order to be compatible with their 
example, we adopt their Markovian process.  For the detailed discussion of sufficient 
conditions on ),,;,,,( 321 aaasrqp , one can refer to Benabou and Ok (1998).  When we 
modify their Markovian example and change income inequality, their conditions are 
always satisfied and the current median voter expects to be wealthier than the future 
median voter. 
 Benabou and Ok (2001, 1998) choose their specifications to match broad facts of 
the United States income distribution and intergenerational persistence.  Hence, they let 
55.=p , 6.=q , 5.=r  and 7.=s leading to the transition matrix: 
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
=
4.6.0
315.3.385.
05.5.
M  
and stationary distribution: )23,44,.33(.),,( 321 =πππ .  Thus, 77 percent of the population 
is always poorer than average.  They choose )91000,36000,16000(),( 32,1 =aaa  and 
obtain a rather good fit with the data.  This income process also has more persistence for 
lower and upper income groups than the middle class, which is consistent with the 
findings of Cooper, Durlauf, and Johnson (1998).  Given that our results primarily 
depend on the prospect of upward mobility for the median voter, note that this is rather 
nice characteristic in favor of our model.  In this example, the median voter expects to 
have $45,625 which is greater than the median income $36,000.   
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 Income inequality is increased by spreading the income to the tails.  Thus, 1a  and 
3a  are each increased by an amount of d .  In order to keep the mean income constant, 
middle class income is reduced by d
11
14 .  The new income distribution then, is 
characterized as )91000,
11
1436000,16000(),( 32,1 dddaaa +−+= .  Note that when 0=d  
the example is exactly the same as that of Benabou and Ok (2001).  When 0>d existing 
income inequality is further exaggerated and middle class income evaporates for higher 
values of  d .   
One can also note that 
dad
dddyE
tm
11
143600032.45625
)91000(*315.)
11
1436000(*3.)16000(*385.)(
2
1
−=>+
=++−++=+
 
for all 6−>d .   
Thus, even as we increase income inequality by increasing myy , the median voter still 
expects to be wealthier than the future median voter.  The following simulation results for 
this specification show that this increase in income inequality, further reduces the 
equilibrium ERI.  This conclusion is our next proposition: 
 
Proposition 5: 
When individuals have some prospect of upward mobility, an increase in income inequality reduces the 
equilibrium efficiency of redistributive institutions ∗α . 
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2.4.4.2. Log-Linear, Log-Normal Specification 
 
Now, Let the transition function be log-linear: pyyf θθ =);(  for all values of 
0≥y  and with )1,0(∈p ensuring strict concavity in y .  The log-linear specification is 
very common in the empirical literature on income or wage dynamics over the life cycle 
or across generations.  Individual incomes thus evolve according to the stochastic 
process: 
11
lnlnln ++ += ttt iii ypy θ   
t , 1+t  are the first and second stages, respectively. 
Both the initial income levels and the shocks are assumed to be log-normally distributed.   
),(ln 2tti Ny t σμ≈  and ),2(ln 22 ssNti −≈θ  
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Notice that )(
1+tiE θ  is normalized to 1 because 1)(
22
1
212 == +−+ ssi eE tθ .  
Everybody faces the same uncertain environment.  In other words, the current income is 
the only individual level state variable that helps predict future income.  With a log-linear 
specification of shocks, the cross-sectional distribution also remains log-normal over time 
and this is a good approximation to the actual income distribution.  Under this 
specification, the distribution of income has the following recursive equations for mean 
and variance: 
)(ln)(ln)(ln
11 ++ += ttt iii EypEyE θ   
which is equal to 
221 sp tt −=+ μμ  
and 
)var(ln)var(ln)var(ln
11
2
++ += ttt iii ypy θ  
or equivalently: 
2222
1 sp tt +=+ σσ . 
Note that tμ is the logarithm of median income )( tt eym μ= , whereas mean per 
capita income is given by 2
2
tteyt
σμ += . 
 
 
We analyze the case where the income distribution does not change over time, so 
that μμμ == +1tt  and 2122 σσσ == +tt .  From above equations, we obtain  2
2
2
1 p
s
−=σ      
and  
2
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Given this specification, notice that 222
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 The next question is what is the income level expected by the median voter in the 
first stage.  The median voter’s expected income is equal to  
p
mm
p
m
p
mmmm ttttttt
yEyyEyfE === +++ )()());(( 111 θθθ  because 1)( 1 =+tmE θ . 
The decisive voter again maximizes Equation 1 with respect to α  and finds a 
variant of Equation 7; 
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Note that the median voter maximizes his utility by considering his/her expected future 
income, inequality and median income of the second stage.   Simulation results below 
show that ∗α  declines with increasing inequality. 
 44
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
Figure-7 Income Inequality and Redistribution 
Log-Linear, Log-Normal Specification Prospect of Upward Mobility b=.5, p=.5
y/ym; inequality
α; 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
y/ym; inequality
T;
 ta
x 
ra
te
 
 
 45
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
0.5
1
1.5
Figure-8 Income Inequality and Redistribution 
Log-Linear, Log-Normal Specification Prospect of Upward Mobility b=.5, p=.8
y/ym; inequality
α; 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
y/ym; inequality
T;
 ta
x 
ra
te
 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
 This chapter investigates the relationship between income inequality and 
redistribution by addressing the role of income inequality on redistributive institutions.  
Existing literature analyzes the effects of income inequality on fiscal policy, 
sociopolitical instability and human capital13.  However, the effects of income inequality 
on institutions and in turn on redistribution have been overlooked so far in the existing 
studies.   
                                                 
13 For detailed account of these explanations, see, for instance, Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, and Swagel (1996), 
Drazen (2000), and Perrson and Tabellini (2002). 
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 We first take ERI as exogenously given and illustrate that ERI needs to be taken 
into account in analyzing the income inequality and redistribution relationship.  The 
model here shows that inefficiency in redistributive institutions reduces the incentive for 
redistribution that arises with income inequality.  Then, we address the question of how 
income inequality influences ERI.  We present a model with several specifications to 
analyze the effects of income inequality on redistributive institutions.  The results show 
that increasing inequality reduces the ERI (1) when ERI is a positive function of average 
income or (2) political influence on ERI is positively associated with income or (3) the 
median voter has some prospect of upward mobility.   The common element in these 
specifications is that income inequality not only increases the redistributive pressure and 
but also exaggerates the incentive to constrain the redistribution.  Hence, these two 
conflicting effects need to be considered in analyzing the income inequality and 
redistribution relationship.  Moreover, this approach can provide an explanation for the 
lack of strong empirical evidence in favor of a positive relationship between income 
inequality and redistribution, as implied by fiscal policy theories.  This chapter concludes 
that income inequality emerges as an important determinant of redistributive institutions 
and hence points out the need for exploring the income inequality issues from this 
perspective. 
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3. Chapter 3: The Role of Efficiency of Redistributive Institutions on 
Redistribution: An Empirical Assessment 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Countries with better bureaucratic quality and lower corruption14 also tend to have 
more redistributive government spending.  According to ICRG, Sweden has the highest 
possible scores both in bureaucratic quality (4) and control of corruption (6).  In addition 
to its high institutional quality, Sweden has redistributed almost 18 percent of its GDP in 
the form of social security and welfare expenditure over the last thirty years.  While, the 
Dominican Republic has only redistributed 0.8 percent of its GDP.  Indonesia has been 
even worse, redistributing just 0.27 percent during the same period.  The Dominican 
Republic and Indonesia have been also characterized by low institutional quality.  
Dominican Republic has only reached a score of 1.8 in bureaucratic quality and a score of 
3.3 in control of corruption. Indonesia has displayed an even worse record in these 
institutional aspects and has only received a 1.2 in bureaucratic quality and a 1.5 in 
control of corruption. Bureaucratic quality and control of corruption are the main 
indicators of how efficiently governments are run in these countries. These institutional 
                                                 
14 Several private companies and non-profit organizations issue evaluations of various dimensions of 
institutional quality for the countries.  The scores reported in this section of the paper are obtained from the 
International Country Risk Guide. Later in the paper, we give detailed descriptions of these institutional 
indicators, which are commonly used in the literature, and discuss them in more depth.   
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scores support the conventional understanding that Sweden has been ruled by better 
governments as compared to the Dominican Republic and Indonesia.    
Based on these observations, a natural question follows: whether there is a casual 
link from quality of institutions to aggregate redistribution in the economy.  Our 
theoretical model shows that the answer is YES.  The theoretical model confirms that a 
decline in the efficiency of redistributive institutions also restrains aggregate 
redistribution and suggests that the efficiency of redistributive institutions needs to be 
taken into account in analyzing the determinants of redistribution. 
Income inequality emerges as the main focus of attention in analyzing the 
determinants of redistribution in the political economy literature15.  However, our 
theoretical model points out that in addition to income inequality, the efficiency of 
redistributive institutions (ERI) plays an important role in determining the size of 
aggregate redistribution.  To this end, our model first differentiates two types of 
inefficiencies that take place in the process of taxation and redistribution stages, 
respectively.  The disincentive to work or accumulate factors of production in the 
taxation stage emerges as a first type of inefficiency and is already widely discussed in 
the existing studies of redistribution16.  Nonetheless, the second type of inefficiency 
appears to have received less attention in existing research.  This latter type of 
inefficiency takes place in the process of redistributing tax revenue back to society.  
                                                 
15 See, for instance, Bertola (1993, 1998), Banarjee and Newman (1993), Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), 
Perotti (1993), Perrson and Tabellini (1994), Galor and Zeira (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Aghion 
and Bolton (1997), Chiu (1998), Benabou (2000), Rigolini (2003). 
16 For an illustration of this form of inefficiency in existing studies, one can refer to McGuire and Olson 
(1996) and Harms and Zink (2003). 
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Contrary to existing theoretical models, it is self-evident that redistribution of tax revenue 
in practice is implemented by means of certain redistributive institutions.  Then, how 
efficiently these institutions are run emerges as a second type of potential inefficiency in 
redistribution.   
Our theoretical model incorporates this second type of inefficiency into existing 
models of income inequality and redistribution and shows that inefficiencies in 
redistributive institutions constrain the demand for redistribution.  Since a fraction of tax 
revenue is lost during the redistribution process, the median voter’s return from the 
redistribution declines.  Consequently, inefficiencies in redistributive institutions limit the 
redistributive pressure in the economy.   
Since existing econometric studies ignore the effect of efficiency of redistributive 
institutions on the size of aggregate redistribution, they suffer from an omitted variable 
bias.  Therefore, one of the major empirical implications of our theoretical model requires 
that in addition to income inequality and other control variables, ERI needs to be 
included in any econometric specifications of the redistribution equation.   In this chapter, 
we proceed in this direction and empirically analyze the role of ERI for redistributive 
spending.   
The literature on institutions and redistribution is scarce.  Empirical papers mainly 
concentrate on the role of income inequality for aggregate redistribution (e.g., Perotti, 
1996; Dalgaard et al., 2003).  This concerted interest partly stems from the motivation to 
test the existing theoretical models of income inequality and redistribution. However, 
there is very little research analyzing the effects of institutions on redistribution.  Ther are 
few papers that address the role of institutions on redistribution (such as Mauro, 1998 and 
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Betancourt and Gleason, 2000).  These papers, however, do not explore the effect of ERI 
on relationship between income inequality and redistribution.  Hence, this current paper 
attempts to integrate these separate strands of research and empirically investigate the 
impact of both ERI and income inequality on redistribution. This empirical specification 
is also necessary considering the possible omitted variable bias suggested in our 
theoretical model.  
In this chapter, redistribution is mainly measured with social security and welfare 
expenditures by the governments. This measure of redistribution is widely used in exiting 
studies of redistribution (Perotti, 1996; Dalgaard et al., 2003; Lindert, 1996).  Social 
security and welfare expenditure also better satisfies the assumption in theoretical papers 
that the poor are the principal beneficiaries of redistribution.  We mainly utilize the 
indices of ‘Quality of Bureaucracy’ and ‘Control of Corruption’ of the International 
Country Risk Guide to quantify efficiency of redistributive institutions.  These indicators 
provide a better proxy for ERI than data that measure other dimensions of institutions17.  
The underlying assumption in this selection of these institutional variables is that 
countries with high corruption and low bureaucratic quality are also characterized by less 
efficient functioning of redistributive institutions18.  
Our measures of ERI are incorporated into existing empirical specifications of 
income inequality and redistribution.  Cross-sectional and panel data regressions show 
that ERI significantly increases redistribution. This result is robust to alternative 
specifications of the empirical model as well as to alternative data sets.  However, we 
                                                 
17 We extensively discuss this issue later in the paper. 
18 The detailed discussion of variables used in this research is covered later in the paper. 
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find weaker evidence concerning the role of income inequality for redistribution.  Income 
inequality does not appear to be strongly significant in various specifications of the 
redistribution equation.  This result is similar to existing empirical results. When the 
measures of ERI are included in the empirical models, the coefficient of income 
inequality tends to get closer to the predictions of theoretical models of income inequality 
and redistribution.  Nonetheless, the coefficients of income inequality measures remain 
insignificant.  Based on this evidence, this chapter concludes that efficiency of 
redistributive institutions plays an important role in redistribution, but this effect does not 
seem to resolve the fiscal policy puzzle, which is emphasized in the theoretical chapter.  
In this regard, this chapter contributes the literature by confirming the existing findings 
on the effects of income inequality on redistribution and more importantly, it vigorously 
elucidates the importance of redistributive institutions to the size of redistribution. 
The plan of this chapter is the following:  In the next section, existing empirical 
models for redistribution and ERI are investigated to guide our empirical specification.  
Existing empirical studies reveal other determinants of redistribution and ERI, that need 
to be controlled for empirical estimations.  They also provide various alternative 
econometric specifications to test the effects of income inequality on ERI and 
redistribution.   Section 3 introduces the data used in this chapter.  Specially, data on the 
measures of redistribution and ERI are discussed in detail, and the reasons for using these 
data sets are given in this section.  Section 4 presents the cross-sectional and panel data 
empirical specifications and results.  Section 5 analyzes the determinants of efficiency of 
redistributive institutions and Section 6 concludes. 
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3.2. Determinants of Redistribution in the Literature 
 
 Initial papers addressing the income inequality and growth relationship base their 
theoretical explanations on redistributive pressure, emanating from higher income 
inequality.  This redistributive pressure explanation has been categorized by subsequent 
work as a fiscal policy approach.  Structural models of the fiscal policy approach require 
a redistribution equation to be estimated in addition to a growth equation.  However, 
empirical estimations typically adopt reduced form estimations to uncover the 
relationship between income inequality and growth (Perrson and Tabellini, 1994; Alesina 
and Rodrik, 1994). 
 Perotti (1996) appears to be the first researcher to address the fiscal policy 
channel with a structural empirical model.  Hence, his paper is taken to be the benchmark 
for later studies.  In Perotti's empirical specifications, growth and redistribution arise as 
two endogenous variables.   In line with the theoretical models of the fiscal policy 
approach, a measure of income distribution enters into the redistribution equation along 
with other control variables.  Various measures of redistribution are treated as exogenous 
variables in the growth equation.  This type of estimation definitely represents a more 
precise test of existing fiscal policy models.  Perotti employs several different variables to 
measure the redistribution formulated by the theoretical models.  His measures include 
types of government expenditures that are explicitly redistributive in nature.  Hence, 
Perotti uses data on social security and welfare, health, housing, and education 
expenditures, compiled by Easterly and Rebello (1993).   He also includes various 
measures of taxation, such as average and marginal tax rates, and average shares of labor 
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and income taxation in GDP to account for the distortionary effects redistributive 
pressure on growth. 
 On the right hand side of the redistribution equation, the share of income accruing 
to the middle-class income enters into the equation.  Perotti uses the share in income of 
the third and fourth quintiles as a proxy for a more equal distribution of income.  Per 
capita GDP in 1960 is included to control for the conventional notion suggested by 
Wagner’s Law that government expenditure is a luxury good.  Hence, countries with 
higher GDP per capita are expected to spend more for redistribution.  The share of 
population over 65 years of age, POP65, is also an important demographic variable in 
affecting the size of redistribution.  The older the population, the higher the demand for 
social security.  Hence, Perotti controls for the age structure of population which is 
especially important considering that the correlation between income inequality and 
POP65 is high in practice.  Since the theoretical models are based on the assumption that 
the median voter decides on the tax rate and the corresponding redistribution, Perotti 
controls for the degree of democracy in the society.  Democracy is expected to enter into 
the redistribution equation with a positive sign.  Moreover, in several specifications, an 
interaction term between the middle-class share, and democracy is employed to test the 
predictions of the fiscal policy models that income inequality has a larger impact on 
redistribution in democracies. 
 Perotti’s empirical estimations are based on cross-sectional data comprising at 
most 54 countries.  His results show that income distribution plays essentially no role in 
the average marginal tax rate equation.  However, this finding in itself is not sufficient to 
invalidate the fiscal policy approach.  Given that the impact of income distribution on 
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government expenditure and taxation sould be felt more strongly in democracies, Perotti 
includes an interaction term, MID*DEM as well as the dummy for democracy.  The 
theory predicts that the coefficient of MID*DEM should be negative and that the sum of 
coefficients of MID and MID*DEM should be negative, too.  The point estimates of his 
specifications confirm both of these predictions.  In democracies, inequality has a large 
effect on redistribution, while in non-democracies this effect is essentially zero.  
However, the relevant coefficients are not even close to being significant.  POP65 has a 
positive and significant coefficient as expected,  while initial GDP per capita appears to 
have a negative and insignificant coefficient.  These patterns persist when various other 
measures of redistribution are used, such as the average share of labor and income 
taxation in GDP, social security and welfare expenditure, housing and health care 
expenditure, and finally education expenditure.  Given these empirical findings, Perotti 
concludes that there seems to be weak empirical support for standard models of the effect 
of income distribution on fiscal policy. 
 Dalgaard et al. (2001, 2003), in a series of papers, attribute the weak relationship 
between income inequality and redistribution to the nature of cross-sectional regressions.  
They claim that weak correlations between income inequality and redistribution may 
emerge in a cross-section of countries, while within any one economy greater inequality 
leads to more redistribution.  Hence, they present the following explanation for what they 
call the "fiscal policy puzzle".  They first demonstrate that countries differ with respect to 
their level of productivity.  In the original fiscal policy models, income shares of capital 
and labor are constant.  In contrast, they use a more general formulation, which allows 
factor shares to vary with the level of productivity.  Dalgaard et al. also present evidence 
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that the labor share of total income is higher in countries with a higher level of 
productivity.  This analysis indicates that as countries improve their productivity, their 
labor share in production increases, and in turn the income distribution becomes more 
equal.  Therefore, when high productivity countries tend to have more equal distribution 
of income, the correlation between income inequality and redistribution, across countries 
may not be conclusive, because the marginal cost of public spending tends to be low in 
countries with a relatively high level of productivity.  It is then possible that a majority in 
the electorate would prefer a relatively high level of government activity in spite of a 
more equal distribution of income, while public expenditure is less desired in countries 
with low productivity19. Given these considerations, a more precise relationship between 
income inequality and redistribution can be derived with panel data estimations.  
 The empirical sections of these papers attempt to provide a test of this 
explanation.  Invoking panel data techniques, they disentangle the time series variation in 
income inequality and measures of redistribution from the cross-section variation.  As in 
Perotti (1996), Dalgaard et al. (2001) use social security, health, and housing 
expenditures as dependent variables in addition to the share of income and property taxes 
in GDP.  GDP per capita, the share of population over 65 years of age and the income 
share of the middle class appear as exogenous variables in their panel data regressions.  
Moreover, they augment Perotti’s specification by adding trade openness to account for 
the idea that more open countries redistribute more to protect against external shocks 
(Rodrik, 1998).   
                                                 
19 Our theoretical paper shares the same result that public expenditures are desired more by the electorate 
when it is more productive due to the efficiency of redistributive institutions prevailing in the economy.  
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In Dalgaard et al. (2003), the authors conduct similar estimations just for 19 
OECD countries over a period of 1971-1995 by averaging the data over five years.  
Unlike the previous study, they control for the size of population and the dependency 
ratio instead of trade openness and POP65.  In this paper, they only use the share of 
income and property taxes as their dependent variables.  They find that the impact of the 
middle class income share on taxes is positive and significant across countries.  However, 
the estimated "time series effect" is negative and significant in accordance with their 
theory.  As a result, they conclude that there is still evidence in favor of the traditional 
fiscal policy approach when time series information is examined; whereas, the puzzling 
weak relationship only emerges due to the cross-country dimension of the data.  Their 
within-country estimates are also broadly consistent with the independent findings of 
Milanovic (2000),  who brings evidence from the Luxemburg Income Study (LIS) that 
redistribution does indeed benefit the poor at least for the countries covered in the LIS.  
As one moves upward among the income deciles, net income transfers appear to be 
decreasing in these surveys.   
Another piece of supportive evidence for a positive relationship between 
inequality and redistribution comes from Sylwester (2000).  Using pure cross-section 
regression analysis, Sylwester finds that more inequality in 1970 is associated with a 
higher level of educational expenditures.  Lindert (1996), however, provides evidence 
against the Metzler-Richard hypothesis of a positive relationship between income 
inequality and redistribution.  His estimation relies on panel data of social spending in 
OECD countries between 1960-1981.  Lindert finds that the greater the distance between 
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the middle class and the poor (higher inequality), the lower the political tendency to 
spend on any major type of social program. 
Borge and Rattso (2004) emphasize that the Metzler-Richard hypothesis should 
be investigated in a more homogenous setting with comparable institutions.  To this end, 
they exploit a new data set on poll taxes and property taxes at the local government level 
in Norway.  They assume that the tax structure is the main instrument of redistributive 
politics.  Given that property tax liability is highly positively correlated with income, an 
increase in property taxes relative to poll taxes is indicative of more redistributive 
pressure.  They find that more equal income distribution leads to less redistribution by 
shifting local financing from property taxes to the poll tax.  Their estimated model 
confirms the conventional understanding of fiscal theory that higher income inequality 
shifts the tax structure from poll tax to property taxes and thereby leads to more 
redistribution in Norway. 
Corcoran and Evans (2004) also provide evidence in favor of a median voter 
hypothesis in a more homogeneous setting.  They point out that income inequality in 
school districts has risen 16 percent in the US since 1969. They analyze the effects of this 
rising inequality trend on school financing.  Local per-pupil public education spending 
increases with rising income inequality within districts in their panel data regressions. 
Rigolini (2003) suggests that the mechanisms underlying redistribution vary 
significantly between democratic and non-democratic regimes.  He first illustrates that 
there seems to be a weak and inexistent relationship between inequality and redistribution 
in democratic countries.  However, redistribution under autocratic regimes displays an 
inverted-U shape relationship with respect to overall income inequality.  He attributes 
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this relationship in autocratic countries to the idea that redistribution in autocratic regimes 
is often exercised to avoid social conflict.  Then, Rigolini develops a theoretical model to 
justify this inverted-U relationship in autocratic countries.  His model considers 
redistribution as an outcome of three forces in the society: the degree of inequality, the 
degree of poverty, and the degree of state repression of political activity, which depends 
on the type of political regime.  In accordance with the simple observations, Rigolini's 
model generates an inverted-U relationship between inequality and redistribution in 
autocracies; whereas, an ambiguous relationship is derived for democracies.  In the 
empirical sections of his papers, Rigolini uses the shares of government expenditure and 
education expenditure in GDP as proxies for redistribution and finds evidence in line 
with his theoretical model.  Income inequality seems to be insignificant for the entire 
sample, especially for democratic countries in affecting redistribution.  However, income 
inequality has a positive but declining role in the redistribution spending of autocratic 
countries.   
Bassett et al. (1999) retest existing studies on the income distribution and 
redistribution relationship using several alternative definitions and an income inequality 
dataset compiled by Deininger and Squire (1996).  Their results resemble the findings of 
Perotti (1996).  More interestingly, they also introduce the possibility that political 
influence is a positive function of income.  Their results indicate that for certain 
parameters of their model, when the income share of the decisive voter (not the median 
voter) rises, various measures of redistribution decline.   
The central variable of interest in the redistribution literature is income inequality.  
Some existing papers attempt to account for the possible endogeneity of the income 
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distribution by instrumental variable estimation.  Papers analyzing the redistribution 
equation in more homogeneous settings are more successful in finding plausible 
instruments for income inequality.  Corcoran and Evans (2004) instrument for within-
district inequality with a measure of income distribution from another nearby school 
district.  Borge and Rattso (2004), on the other hand, choose regional industrial structure 
in 1990 as an instrument for income inequality.  They argue that the industrial structure 
plays a role for income distribution but not for the particular choice of tax structure (more 
reliance on poll or property taxes).     
Papers addressing the income inequality and redistribution relationship in more 
heterogeneous settings with cross-country data have more difficulty in solving the 
potential endogeneity of income distribution measures.  Dalgaard et al. (2003) attempt to 
instrument for income inequality with initial GDP per capita and time dummies in their 
panel data regressions.  However, they do not explain their arguments for the choice of 
these instruments.  In their earlier paper, Dalgaard et al. do not even mention the possible 
endogeneity issues.  This approach seems to be a general tendency in earlier papers as 
well.  Perotti (1996), Lindert (1996) and Bassett et al. (1999), for example, do not even 
discuss instrumenting their income inequality measures.   
The inability of existing literature to account for the endogeneity of income 
inequality stems from the lack of consensus on the right instruments for income 
inequality across countries.  Rigolini (2003) acknowledges potential problems with the 
endogeneity of income distribution but fails to find a proper instrument for it.  Following 
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000), Rigolini employs dummies for oil and non-oil 
commodity exporters as well as tropical location as an instrument for income inequality.  
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However, he finds that none of the explanatory variables in his estimations is consistently 
significant.  Hence, he chooses not to report these results.   
It is apparent from the aforementioned research20 that the role of redistributive 
institutions in determining the size and the composition of public spending has not really 
been investigated in analyzing the income inequality and redistribution relationship.  
However, a separate branch of the redistribution literature shows the importance of the 
quality of existing institutions in redistribution.  Mauro (1998), for example, studies the 
effects of corruption as an indicator of quality of institutions on the size and composition 
of government expenditure.  His empirical results reveal that corruption alters the 
composition of government expenditure, especially by reducing government spending on 
education.  He interprets this result as evidence that more corrupt countries choose to 
spend less on education, because education provides less lucrative opportunities for 
government officials to rent seek21.   
Betancourt and Gleason (2000) provide further evidence for the importance of 
institutional structure in the size and allocation of publicly provided goods to rural 
households in India.  Their empirical findings lead them to conclude that district 
characteristics in rural India that capture the bureaucratic aspects of redistribution play a 
robust and systematic role in determining the allocation of medical inputs to rural areas of 
districts.   
                                                 
20 See Table 1 for the summary of results of papers on income inequality and redistribution. 
21 Moreover, Evrenk (2003), in a theoretical paper, shows that corruption increases the size of government.  
In his model, even the low income non-evaders prefer to live under a large government with corruption, 
rather than a small and clean one given that they disproportionately benefit from higher government 
spending. 
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This class of papers does not analyze the relationship between redistribution and 
income inequality.  However, they shed light on the key role of efficiency of 
redistributive institutions in affecting the aggregate redistribution, consistent with our 
theoretical model.  Hence, in our empirical estimations we account for the efficiency of 
redistributive institutions in addition to measures of income inequality and other control 
variables used in the literature. 
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Table 3.1. Literature on 
Income Inequality and 
Redistribution 
Measure of 
Redistribution 
Inequality to 
Redistribution 
Strength of 
Results 
Authors    
Persson & Tabellini 
(1992)  Transfers pos. 
consistent sign 
but generally 
insignificant 
    
Easterly and Rebelo 
(1993) Education pos. 
consistent sign, 
sometimes 
significant 
    
Keefer & Knack (1995) Transfers and tax rates neg. 
consistent sign 
but generally 
insignificant 
    
Lindert (1996) 
All government 
expenditure neg. insig. 
 Nonsocial exp. neg. sig. 
 All social expenditure pos. insign. 
 Pensions  neg. insign. 
 Welfare pos. sign. 
 
Unemployment 
compensation pos. sign. 
 Education  pos. insign. 
 Health care neg. insign. 
    
Perotti (1996) Marginal tax rate pos. insign. 
 
Average labor income 
tax rate pos. insign. 
 
Average personal 
income tax rate  pos. insign. 
 
Social Security and 
Welfare Exp. pos. insign. 
 Housing Exp. pos. insign. 
 Education Exp.  pos. insign. 
    
Sylwester (2000) Education Exp. pos. sign. 
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Table 3.1. (cont) Authors 
Measure of 
Redistribution 
Inequality to 
Redistribution 
Strength of 
Results 
    
Dalgaard, Hansen & 
Larsen (2001) 
Social Security and 
Welfare Exp. neg. insign. 
 Health Care Exp. pos. insign. 
 Housing Exp. pos. insign. 
 Education Exp. pos. sign. 
 Income taxes neg. insign. 
 Property taxes pos. insign. 
    
Dalgaard, Hansen & 
Larsen (2003) Income taxes neg. sign. 
 Property taxes neg. sign. 
 Education Exp. pos. sign. 
    
Rigolini (2003) 
Total Government 
Expenditure minus 
military spending neg. pos. insign. 
 Education exp. neg. pos. insign. 
    
Milanovic (2000) Transfer pos. sign. 
    
Bassett, Burkett & 
Putterman (1999) 
Social Security and 
welfare exp. pos. neg. sign. insign. 
 Education Exp. pos. neg. sign. insign. 
    
Borge & Rattso (2004) Poll Tax neg. sign. 
 Property Tax pos. sign. 
    
Corcoran & Evans (2004) Education Exp. pos. sign. 
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3.3. Bringing the Theory to the Data 
 
Our theoretical model relies on two fundamental variables.  The first is aggregate 
redistribution and the second is the efficiency of redistributive institutions (ERI).  In this 
section, we explain how one can find data that correspond to these variables in practice.  
Since the models are highly stylized, it is somewhat easier to define these concepts in 
theory.  For example in the model, aggregate revenue from a flat income tax rate is 
considered to be redistributed back to the society.  In this regard, governments in our 
theoretical model exist only to redistribute income.  However, this type of 
characterization of governments in practice is definitely incomplete.  Even in most 
democratic countries, governments are not established solely for the sake of transferring 
income to the poor.  For instance, governments spend for safety and protection in the 
form of military and police expenditure.  Some government expenditure is intended to 
promote growth and development.  In this regard, government spending for research and 
innovation or investment for infrastructure cannot be solely characterized as 
redistributive expenses.   Hence, it would be a mistake to consider total government 
outlays as redistributive spending in empirical testing of the theoretical model.   
Given these considerations, we must find types of government expenditures that 
are redistributive in their nature in order to better test the role of efficiency of 
redistributive institutions in redistribution.  IMF Government Financial Statistics (GFS) 
provides disaggregated data on government expenditure.  GFS classifies the aggregate 
expenses according to the functions of government.  Among others, this classification 
includes spending for defense, economic affairs, transportation, energy, education, health 
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care and social security and welfare expenditures.  Existing literature typically 
categorizes expenditures on education, heath care, housing and social security and 
welfare as redistribution expenditures (Perotti, 1996; Dalgaard et al., 2001; Rigolini, 
2003).  In this empirical chapter, social security and welfare expenditures are also used to 
proxy redistribution22.  In the theoretical model, redistribution is intended to benefit the 
poor more than the wealthy.  Social security and welfare expenditures satisfy this 
assumption better.  The poor are more likely to receive funds allocated for social 
protection.  Education expenditure, health expenditures and, to a certain extent, housing 
expenditures also tend to benefit the poor.  However, these expenditures may also arise 
from other motivations as well.  For example, investment on education has growth 
enhancing effects and contains supplementary positive externalities for the entire 
economy.  Therefore, in the empirical analysis, we mainly rely on social security and 
welfare expenditures to measure redistribution for the poor.   
The second vital parameter in our theoretical model is the efficiency of 
redistributive institutions.  Any type of redistribution requires some institutions or 
government branches.  For example, in order to carry out redistribution to the poor, social 
security and welfare administrations, or other branches of government, need to be 
established.  Then, the question is how efficiently these institutions are operated.  Our 
theoretical model indicates that when these redistributive institutions fail to operate 
                                                 
22 In the theoretical model, the tax revenue is redistributed back to the society equally.  In this respect, it 
may be better to represent the redistribution only with social security expenditure because the median voter 
may not benefit from the government’s welfare spending and hence opposes to any welfare expenditure but 
not to the social security expenditure.  However, in the data set social security and welfare expenditure is 
not provided separately. 
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efficiently, the poor benefit less from taxation and the redistribution process and hence 
demand less redistribution in light of the deadweight losses from redistributive taxation.   
The main issue then is to quantify the efficiency of redistributive institutions in 
practice.  The ideal data would provide an index of quality of redistributive institutions 
for various countries.  Unfortunately, there is no such data for most of the countries.  
However, there exist certain governance indicators that provide proxy for the ERI in our 
theoretical model.   Having said that, however, this does not exactly match our definition 
of ERI.  Distinguishing various aspects of governance is crucial because governance and 
institutions concepts are sometimes used such a general manner that it becomes hard to 
pinpoint their different dimensions. Existing governance indicators actually capture 
different aspects of governance and institutions.  For example, some widely used 
indicators capture democratic accountability and inclusiveness of governance such as the  
Political Rights and Civil Liberties indices of Gastil / Freedom House or the Polity IV 
variables.   On the other hand, measures of the rule of law, political stability, and 
regulatory quality provide information on other aspects of governance.   Our theoretical 
model draws attention to a particular feature of governance namely, the ‘efficiency of 
redistributive institutions’.   Therefore, in order to appropriately test the implication of 
the model, we utilize existing governance indices that come closest to our definition of 
ERI.      
The international Country Risk Guide (ICRG) provides precious information on 
the different aspects of governance starting in 1984.  In order to find a good proxy for 
ERI, it is important to realize the distinction among these various indicators of 
governance.  Table 3.2 reports the different governance indicators of ICRG and their 
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correlations.  Among these indices, ‘quality of bureaucracy’ and ‘control of corruption’ 
arguably represent the ERI better than the other indices.   
Countries where bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without 
drastic changes or interruptions in policy receive higher points for this index.  Countries 
with a higher score in quality of bureaucracy score tend to have bureaucracies that are 
autonomous from political pressure.   An established mechanism for recruitment and 
training increases the quality of bureaucracy score.  Civil servants tend to have more 
competence when they are less subject to political pressure in their daily operations as 
well as in the process of their recruitment.  Countries with higher scores are also expected 
to provide better quality of public service in their day-to-day administrative function.  In 
our context, efficiency of institutions is very much related to the quality of bureaucracy, 
given that the latter indicates not only more qualified employees but also better 
administrative structure of these institutions in delivering redistribution.  The ICRG’s 
quality of bureaucracy index ranges between 0 and 4 where a higher point represents 
better bureaucratic quality. 
Corruption, on the other hand, is conventionally defined as the exercise of public 
power for private gain.  It reduces the efficiency of government by enabling people to 
assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability and increases instability 
in public administration.  This index is concerned with actual or potential corruption in 
the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, reciprocal favors, and 
suspiciously close ties between politics and business.  In the ICRG data set, this index 
ranges between 0 and 6, where higher scores indicate more control over corruption.  In 
our model, corruption is associated with lower ERI.  In more corrupt countries, a higher 
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fraction of government revenue would be lost during the process of redistribution.   
Redistributive institutions would invest more in wasteful projects, which benefit the poor 
less but provide high returns for corrupt officers. 
Other ICRG indicators of governance are likely to affect aggregate redistribution 
as well.  However, as it is apparent from their definitions23, these indices of governance 
do not primarily capture redistributive efficiency.  Even though they are widely used in 
the literature, the Government Stability, Military in Politics, Religious Tensions, External 
and Internal Conflict indicators, for example, do not really match our definition of ERI.  
The investment Profile index measures contract viability and expropriation, profit 
repatriation and payment delays and hence is more related to investment climate and less 
related to redistribution.   
Beside the ICRG indices, other organizations such as the Heritage Foundation and 
the Fraser institute also report indicator of the quality of governance.  Kaufmann et al. 
(2003) construct six governance indicators based on several hundred variables measuring 
perceptions of governance.  These indicators are drawn from 25 separate data sources 
from 18 different organizations. Among their governance indicators, ‘government 
effectiveness’ and ‘control of corruption’ come closest to representing our ERI24.   In the 
construction of these indicators, they also use quality of bureaucracy variable from ICRG 
to construct their ‘government effectiveness’ cluster.  Similarly, Kaufmann et al. also use 
the corruption index from ICRG to form their “control of corruption” cluster.  However, 
                                                 
23 Formal descriptions of these variables by ICRG are given in the Appendix.  
24 Their other governance indicators also include ‘Voice and Accountability’, ‘Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence’, ‘Regulatory Quality’, and ‘Rule of Law’. 
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since they attempt to use some other sources as well to construct these indices, their 
governance data only span four data points after 1996 with two-year intervals.  Kaufmann 
et al. also incorporate the government stability variable of ICRG in constructing 
government effectiveness.  We prefer to use the original sources in constructing our 
measure of ERI.  For example, the government stability index of ICRG is also included in 
constructing the ‘government effectiveness variable.  This index is likely to be influential 
in affecting redistribution but it does not directly capture our idea of ERI.  Hence, we 
exclude this index in constructing our measure of ERI. 
In this study, we primarily resort to ‘Quality of Bureaucracy’ and ‘Corruption’ 
indices from ICRG to represent ERI.   These two variables share a high correlation 
coefficient (0.73) as is seen in Table 3.2.   Since they capture somewhat different but 
highly related aspect of redistributive institutions, we construct an index from these two 
indicators using principal component analysis and call it our ‘efficiency of redistributive 
institutions’ variable.   
At a first glance, the ‘quality of bureaucracy’ index seems to fit better our 
definition of ERI.  The index of ‘control of corruption’ seems to be redundant due to the 
quite reasonable understanding that better quality of bureaucracy has to incorporate less 
corruption by its nature.  However, ICRG constructs these indices to capture different 
aspects of quality of governance.  To grasp this idea better, one may think of a country 
with a high bureaucratic quality.  Let’s say that this high quality of bureaucracy is 
achieved because of the reasons given in the definition of ‘quality of bureaucracy’ index.  
Officers are recruited on the basis of meritocracy.  They have high competence and 
education as it is in the case for bureaucrats in many developing countries.  Moreover, 
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they are autonomous from political pressure.  These are the aspects of governance that 
are covered by ‘quality of bureaucracy’ index of ICRG.  However, it is possible that in 
spite of these characteristics, the bureaucracy can be still corrupt, for various reasons for 
this outcome.  For example, inadequate economic incentives given to the bureaucrats may 
induce them to indulge in corrupt conduct.  Weak enforcement of laws reduces the 
opportunity cost of corruption even for high quality bureaucrats.       
Given these considerations, we generate our index of ERI by combining the 
‘quality of bureaucracy’ and ‘control of corruption’ indices from ICRG.  However, in 
testing the sensitivity of our results, the arithmetic average of these variables are 
employed in addition to using these variables separately. 
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Quality of 
Bureaucracy  1.00            
Corruption 0.73 1.00           
Socioeconomic 
Conditions  0.55 0.40 1.00          
Religious Tensions  0.34 0.40 0.15 1.00         
Military in Politics 0.62 0.65 0.34 0.50 1.00        
Law and Order  0.68 0.69 0.43 0.47 0.61 1.00       
Investment Profile  0.43 0.29 0.55 0.19 0.39 0.38 1.00      
Internal Conflict  0.50 0.54 0.35 0.53 0.64 0.77 0.35 1.00     
Government 
Stability  0.31 0.24 0.24 0.16 0.32 0.44 0.67 0.41 1.00    
External Conflict  0.29 0.34 0.21 0.53 0.44 0.49 0.26 0.60 0.27 1.00   
Ethnic Tensions  0.34 0.41 0.23 0.51 0.46 0.54 0.25 0.65 0.31 0.43 1.00  
Democratic 
Accountability 0.66 0.68 0.33 0.42 0.67 0.62 0.41 0.56 0.31 0.42 0.40 1.00 
Source: International Country Risk Guide 2004         
   
 
The income distribution data in this chapter needs special mentioning. Most of the 
recent papers use the Deininger and Squire (1996) data set for income inequality 
(Rigolini, 2003; Dalgaard et al. 2001, 2003; Forbes, 2000; and many others).  Studies 
prior to the release of this data set contained data of arguably dubious quality.  Persson 
and Tabellini (1994), for example, make use of the income distribution data compiled by 
Paukert (1973).  On the other hand, Perotti (1996) obtains his data mostly from Jain 
(1975) and Lecaillon et al. (1984). Many of the observations in these studies, however, 
fail to meet the ‘high quality’ criteria of Deininger and Squire.  In order to be included in 
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Deininger and Squire’s ‘high quality’ data set, the data derived from the existing surveys 
of income and expenditure distribution have to satisfy three main criteria.  The data must 
come from household surveys, rather than being derived from national account statistics.  
The population covered in the surveys must be representative of the whole population 
rather than covering a certain segment of population like the urban population or wage 
earners only.  Moreover, the measure of income or expenditure must include income 
from self employment, nonwage earnings and nonmonetary income.  
Deininger and Squire’s data set cover income distribution data up to 1996. 
Recently, the United Nations University/World Institute for Development Economics 
Research has compiled the World Income Inequality Database (WIID).  This database is 
available online and is planned to be published in summer 2005, and contains robust data 
that are measured consistently.  It extends the   Deininger and Squire data set and is more 
comprehensive, including almost twice as many observations. 
In this chapter, we use primarily the income inequality data, compiled by the 
research department of the World Bank.  Dollar and Kraay (2002) describe this data set 
as the most reliable source of data on income inequality.  When multiple observations are 
reported in existing data sets, this data set only includes the better quality data. Moreover, 
it also includes current estimates of income distribution based on the consistent World 
Bank surveys in recent years.  In addition to this data set, we extend our sample of 
observations by using the World Income Inequality Database of the United Nations. In 
extending our sample of countries, we have been extremely vigilant so that our final 
income inequality data set has only includes ‘high quality’ data according to criteria of 
Deininger and Squire (1996).  
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Other key control variables in the regressions come from various sources.  The 
degree of democracy is derived from the Gastil/Freedom House and Polity IV.  Real GDP 
per capita in purchasing power parity terms is obtained from Version 6 of the Penn World 
Tables.  The percentage of population above 65 years old is provided by the World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank.   
 Since political economy models of income inequality and redistribution are 
mainly based on the median voter hypothesis, existing empirical models account for the 
degree of democracy in the country.  In more democratic counties, the median voter is 
assumed to have more political power as compared to autocratic regimes.  Hence, 
existing political economy models predict a positive relationship between the measures of 
democracy and redistribution. However, empirical studies fail to find strong evidence that 
democratic countries redistribute more (Perotti, 1996; Rigolini, 2003).   This study 
employs two primary sources to control for the degree of democracy across countries and 
time.  The Polity variable from Polity IV measures the extent of democracy, based on the 
institutional characteristics of politics in countries. Countries are first given points based 
on various criteria that capture different requirements for democracy.  Later, these points 
are aggregated to determine the overall democracy score of the country25.   
We also use the Gastil/Freedom House data set to control for democracy in the 
sensitivity analysis of our empirical results.  This democracy indicator is composed of 
two subcomponents Political Rights and Civil Liberties.  Each year, countries are rated 
                                                 
25 See the Appendix for the definition of Polity variable given by Polity IV. 
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based on these somewhat subjective criteria.  Then, the arithmetic average of these two 
variables is reported as a proxy for the level of democracy in the country26.   
 The percentage of the population above 65 years old captures the idea that many 
of the primary recipients of social security and welfare expenditures are the people above 
a certain age.  Hence, all the previous empirical studies account for this variable.  The 
correlation between income inequality and the share of population above 65 is (-0.47).  
Perotti (1996) states that age structure of the population is likely to be correlated with 
income distribution for two reasons: First, inequality is lower among people above 65 
years old.  Secondly, their average income is low as well.  As a result, their demand for 
social security is high in spite of low income inequality. Hence, omitting this age 
structure variable would bias the coefficient of income distribution downward.    
GDP per capita in purchasing power parity terms is included as a control variable 
to capture “Wagner’s law” that redistribution is a luxury good.  On the other hand, when 
average income increases, the number of people dependent on the government’s income 
assistance declines.  When social security and welfare expenditures are used as a proxy 
for redistribution, the latter effect is likely to dominate.  Summary statistics and the 
correlation matrix of cross-section averages of variables in our sample are reported in 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4, respectively.   
                                                 
26 The Appendix provides the formal descriptions of these variables given by Gastil/Freedom House.  
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Table 3.3. Summary Statistics        
      
Variable 
 # of 
Coun. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
      
Social Security and Welfare Expenditure 63 6.26 5.50 0.05 19.92
ERI 63 -0.22 1.11 -2.60 2.12 
Inequality 63 42.09 8.38 24.16 63.65
Democracy/ Polity IV 63 3.37 6.14 -9.00 10.00
Democracy/ Gastil 63 1.66 0.59 1.00 3.00 
Real GDP per capita PPP 63 8.59 0.82 6.33 10.10
% of pop. above 65 63 7.55 4.44 2.48 16.61
Bureaucratic Quality 63 2.28 1.01 0.29 4.00 
Control of Corruption 63 3.41 1.18 0.90 6.00 
Education, Heath Care and Social Security 
& Welfare Expenditure 62 10.50 6.62 0.44 27.20
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Social 
Security and 
Welfare 
Expenditure 1.00          
ERI 0.42 1.00         
Inequality -0.43 -0.13 1.00        
Democracy/ 
Polity IV 0.44 0.55 -0.10 1.00       
Democracy/ 
Gastil -0.40 -0.57 0.07 -0.87 1.00      
Real GDP 
per capita 
PPP  0.55 0.68 -0.18 0.57 -0.56 1.00     
% of pop. 
above 65 0.90 0.46 -0.47 0.56 -0.48 0.65 1.00    
Bureaucratic 
Quality 0.35 0.93 -0.14 0.51 -0.53 0.68 0.41 1.00   
Control of 
Corruption 0.44 0.92 -0.10 0.50 -0.53 0.57 0.44 0.71 1.00  
Education, 
Heath Care 
and Social 
Security & 
Welfare 
Expenditure 0.91 0.40 -0.41 0.41 -0.42 0.53 0.80 0.35 0.39 1.00
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3.4. Estimation Specification and Cross-Section Regressions 
 
Redistribution is our main endogenous variable in the model.  Other central 
variables in the model are income inequality and ERI.  Hence, in all variants, we regress 
the ratio of redistributive transfers to GDP on the measures of income inequality, the 
proxy for ERI and additional control variables.  Hence, the following equation is the 
basic form underlying the estimation: 
 
iiiii XinequalityERIRD εαααα ++++= 13210   (1) 
 
Where i  corresponds to countries and iε  represents a country error term.  As explained 
in the previous section, social security and welfare expenditures as a fraction of aggregate 
GDP is the dependent variable, RD .  ERI  stands for the efficiency of redistributive 
institutions and is a combined index of ‘quality of bureaucracy’ and ‘control of 
corruption’ variables from ICRG.  Income inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient, 
inequality .  The vector of control variables, 1X  includes log real GDP per capita in 
purchasing power parity terms, rgdpchln , the degree of democracy, polity  and the 
percentage of population over 65 years old, 65pop .  Regional dummies are also included 
in order to account for unobservable regional characteristics.  These are the standard 
control variables that are commonly used in existing empirical studies as explained in the 
previous two sections.  
To begin, we run cross-section OLS regressions to uncover the effects of 
efficiency of redistributive institutions on social security and welfare expenditure.  Strong 
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arguments exist that quality of institutions evolves slowly and short-term changes in 
institutional indices may not reflect actual changes in institutions.  Moreover, other right-
hand side variables like the income distribution measures and the age structure of 
population also change slowly over time.  These considerations justify the cross-country 
analysis of existing data.   
Hauk and Wacziarg (2004) also acknowledge that when omitted variables are 
correlated with the explanatory variables, a fixed effect panel data estimator 
unambiguously dominates the cross-section OLS estimator.  However, in the presence of 
measurement error, fixed effects estimators tend to exaggerate measurement error bias.  
In this regard, they analyze whether the gains from reducing omitted variables bias are 
offset by an increase in the measurement error bias under fixed effects. They assert that 
“when potential for omitted variables bias coexists with measurement error, a cure for the 
first problem can be worse than the disease, as it may exacerbate the second”27.   Their 
simulation results confirm that cross-sectional estimators perform much better than the 
more state-of-art panel alternatives.  Hence, they conclude that the use of panel data 
estimation methods leads to unreliable estimates when measurement error is present and 
OLS on cross-sectional averages is a better choice.   
Given these considerations, the average values of all the variables are employed 
in cross-sectional regressions.  This sample averaging reduces possible measurement 
problems by smoothing out the observations.  Western European countries are widely 
known to have strong welfare states.  This region is the reference category for regional 
                                                 
27 Hauk and Wacziarg (2004) p. 4.  
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dummies in the regression specifications and it constitutes the basis of comparison for 
other regions. 
In averaging the explanatory variables, we have been extremely careful.  Social 
security and welfare expenditure data are available starting from 1970.  However, 
because of our concern for the quality of earlier data, we do not use all the available data 
after 1970.  Instead, we concentrate on years after 1983.  There are two reasons for this 
choice.  First, data quality is expected to be better in more recent years as compared to 
much earlier periods.  For example, real GDP per capita data from Penn World Tables are 
less reliable in the 1970s.  Secondly, ICRG starts reporting institutional variables in on  
annual basis only in 1984.  For the data to be comparable in time, we average ERI and 
democracy starting in 1984.  As a result, democracy variables and ERI variables are 
averaged for the years after 198328.  
Countries in the sample also vary in terms of availability of data on social security 
and welfare expenditures.  Since the share of population over 65 years old and real GDP 
per capita may have a direct effect on that specific year’s social security and welfare 
expenditures, we only take the average of these variables for years in which there is 
corresponding data for social security and welfare expenditure29.  Since the income 
distribution is likely to evolve slowly, we take the mean of all the available high quality 
                                                 
28 Relatively long period of averaging for democracy and institutional variables is reasonable considering 
the fact that these variables are subject to drastic shifts in data as a result of regime changes.  For instance, 
in these data sets, just in one year, democracy can change to a dictatorship or vice versa.  In this regard, 
averaging over a longer period of time makes these variables more reliable. 
29 In other words, the share of population over 65 years old and real GDP per capita data for a given year 
are dropped if social security and welfare expenditure data are missing in that year.   
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data on income inequality.  We also split the income inequality data before and after 1985 
and name them as gini_past and gini_pres.  Average income inequality data over the 
whole sample has a high correlation with these alternative averages of income inequality 
(0.9049 with gini_past and 0.9633 with gini_pres,).  Hence, we have decided to use the 
average of all available income inequality data30.  
Table 3.5 reports the estimation results of cross-country regressions of 63 
countries.  The first column shows the OLS regression specification without ERI.  In the 
second column, ERI enters into redistribution equation as an additional control variable 
in OLS regression.  The main result of this cross-country regression shows that ERI plays 
a significant role in redistribution.  It has a positive coefficient and it is almost significant 
at one percent even in two-sided statistics31 (student’s t statistics is 2.31).  This strong 
result shows that ERI needs to be taken into account in analyzing the determinants of 
redistribution. This result is highly robust to alternative regression specifications as well.  
Later, we will explore the robustness of this result in more detail. But, before doing that, 
we first summarize the other major results.  
Income inequality appears to have a negative coefficient.  However, it is not 
significant at conventional levels.  This result is not surprising considering the existing 
literature on the effects of income inequality on redistribution that also fails to find a 
robust positive relationship as well.  For example, Dalgaard et al. (2001) and Rigolini 
                                                 
30 We also run all the regressions in this section with these alternative income inequality data, the results 
are not altered at all. 
31 Since we have prior expectation that ERI enters into the redistribution equation with a positive sign.  One 
sided test actually better represents the significance level of coefficient of ERI. 
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(2003) find negative and insignificant coefficients for income inequality measures in the 
redistribution equations.   
Democratic countries seem to redistribute less in the form of social security and 
welfare expenditure.  The democracy coefficient is, however, insignificant at the 
conventional levels.  This negative relationship is consistent with the results of most 
previous literature that does not find a strong link between inequality and redistribution in 
democracies (Perotti, 1996; Benabou, 2000; Dalgaard et al., 2003).   
The log GDP per capita emerges with a negative sign, and its coefficient is 
significant at five percent.  This result may stem from the type of redistribution used in 
this study.  Wealthier countries may have a smaller fraction of population that depends on 
the redistribution of income by the government32.  Similarly, Bassett et al. (1999) and 
Lindert (1996) find negative and significant coefficients for GDP per capita in explaining 
social security and welfare expenditure.  Perotti (1996) also finds that higher GDP per 
capita reduces redistributive pressure in the form of marginal and average tax rates.  
The share of population over 65 years old is always highly significant and 
positive in all specifications at the one percent level.  This result is also in line with 
earlier empirical research and indicates the importance of the age-structure of population 
in the redistribution decision (Perotti, 1996; Bassett et al., 1999; Lindert, 1996).   
                                                 
32 We also include the log of square of GDP per capita to analyze the non-linear relationship between 
income per capita and redistribution.  However, we find out that GDP per capita and its square are highly 
collinear.  Variance inflation factor is much more than 10.  Hence, in order to avoid a multi-collinearity 
problem, we continue with the existing specification of the model.  Moreover, just a side note, other 
variables do not suffer from the multi-collinearity problem given that they have much lower variance 
inflation factor than 10.   The results of variance Inflation Factor analysis is provided in the Appendix. 
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Although we rely on the best available compilation of each variable, measurement 
error might be driving our results.  In Column 3, we account for one source of potential 
measurement error, weighting the data by the log GDP per capita.  It is often claimed that 
in richer countries data quality is better.  Summers and Heston (1991), for example, 
report that the margin of error in estimating gross domestic product is much lower for 
richer countries.  This weighted least squares (WLS) estimation gives results that are very 
similar to OLS results.  The coefficient of ERI appears to be slightly higher but its 
significance level almost remains almost the same.  The same result applies to the 
coefficients of democracy, log GDP per capita and the share of population over 65 years 
old.  
In Column 4, we attempt to ensure that the results are not a product of few 
influential observations.  Hence, we employ a robust regression method in which 
observations with higher residuals are down-weighted.  In this case, the initial OLS 
results are strengthened.  ERI is now significant at a one percent level.  The significance 
level of log GDP per capita now appears to be one percent instead of five percent.  The 
share of the population over 65 years old variable is still significant at its initial level as 
in column 2.  
In the Column 5, we report the heteroskedasticity consistent robust estimation 
results.  The Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used in place of the 
traditional calculation in this regression.  Again the primary OLS results are not altered 
much.  ERI is still significant at a five percent level.  Other significant variables are also 
still significant at their initial levels in this heteroskedasticity robust estimation 
specification.  
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Finally, we run one more weighted regression.  The weighting variable now is a 
function of the number of observations over which the average social security and 
welfare expenditure is calculated.  ERI is still significant but now at a ten percent level 
and other results are not altered at all.  
In all these regressions, dummy variables for region do not appear to be 
significant individually.  However, these dummy variables are jointly significant in all 
regressions.  The significance level varies between regression specifications. For 
example, in the OLS regressions, the dummy variables are jointly significant at ten 
percent while in the robust regression, they are significant at one percent level.  Hence, 
all the other regions together appear to be different from Western Europe. 
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Dependent Variable    Table 3. 5. Cross-
Sectional Regressions 
on Redistribution 
  Social Security and Welfare Expenditure     
             
  
OLS 
without 
ERI 
OLS with 
ERI 
Weighted 
Least 
Squares Robust 
heteroske
dasticity 
consistent 
robust 
Weighted 
by 
Number 
of 
Observati
ons for 
SSW 
       
ERI  1.5029 1.5108 1.5102 1.5029 1.2177 
  **2.31 **2.29 ***2.68 **2.14 *1.81 
Inequality -0.0316 -0.0041 -0.0080 -0.0246 -0.0041 -0.0001 
 -0.55 -0.07 -0.14 -0.5 -0.07 0 
Democracy  -0.0312 -0.1369 -0.1292 -0.1419 -0.1369 -0.1204 
 -0.29 -1.22 -1.15 -1.46 -1.17 -1.06 
Log of Real GDP per 
capita PPP -0.5967 -1.7704 -1.7742 -2.3096 -1.7704 -1.7810 
 -0.9 **-2.17 **-2.1 ***-3.26 **-2.19 **-2.03 
% of pop. above 65 1.0946 1.1352 1.1393 1.1413 1.1352 1.2608 
 ***6.14 ***6.6 ***6.59 ***7.65 ***6.1 ***7.26 
East Asia & Pacific -1.8526 -1.1309 -1.1872 -1.5146 -1.1309 -0.7183 
 -0.91 -0.57 -0.61 -0.88 -0.64 -0.38 
Eastern Europe & 
Central Asia -0.2508 1.4261 1.4884 0.2017 1.4261 1.0427 
 -0.17 0.89 0.95 0.14 0.83 0.67 
Middle East & North 
Africa 0.0075 0.6403 0.8309 0.0057 0.6403 1.5872 
 0 0.27 0.35 0 0.32 0.67 
South Asia -2.0766 -1.0816 -0.9738 -2.1103 -1.0816 -0.1260 
 -0.78 -0.42 -0.37 -0.94 -0.59 -0.05 
North America -2.3779 -2.0880 -2.0755 -1.7462 -2.0880 -1.7438 
 -1.08 -0.98 -1.04 -0.95 -1.22 -0.98 
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.3734 -1.6585 -1.4326 -2.6307 -1.6585 -0.9936 
 -0.57 -0.72 -0.62 -1.31 -0.78 -0.41 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 0.2019 2.2405 2.3616 1.9834 2.2405 2.8926 
 0.11 1.1 1.18 1.12 1.03 1.55 
cons. 5.1721 13.0895 13.1294 19.0847 13.0895 11.5815 
  0.85 *1.93 *1.85 ***3.24 *1.97 1.59 
       
# of coun. 63 63 63 63 63 63 
F Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.82 0.84 0.84   0.84 0.85 
Notes: (*) indicates significance at 10 %; (**) indicates significance at 5 %; (***) indicates significance at 1 %.  
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Figure 3.1: OLS Partial Regression Diagram of ERI
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Figure 3.2: WLS Partial Regression Diagram of ERI
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3.4.1. Controlling for Endogeneity of Income Inequality and Efficiency of 
Redistributive Institutions 
 
In estimating the roles of ERI and income inequality in redistribution, the issue of 
causality needs to be addressed, when one suspects that redistribution in turn alters 
income inequality and ERI.  It is, for example, quite possible to expect that redistribution 
changes the income distribution.  Existing income inequality data sets are often derived 
from post-transfer income distributions.  However, in the theoretical models, actual 
income inequality measures are given for the pre-transfer income distributions.  This 
reason also justifies why income inequality variable needs to be instrumented in the 
regressions.  
 87
It is clear that redistribution could affect the income distribution though it is less 
obvious how redistribution in the form of social security and welfare expenditure could 
affect ERI.  Nonetheless, more comprehensive redistribution schemes, such as 
redistribution in the form of education, can change the redistributive institutions in the 
long run.  A more educated public may demand better quality of redistributive institutions 
with less corruption and higher bureaucratic quality.  Moreover, higher education 
spending is also likely to increase the supply of better qualified bureaucrats.   Given these 
considerations, a number of instrumental variables are employed to examine a potential 
endogeneity bias.   
It is a great challenge to find appropriate instruments for income inequality and 
ERI.  Hence, as mentioned earlier, existing studies of income inequality and 
redistribution either avoid using instrumental variables or merely discuss this endogeneity 
issue (Rigolini, 2003).  On the other hand, recent studies on the determinants of 
institutions provide a broader scope to find instruments for ERI (Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson; 2001; Easterly and Levine, 2002).  In this study, we follow the arguments that 
have been developed in the literature to justify our instruments for income inequality and 
ERI.  We have tried to choose instruments for income inequality and ERI in accordance 
with the following criteria:  First, they have to have a high explanatory power in 
explaining the endogenous variables.  Moreover, instrumental variables have to be 
uncorrelated with the disturbance term of redistribution equation.  In other words, their 
effects on redistribution need to appear only indirectly through their effect on the 
endogenous variables for which they serve as instruments.   Given these considerations, 
we focus on the following variables to instrument income inequality and ERI.   
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1-Ethnolinguistic fractionalization (for inequality and ERI) 
2-Dummy for tropical climate (for inequality) 
3-Natural resource abundance in the form of oil exports as a percentage of total 
merchandise export in GDP (for ERI) 
4-Number of years after independence (for ERI) 
 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization is drawn from Taylor and Hudson (1972), 
Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina et al. (2003).  It measures the probability that two 
randomly selected individuals from a given country will belong to different 
ethnolinguistic groups.  Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that more fractionalized 
countries tend to have more dishonest bureaucracies.  La Porta et al. (1999) provide 
empirical evidence that ethnolinguistic fractionalization explains the quality of 
governments.  In their study, ethnolinguistic fractionalization is associated with negative 
institutional outcomes like corruption, and low bureaucratic quality.  Mauro (1995 and 
1998) also use ethnolinguistic fractionalization as an instrument for corruption.  
Similarly, in our context, ethnolinguistic fractionalization is expected to reduce ERI.  
Furthermore, any fractionalization is also associated with higher income inequality 
(Alesina et al., 1999).  This index is likely to be a good instrument because it is definitely 
exogenous and is most likely determined as a result of the long historical process.  
Moreover, its effect on redistribution has to be indirect through either affecting ERI or 
income inequality or both.   
The dummy for tropical climate is essentially used as an instrument for income 
inequality.  The motivation for this instrument comes from the highly influential papers 
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by Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000), who argue that tropical commodity 
endowments that had significant scale economies led to the concentration of wealth in the 
hands of a small elite, especially in Latin American countries.  In their analysis, the chain 
of causation starts with the tropical climate.  A tropical climate enables countries to be 
primary commodity exporters.  Primary commodities, such as sugar cane, rice, and silver 
are characterized by economies of scale and hence enjoy high returns from using slave 
and indigenous labor in mass production.  Hence, this production structure is historically 
associated with concentration of power in the hands of the plantation and mining elite.  In 
contrast, non-tropical land in North America led to more equal distribution of income 
with family farms and a more equal distribution of land.  To give an example, even in the 
early twentieth century, only 2.4 percent of household heads in Mexico owned land, 
while the corresponding number in the US was 75 percent.   
Over a long period of time, these income distribution characteristics persist due to 
path-dependence.  In Latin America, for example, the entrenched elite opposed 
democracy and other institutions promoting equality before the law.  They were afraid of 
losing power to the poor.  Hence, they restricted the voting franchise by imposing literacy 
and wealth requirements.  In the 1940s, the proportions of the population voting in the 
U.S. and Canada were five to ten times higher than Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Ecuador.  
These historically shaped institutional limitations on the poor led to enduring high 
income inequality33.  Hence, tropical climate is used as an instrument for the income 
distribution.  This variable is definitely exogenous.  Even the type of production can be 
                                                 
33 A similar point is also emphasized for the high income inequality in Latin America by the World Bank’s 
publication in 2004, “Inequality in Latin America Breaking with History?”.  
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changed over time in these tropical regions; it is hard to claim that climate has been 
changed radically over time.  It has a high correlation with income inequality (0.52) and 
the correlation coefficient is significant at less than one percent.  Moreover, it is difficult 
to think of any conceivable direct effect of this variable on redistribution.  
Mauro (1998) uses an oil dummy to instrument corruption.  We adopt a similar 
variable as an instrument for ERI namely; the percentage of oil exports in total 
merchandise exports.  We check the robustness of our results by using similar variable 
that is the share of the mining exports in GDP.  The motivation behind these variables is 
to capture the ‘rentier effect’.  Oil, diamonds, and other minerals are characterized as 
‘point source’ resources (Isham et al., 2002).  It is easier for the elite to control and 
capture the rents from ‘point source’ resources.  Resource rents are generally high in oil 
production.  Around 80 percent of oil income is considered to be resource rent (Gylfason, 
2001), while such rents are much lower for other types of products in industry or in 
agriculture.  A small work force is required to extract oil resources.  Most of the time, oil 
is extracted by foreign firms with sophisticated technical skills (Isham et al., 2002).  As a 
result, the ruling elite can exclude the majority of population in extracting oil reserves.  In 
other words, there exists no incentive on the part of the elite to incorporate the society 
into increasing aggregate production.  Given the lack of economic preconditions, the 
citizens cannot generate pressure for increased literacy and political influence.  This lack 
of political influence further feeds the vicious cycle by not effectively and peacefully 
revealing public interest and preferences.  This process also restricts the society’s ability 
to monitor officials and more importantly limits the public's ability to penalize corrupt 
conduct.   
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There are numerous examples for the positive connection between oil rents and 
less efficient institutions.  Nigeria, for example, is the most widely cited case for high 
corruption due to its oil resources.  Nigeria’s suddenly rising oil revenue after the oil 
shocks of the 1970s have generated extraordinary opportunities for corruption.  Ades and 
Di Tella (1999) quotes the following clause from the Economist of August 4, 1984: 
 
“Oil and corruption go together.  Nigeria’s oil accounts for about 80 
percent of government revenue.  The official price of crude oil increased 
17-fold in eight years from about $2 a barrel in 1973-4 to $34 by the end 
of 1981.  Nigeria went on a construction and improving spree.  Parties 
and party officials grew rich.” 
 
Alesina et al. (2003) further notes the following: 
 
“Nigeria has produced $280 billion in oil revenues since the discovery of 
oil in 1950s, but the average Nigerian is no further out of poverty today 
than 4 decades ago.  Such egregious failures as the $8 billion state-owned 
Ajaokuta steel complex, which has yet to produce a bar of steel, give a hint 
of the breakdown of state institutions.” (p.18)  
 
In addition to anecdotal evidence, empirical evidence on the negative role of 
resource abundance on governance abound.  For instance, Ades and Di Tella (1999) 
reveal that oil rents determine the level of corruption in the economy.  Treisman (2000) 
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and Gylfason (2001) also provide empirical evidence along the same line.  Oil resources 
or any mineral resources are natural endowments and in this sense this variable is 
definitely exogenous34.  Moreover, its effect on redistribution has to be trough its effect 
on institutions.   
The number of years after independence is also used as an instrument.  Our choice 
of this instrument is based on the assumption that strong institutions develop over a long 
period of time by learning by doing and with accumulating various experiences35.  Hence, 
it is expected that countries which achieved their independence earlier had more chances 
to establish better institutions.  This variable is widely used as an instrument for 
institutions.  For example, Mauro (1998) employs similar dummies in his instrumental 
variable regressions.  The correlation matrix and summary statistics of instruments are 
also presented in the Appendix. 
 
                                                 
34 Given that actual resource extraction is endogenous, one may argue that potential extraction of oil is 
more appropriate measure for rentier effect than its actual extraction.  Even though there is a merit in this 
argument, potential resources only materialize as rent for the elite after their extraction.  Moreover, in 
practice, there will be high correlation between potential and actual extraction of natural resources.    
35 We restrict the maximum number of the years after independence to 200 years considering that the 
relationship between institutions and years of independence cannot be linear after some range.  For 
example, Denmark has been independent since 920.  Hence, Denmark receives maximum 200 years instead 
of the actual number of the years after independence.  
 93
3.4.2. Two Stage Least Squares Regression Results 
 
 Table 3.6 reports 2SLS results with heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
errors36.  Since El Salvador does not have data on ethnolinguistic fractionalization, the 
number of countries declines to 62. Hence, the first column presents the OLS regression 
for 62 observations.  The third and fourth columns in Table 3.6 report the first stage 
regressions.  Ethnolinguistic fractionalization, oil exports as a fraction of total 
merchandise exports and the number of the years after independence are all highly 
significant in ERI equation (p values = 0.009, 0.060 and 0.048 respectively).  These 
results are in accordance with the arguments discussed above.  Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization and oil exports reduce ERI, while countries that achieved their 
independence earlier reach higher level of ERI.  On the other hand, the dummy for 
tropical climate and ethnolinguistic fractionalization emerge as significant instrumental 
variables in the income inequality regression in Column 4.  Both tropical climate and 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization increase the income inequality and their coefficients are 
almost significant at a five percent.  Test of excluded instruments indicates that 
instruments are also jointly significant at the conventional levels in the first stage 
regressions37.  
                                                 
36 Heteroskedasticity test reject the null hypothesis that disturbance is homoskedastic. Hence, we proceed 
with heteroskedasticity consistent 2SLS estimations. 
37 P-value of test of excluded restriction for ERI is equal to 0.0024.  
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 When both ERI and income inequality are instrumented, the OLS results are 
strengthened.  ERI is now significant below one percent (t=3.08)38.  These 2SLS 
regression results also confirm the proposition that ERI plays an important role in 
determining redistribution.  
 The 2SLS results are consistent with the OLS results for the other control 
variables as well.  Optimistically, the coefficient of income inequality is now positive, but 
it is still insignificant.  All the previously significant variables are still significant.  The 
democracy variable appears to be significant at five percent, while the significance level 
of log GDP per capita reaches below one percent. Similarly, regional dummies are jointly 
significant at less than one percent level. 
 Finally, an overidentifying restrictions test supports the empirical specification of 
the model. The Hansen's J statistic test is a test of overidentifying restrictions in 
heteroskedasticity consistent IV regressions (Hayashi 2000).  The joint null hypothesis is 
that the instruments are valid, in that they are uncorrelated with the error term, and are 
correctly excluded from the estimated equation.   Under the null, the test statistic is 
distributed as chi-squared with degrees equal to the number of overidentifying 
restrictions.   A rejection would shed doubt on the validity of the instruments.  Hansen’s J 
statistics gives a p value of 0.66430 and consequently we fail to reject the null hypothesis 
that the instruments are exogenous.  Hence, we conclude that our instruments are 
appropriate by passing Hansen’s overidentification test.   
                                                 
38 In terms of economic significance, one standard deviation increase in ERI increases the share of social 
security and welfare expenditure by 3.4 percent.  However, one needs to keep in mind that magnitude of 
coefficients for changes in ERI may not be a good indicator for economic significance. 
 
 95
 In the Appendix, we also provide the results of an alternative instrument when 
income inequality is instrumented with its past values instead of the tropical dummy.  In 
order to obtain the past inequality measure, we consider the Gini coefficient measured 
using data before 1985 (or closest year available to 1985) as our past income inequality 
measure and the average of Gini coefficient after this date as the present income 
inequality measure.  The main results of the 2SLS estimation in Table 3.6 stay the same. 
The only difference is that ethnolinguistic fractionalization loses its significance in the 
first stage regression for income inequality, while ethnolinguistic fractionalization is still 
highly significant in the first stage regression for ERI. 
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Dependent Variable   Table 3.6. Cross-Sectional 
2SLS Regressions on 
Redistribution 
  
Social Security and Welfare Expenditure 
  
  OLS 2SLS 
ERI 
First 
Stage 
Inequality 
First 
Stage 
ERI 1.4927 3.2223   
 **2.26 ***3.08   
Inequality -0.0033 0.1823   
 -0.06 1.06   
Democracy  -0.1367 -0.3492 0.0428 0.6112 
 -1.21 **-2.17 ***2.72 ***2.83 
Log of Real GDP per capita 
PPP -1.7687 -3.3856 0.8293 1.7025 
 **-2.15 ***-3.11 ***7.19 1.03 
% of pop. above 65 1.1359 1.3422 -0.0235 -0.9255 
 ***6.54 ***4.94 -0.61 ***-2.99 
East Asia & Pacific -1.1397 -0.1500 -0.0990 -5.2916 
 -0.57 -0.07 -0.23 -1.11 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia 1.4123 3.7315 -0.7180 -2.1949 
 0.87 *1.89 **-2.45 -0.64 
Middle East & North Africa 0.6275 1.0261 -0.2393 3.4959 
 0.26 0.44 -0.52 0.73 
South Asia -1.0946 0.5956 -0.1532 -5.2387 
 -0.42 0.27 -0.35 -0.77 
North America -2.0911 -2.1181 0.1308 1.2590 
 -0.98 -1.32 0.27 0.28 
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.6753 -3.2790 0.5664 3.1351 
 -0.72 -1.24 1.11 0.56 
Latin America & Caribbean 2.2389 4.1366 -1.4055 1.2437 
 1.09 1.5 ***-3.57 0.39 
Tropical   -0.0433 4.5514 
   -0.25 *1.93 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization -0.8357 7.5930 
   ***-2.73 *1.85 
Oil export   -0.0060 -0.0216 
   *-1.93 -0.48 
Years after independence 0.0030 0.0174 
   **2.03 0.95 
cons. 13.0505 17.3319 -6.4118 27.4143 
  *1.9 **2.05 ***-6.72 **2.01 
# of coun. 62 62 62 62 
F Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.84 0.79 0.84 0.61 
Notes: (*) indicates significance at 10 %; (**) indicates significance at 5 %; (***) indicates 
significance at 1 %.  
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Partial Regression Diagram
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3.4.2.1. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
To test the robustness of our 2SLS results, a number of alternative specifications 
are estimated.  First, as an alternative, ERI is constructed by normalizing the ‘quality of 
bureaucracy’ and ‘control of corruption’ indices between zero and one and then taking 
their simple average.  These normalized indices are also used separately as another 
alternative for ERI.  In all these specifications, our main results are not altered at all.  
However, the results are less significant for quality of bureaucracy and democracy is not 
significant in this specification.  The simple average of the quality of bureaucracy’ and 
‘control of corruption yields a t statistic (2.98) slightly higher than initial ERI.  These 
indices used in the construction of ERI are also significant individually at the 
conventional levels.   
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Dependent Variable  Table 3.7. Alternative 
Measures of ERI: 2SLS 
Regressions  
  
  
Social Security and Welfare Expenditure 
  
  
  
ERI=simple 
average 
ERI=Control 
of 
Corruption 
ERI=Quality 
of 
Bureaucracy 
    
ERI 15.9184 2.1163 3.5863 
 ***2.98 ***2.99 **2.26 
Inequality 0.0295 0.1792 0.0020 
 0.43 1.06 0.01 
Democracy -0.2480 -0.2879 -0.2275 
 **-1.98 **-1.94 -1.54 
Log of Real GDP per capita 
PPP -3.0861 -1.7748 -4.1103 
 ***-3.41 **-1.99 **-2.57 
% of pop. above 65 1.1841 1.2545 1.2629 
 ***5.72 ***4.91 ***5.36 
East Asia & Pacific -0.5008 -0.0554 -1.2551 
 -0.27 -0.03 -0.67 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia 3.0228 3.3228 2.0447 
 *1.64 *1.83 1.14 
Middle East & North Africa 1.1546 1.1320 0.4930 
 0.55 0.53 0.2 
South Asia -0.2921 1.2678 -2.0300 
 -0.15 0.54 -0.96 
North America -1.7973 -2.5625 -1.4466 
 -1.34 *-1.8 -0.75 
Sub-Saharan Africa -2.1641 -2.3665 -2.9921 
 -1.12 -0.93 -1.01 
Latin America & Caribbean 4.2141 2.9843 3.9455 
 1.62 1.25 1.31 
cons. 13.2433 -2.5835 23.9159 
  **2.39 -0.35 **2.11 
    
# of coun. 62 62 62 
F Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.82 0.80 0.76 
    
Notes: (*) indicates significance at 10 %; (**) indicates significance at 5 %; (***) indicates 
significance at 1 %.  
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Next, we experiment with a different measure of redistribution in Table 3.8.  
Among other categories of government expenditures, spending for education and health 
care are likely to be redistributive to the poor as well (Perotti, 1996; Rigolini, 2003; 
Sylwester, 2000).  Hence, we aggregate education, health care and social security and 
welfare expenditures and use this expenditure as a share of GDP as our alternative 
measure of redistribution.  We rerun our specifications using this new endogenous 
variable.  Our main estimation results stay essentially the same39.  ERI turns out to be 
even more significant (with t-statistic=3.21).  All the other significant variables remain 
significant except the democracy variable. Democracy loses its significance in this 
regression.  But, most importantly for our concern, ERI substantially increases the 
redistribution and this result is highly significant at one percent level. 
                                                 
39 Albania is dropped due to the lack of data for other components of redistribution.  
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Dependent Variable  Table 3.8. Alternative 
Measures of Redistribution: 
2SLS Regressions  
  
Education, Heath and Social Security and Welfare 
Expenditure 
     
  OLS 2SLS 
   
ERI 2.8506 4.3763 
 ***2.85 ***3.21 
Inequality -0.0394 0.1521 
 -0.45 0.75 
Democracy  -0.1006 -0.3029 
 -0.59 -1.37 
Log of Real GDP per capita 
PPP -1.6926 -3.1596 
 -1.36 **-2.21 
% of pop. above 65 0.9993 1.2273 
 ***3.65 ***3.25 
East Asia & Pacific -0.7125 0.3722 
 -0.23 0.14 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia 3.8931 6.0336 
 1.59 **2.28 
Middle East & North Africa 4.1484 4.6670 
 1.11 1.42 
South Asia -1.8126 -0.0132 
 -0.45 0 
North America -4.8292 -4.8648 
 -1.49 ***-3.41 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.5302 -0.8700 
 0.15 -0.23 
Latin America & Caribbean 4.7206 6.5032 
 1.5 *1.75 
cons. 17.9274 20.4866 
  *1.69 *1.71 
   
# of coun. 61 61 
F Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.72 0.69 
   
Notes: (*) indicates significance at 10 %; (**) indicates significance at 5 %; (***) indicates significance at 1 %.  
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Next I experiment with using the democracy indicators of Gastil/Freedom instead 
of the Polity IV indicator of democracy.  In doing so, we keep the initial specification of 
the model constant but only change the democracy indicator.  The Gastil/Freedom House 
indicators in general generate less significant coefficients for democracy.  However, the 
coefficients and significance of other control variables, especially ERI and inequality, 
remain essentially the same.  However, in the third column, the civil liberties variable is 
not significant.  We can conclude that political rights are more relevant for redistribution, 
considering that its coefficient is significant at the five percent level in Column 2.   
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Dependent Variable  Table 3. 9. Alternative 
Measures of Democracy: 
2SLS Regressions   
  Social Security and Welfare Expenditure 
       
  
Democracy=Freedom 
House 
Democracy=Political 
Rights 
Democracy=Civil 
Liberties 
    
ERI 3.3354 3.4216 2.9138 
 ***2.59 ***2.74 **2.27 
Inequality 0.1317 0.1645 0.1580 
 0.86 0.99 0.99 
Democracy  2.5438 1.0668 0.7305 
 *1.8 **2.14 1.06 
Log of Real GDP per capita 
PPP -3.2970 -3.3317 -3.0486 
 ***-3.07 ***-3 ***-3.01 
% of pop. above 65 1.3454 1.3770 1.2969 
 ***5.2 ***5.12 ***4.97 
East Asia & Pacific 0.8800 0.3555 -0.1389 
 0.4 0.17 -0.07 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia 4.1678 4.0974 3.4811 
 *1.97 *1.94 *1.69 
Middle East & North Africa 2.9917 2.4799 2.5267 
 1.31 1.1 1.06 
South Asia 0.3788 0.6823 -0.2284 
 0.17 0.3 -0.11 
North America -1.8209 -1.9097 -2.1042 
 -1.16 -1.18 -1.16 
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.2596 -2.0327 -2.0908 
 -0.49 -0.8 -0.81 
Latin America & Caribbean 5.0928 4.7664 3.4372 
 1.55 1.51 1.07 
cons. 12.0984 11.9976 11.9289 
  1.34 1.42 1.39 
    
# of coun. 62 62 62 
F Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.79 0.78 0.77 
    
Notes: (*) indicates significance at 10 %; (**) indicates significance at 5 %; (***) indicates significance at 1 %.  
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It is likely that a low ERI not only affects the redistributive government 
expenditure but also other types of government outlays.  In order to analyze this 
argument, we use various other types of government expenditures as dependent variables.  
Regression results reveal that expenditures on economic affairs and services, public order 
and safety and recreational and cultural services are not robustly affected by ERI.  Either 
ERI does not appear to be significant in these regressions or it appears with a negative 
coefficients.  This evidence confirms our theory by illustrating that ERI is primarily 
relevant in redistribution but not for all types of government expenditures. 
We also conduct a sensitivity analysis to see how our results changes when we 
drop ethnolinguistic fractionalization from our set of instruments.  The initial results are 
not altered at all.  All the significant variables are still significant as in the initial 2SLS 
regressions in Table 3.6.  ERI is still significant at one percent level. T-statistic for ERI 
declines only to 2.82 from 3.08. 
Other indicators of institutional quality in ICRG indices are also used instead of 
our ERI indicator in order to analyze whether our ERI variable is different from other 
indicators in ICRG.  It turns out to be that other indicators of institutional quality in 
ICRG are not significant in redistribution equation.  These variables are military in 
politics, religion in politics, socioeconomic conditions, law and order, investment profile, 
internal conflict, external conflict and government stability.  This result shows that our 
ERI indicator has primary relevance for redistribution as compared to other indicators of 
institutional quality in ICRG.  
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Table 3.10. 2SLS Regressions 
Other Types of Government 
Expenditures  Dependent Variables  
   
  
Economic 
Affairs and 
Services 
Public 
Order and 
Safety 
Recreational 
and Cultural 
Services 
    
ERI 0.0029 -0.0019 0.0011 
 0.36 -0.91 0.8 
Inequality 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 0.26 -1.01 -1.23 
Democracy  -0.0010 0.0003 0.0001 
 -1.08 0.94 0.64 
Log of Real GDP per capita 
PPP -0.0040 0.0006 -0.0012 
 -0.5 0.31 -1.05 
% of pop. above 65 0.0003 0.0002 0.0000 
 0.19 0.32 -0.04 
East Asia & Pacific -0.0085 0.0024 0.0013 
 -0.75 0.61 0.79 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia -0.0010 0.0090 0.0021 
 -0.08 ***2.58 1.28 
Middle East & North Africa 0.0107 0.0064 0.0116 
 0.67 1.46 2.27 
South Asia -0.0055 -0.0011 -0.0018 
 -0.28 -0.21 -0.89 
North America -0.0194 -0.0004 0.0002 
 -2.64 -0.22 0.18 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.0188 0.0030 0.0023 
 -1.22 0.57 0.91 
Latin America & Caribbean -0.0126 0.0014 0.0016 
 -0.82 0.32 0.69 
cons. 0.0718 0.0078 0.0221 
  1.15 0.49 *1.68 
    
# of coun. 62 62 62 
F Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.19 0.56 0.41 
Notes: (*) indicates significance at 10 %; (**) indicates significance at 5 %; (***) indicates 
significance at 1 %.  
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3.4.3. Panel Data Regressions  
  
 The determinants of redistribution emphasized in the redistribution literature as 
well as in this study do not actually have much time series variation.  For example, 
income inequality, efficiency of redistributive institutions, democracy and the share of 
population over 65 do not vary quickly over time.  Hence, initial research on this topic 
has concentrated on cross-country regression analysis without dealing with the time 
dimension (Persson and Tabellini, 1992; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Perotti, 1996).  
However, some recent researchers utilize panel data regression techniques to investigate 
the income inequality and redistribution relationship (Forbes, 2000; Dalgaard et al., 2001, 
2003; Rigolini, 2003).  The primary motivations behind using panel data regressions are 
to increase the number of sampling observations and to distinguish country specific 
unobservables by using random and fixed effect regressions.  The latter reason to use 
panel data regression is quite legitimate given that cross-country specifications cannot 
account for all the country specific factors relevant for the dependent variable.  By the 
same token, the limited number of observations (countries) as well as the lack of data to 
control for various country specific features also induce us to resort to panel data 
regressions.  Moreover, panel data regressions provide further robustness tests for the 
cross country regression results presented in the previous section.   
For the panel data regressions, we adopt the same specification as used in the 
cross-section regressions.   Hence, the following equation is estimated: 
 
ititititit XinequalityERIRD 113210 εαααα ++++=   (1) 
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Where i  and t  correspond to countries and half decades, and it1ε  represents a country-
time error term.  Given that the main variables of our model do not vary much over time, 
we follow the common approach in the empirical growth literature and take averages of 
every variable over a five-year period instead of using yearly observations.  In other 
words, all the explanatory and dependent variables remain the same as in the cross-
section regressions, but are averaged over half decades instead of over all years.    
Summary statistics and the correlation matrix of five-year averages of variables in our 
sample are reported in the Appendix.   Our constructed ERI variables are also reported in 
the Appendix as well.  
 There are numerous panel data regression techniques that are employed in 
previous empirical studies.  Since our main objective is to account for the country-
specific unobservable factors, we concentrate on random-and fixed-effect estimations.  
The random-effect specification assumes that the unobservable country specific, time 
constant effect is uncorrelated with the explanatory variable, while the fixed-effect 
specification does not require this assumption.  Hence, we first test whether there is an 
indication for country specific unobservable effect.  The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
Multiplier test for random effects concludes that the existence of unobservable effects is 
not rejected40.  Hence, we proceed to run fixed-and random-effect regressions.  Table 
3.11 reports these results.  The first column presents the fixed-effect regression, while the 
                                                 
40 The explanation for this test is given by Wooldridge (2003). The results of Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrangian Multiplier test is also presented in the Appendix.  
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last two columns present the random-effect and random-effect maximum likelihood 
estimation results, respectively.     
 All these regression results confirm our initial findings in cross-section 
regressions.  Similar to earlier results, the efficiency of redistributive institutions (ERI) 
strongly increases social security and welfare expenditure, although its coefficient is only 
significant at a ten percent level with a one-sided test in the fixed-effect regression (t-
statistic=1.61).  In random effect regressions, its coefficients are significant at one 
percent level (t-statistics= 2.66 and 2.78, respectively).  Other variables give similar 
results, as well.  The coefficient on income inequality appears to be negative and 
insignificant.  The democracy variable is negative but insignificant in all regressions.  
Wealthier countries redistribute less in the form of social security and welfare 
expenditure, but this result is not significant at the conventional level.  On the other hand, 
the age structure of the population is highly significant and indicates that a higher share 
of the elderly increases social security and welfare expenditure.  Regional dummies are 
not jointly significant in the random-effect regressions, and when we drop the regional 
dummies in the last column, the results are virtually identical, although ERI is only 
significant at five percent with t-statistic=2.15.  Based on this evidence,, we can repeat 
our earlier main conclusion that ERI plays an important role in stimulating 
redistribution41.  
 The fixed and random effect regressions generate similar results in terms of the 
coefficient signs of explanatory variables.  However, the positive role of ERI on 
                                                 
41 We have also tried other panel data regression techniques, which are not reported here like various forms 
of feasible generalized least square and have reached to the similar conclusions.  
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redistribution appears to be stronger in random-effect regressions.  Hence, we run a 
Hausman specification test to differentiate whether the random-effect model can be 
rejected in favor of fixed-effect regression.  The Hausman specification test fails to reject 
the null hypothesis that unobservable country-specific factors are uncorrelated with 
explanatory variables42.  Hence, this test suggests that random-effect regressions are 
appropriate.   
                                                 
42 The outcome of this test is also reported in the Appendix. 
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Table 3.11. Panel Data 
Estimations Dependent Variable  
  Social Security and Welfare Expenditure 
     
  
Fixed 
Effect 
Random 
Effect  
Random 
Effect 
MLE 
Random 
Effect  
     
ERI 0.5208 0.7038 0.7144 0.5141 
 1.61 ***2.66 ***2.78 **2.15 
Inequality -0.0158 -0.0181 -0.0176 -0.0214 
 -0.56 -0.75 -0.75 -0.93 
Democracy / Gastil -0.0147 -0.0438 -0.0453 -0.0367 
 -0.35 -1.25 -1.33 -1.11 
Log of Real GDP per capita 
PPP -0.2085 -0.8298 -0.8475 -0.7029 
 -0.22 -1.51 *-1.62 -1.49 
% of pop. above 65 0.7089 0.9834 0.9909 1.0550 
 **2.84 ***7.38 ***7.79 ***11.95
East Asia & Pacific -2.2766 -2.2231  
  -1.22 -1.27  
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 0.4852 0.5109  
  0.34 0.38  
Middle East & North Africa -0.2824 -0.2200  
  -0.13 -0.11  
South Asia -2.0106 -1.9417  
  -0.8 -0.83  
North America -1.9423 -1.9110  
  -0.86 -0.9  
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.7295 -1.6785  
  -0.84 -0.86  
Latin America & Caribbean 0.4300 0.5016  
  0.24 0.30  
cons. 3.5295 7.1798 7.2130 5.3420 
  0.46 1.48 1.57 1.39 
     
# of obs. 166 166 166 166 
# of coun. 63 63 63 63 
F Test (p-value) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.74 0.78   0.75 
     
Notes: (*) indicates significance at 10 %; (**) indicates significance at 5 %; (***) indicates 
significance at 1 %.  
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3.4.3.1. Panel Data Regressions when ERI and Income Inequality are Instrumented  
 
 In order to account for possible endogeneity of our main variables, we instrument 
ERI and income inequality in our panel data estimation using the same instruments as for 
the cross-section case.  The dummy for tropical climate is expected to increase income 
inequality without affecting the error component of the redistribution equation.  
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization is expected to reduce ERI and increase income 
inequality.   The share of oil in merchandise exports and years after independence are 
also used as instruments for ERI.  The former is expected to reduce ERI, while the latter 
increases it.  Since justifications for these instruments are presented in the previous 
sections, we do not explain them further at this point.   
As with ERI and income inequality, the instruments used to predict them do not 
change much over time.  Oil export and years after independence have some within 
variation, but the tropical dummy and ethnolinguistic fractionalization have only between 
variations.  However, given that most of the variation in ERI and income inequality come 
from the between variation, our choice of instruments for the panel data regressions are 
reasonable.   
 Table 3.12 presents the first stage and final instrumental variable regressions.  We 
apply the Hausman test for the instrumental variable regressions and find that the 
random-effect regression results are not systematically different from the fixed-effect 
regression results.  Given that some of our instruments are time-invariant and that the 
fixed-effect regression specification drops these instruments, we only concentrate on the 
random-effects results.  Similar to the cross-section results, oil exports and 
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ethnolinguistic fractionalization significantly reduce ERI at the one percent level,   while 
both tropical climate and ethnolinguistic fractionalization significantly exacerbate income 
inequality.  In the final regressions, ERI appears to be highly significant in redistribution 
equation.  Its coefficient is significant at the one percent level (t-statistics=2.96).  The 
coefficient of income inequality is positive and is almost significant at five percent.  A 
positive relationship between income inequality and redistribution emerges when ERI is 
taken into accounts as in the cross-section regressions. Other results are also stronger than 
in the cross-sectional 2SLS regressions.  Democracy and log GDP per capita enter into 
the redistribution equation with negative and highly significant coefficients, while the 
share of population over 65 years of old significantly increases social security and 
welfare expenditure.  In general, it is clear that our previous results are consistent with 
the panel data regressions43.   
When ERI is dropped from the redistribution equation without changing anything 
else.  Income inequality loses its significance and t-statistics becomes 1.53.  This result 
supports one of the main ideas of the theoretical chapter that when ERI is taken into 
account income inequality can be significant.  When we also drop other instruments and 
only keep tropical climate dummy to instrument income inequality in the first stage, the 
results are even more supportive for our theoretical model.  The coefficient of income 
inequality is smaller in magnitude and t-statistic is equal to 0.43. 
 
                                                 
43 In the Appendix, estimation results are reported when the number of years from independence is dropped 
from the first-stage regressions.  In general, the main results remain the same.  But, the coefficient of 
income inequality is no longer significant.  
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Table 3.12. Panel Data 
Estimation: 2SLS 
Dependent Variable 
Social Security and Welfare Expenditure 
 
 
Random 
effect 
2SLS 
ERI First 
Stage 
Inequality 
First 
Stage 
Random 
effect 2SLS 
Random 
effect 2SLS 
ERI 3.5554     
 ***2.96     
Inequality 0.2729   0.1934 0.0789 
 **1.96   1.53 0.43 
Democracy -0.2615 0.0391 0.1284 -0.0693 -0.0392 
 ***-2.97 ***3.69 1.12 -1.32 -0.83 
Log of Real GDP per capita 
PPP -3.5645 0.8512 1.8452 -0.5548 -0.6787 
 ***-2.92 ***7.8 1.56 -0.99 -1.24 
% of pop. above 65 1.4101 -0.0443 -0.5519 1.1669 1.0183 
 ***8.34 *-1.87 **-2.15 ***8.56 ***7.67 
East Asia & Pacific 1.1751 -0.4925 -5.6214 -2.2340 -3.0255 
 0.62 -1.6 *-1.69 -1.48 *-1.66 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia 5.7875 -1.2431 -2.8119 0.2464 -0.5696 
 **2.7 ***-5.72 -1.2 0.21 -0.42 
Middle East & North Africa 3.7473 -0.8744 0.821 -0.2647 -1.4340 
 *1.67 **-2.56 0.22 -0.15 -0.68 
South Asia 2.2373 -0.5565 -0.5319 -1.3748 -2.9037 
 0.96 -1.48 -0.13 -0.68 -1.25 
North America -1.5476 0.1268 1.8979 -2.2832 -2.2805 
 -0.58 0.27 0.38 -1.04 -0.95 
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.1615 -0.0296 2.2381 -2.9181 -3.5684 
 -0.5 -0.08 0.53 -1.38 -1.19 
Latin America & Caribbean 5.3734 -1.7064 3.3333 -0.7567 -1.3755 
 **2.18 ***-6.63 1.2 -0.49 -0.61 
Tropical  0.0412 4.6749   
  0.28 ***2.94   
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization -1.025 6.3273   
  ***-3.58 **2.04   
Oil export  -0.0075 -0.0412   
  ***-2.89 -1.46   
Years after independence 0.0008 0.0161   
  0.66 1.18   
cons. 12.1752 -5.7811 26.4627 -4.7840 2.8402 
 1.22 ***-5.95 ***2.52 -0.73 0.36 
# of obs. 159 159 159 159 159 
# of coun. 62 62 62 62 62 
F Test (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0 
R-squared 0.69   0.74 0.77 
Notes: (*) indicates significance at 10 %; (**) indicates significance at 5 %; (***) indicates significance at 1 %. Countries 
have  unequal number of observations. El Salvador does not have data on ethnolinguistic fractionalization. Hence, 
number of countries declines to 62. Number of observations declines also due to lack of data for oil export. 
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3.4.3.2. Sensitivity Analyses of Panel Data Regressions 
 
We have conducted a number of robustness tests to check the sensitivity of our 
2SLS panel data regression results.  Our general conclusions remain the same for all 
these robustness tests.  First, we use the simple average of the normalized control of 
corruption and quality of bureaucracy instead of their principal component.  We also 
enter these normalized variables separately in the redistribution equation.  These 
alternative measures of ERI produce highly significant coefficients, except for the quality 
of bureaucracy as shown in Table 3.13.  The simple average of these institutional 
variables generates a t-statistic of 2.91. T statistic (2.97) is even higher for the control of 
corruption.  When the dependent variable is changed to sum of education, health and 
social security and welfare expenditure, again the ERI is highly significant in increasing 
redistribution with t statistics equal to 3.39 as reported in Table 3.14. 
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Dependent Variable  Table 3.13. Panel Data 
Estimation, 2SLS: Alternative 
Measures of Democracy 
  Social Security and Welfare Expenditure 
       
  
ERI=simple 
average 
ERI=Control 
of 
Corruption 
ERI=Quality 
of 
Bureaucracy 
    
ERI 18.7994 2.8167 3.1918 
 ***2.91 ***2.97 *1.62 
Inequality 0.2542 0.3939 0.1211 
 **1.85 **2.44 0.84 
Democracy  -0.2640 -0.2261 -0.2013 
 ***-2.96 ***-2.65 **-2.01 
Log of Real GDP per capita 
PPP -3.6640 -2.5832 -3.1242 
 ***-2.9 ***-2.58 *-1.85 
% of pop. above 65 1.4045 1.4316 1.2236 
 ***8.37 ***7.66 ***7.91 
East Asia & Pacific 0.9744 2.2139 -1.5311 
 0.52 0.99 -0.88 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia 5.6134 6.4202 2.7304 
 ***2.66 ***2.69 1.34 
Middle East & North Africa 3.5200 4.9357 0.4996 
 1.59 **1.88 0.24 
South Asia 2.0705 3.0489 -0.4916 
 0.9 1.16 -0.21 
North America -1.4824 -2.0394 -1.6840 
 -0.56 -0.7 -0.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.2806 -0.4718 -2.8265 
 -0.56 -0.18 -1.2 
Latin America & Caribbean 5.3955 4.6516 3.0176 
 **2.17 1.94 1.02 
cons. 3.6313 -11.1859 11.2943 
  0.44 -1.37 0.95 
    
# of obs. 159 159 159 
# of coun. 62 62 62 
F Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.69 0.64 0.70 
    
Notes: (*) indicates significance at 10 %; (**) indicates significance at 5 %; (***) indicates 
significance at 1 %.  Countries have unequal number of observations.  El Salvador does not 
have data on ethnolinguistic fractionalization.  Hence, number of countries declines to 62.  
Number of observations declines also due to lack of data for oil export. 
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Dependent Variable  Table 3.14. Panel Data 
Estimation, 2SLS: Alternative 
Measures of Redistribution 
  
Education, Heath and Social Security and Welfare 
Expenditure 
  Random Effect 2SLS Random Effect 
   
ERI 1.5541 5.0569 
 ***3.99 ***3.39 
Inequality -0.0014 0.2025 
 -0.04 1.12 
Democracy  -0.0390 -0.2448 
 -0.76 **-2.22 
Log of Real GDP per capita 
PPP -1.0393 -3.5107 
 -1.27 **-2.31 
% of pop. above 65 1.1328 1.3470 
 ***5.44 ***5.92 
East Asia & Pacific -0.7949 3.0659 
 -0.28 1.21 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia 2.6054 9.2463 
 1.19 ***3.44 
Middle East & North Africa 4.0688 8.9184 
 1.26 3.01 
South Asia -1.7230 3.9640 
 -0.45 1.3 
North America -4.1950 -4.0414 
 -1.21 -1.19 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.5200 2.8199 
 0.48 0.94 
Latin America & Caribbean 3.5718 9.5563 
 1.29 ***3.03 
cons. 9.8247 17.0186 
  1.35 1.3 
   
# of obs. 155 155 
# of coun. 61 61 
F Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.67 0.60 
   
Notes: (*) indicates significance at 10 %; (**) indicates significance at 5 %; (***) indicates significance at 1 %. 
Countries have unequal number of observations. El Salvador does  not have data on ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 
Albania is also dropped due to lack of data on heath expenditure.  Hence, number of countries declines to 61. 
Number of observations declines also due to lack of data for oil export. 
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  The results are also robust to alternative measures of democracy.  When 
alternative Freedom House indicators for democracy are used instead of the Polity IV 
index of democracy, results are not altered much.  The composite index of Freedom 
House democracy indicator produces a t-statistic of 2.99, while their political rights and 
civil liberty measures give t-statistics of 2.94 and 2.64, respectively. 
Finally, we have tried alternative measures of government expenditures to analyze 
whether ERI influences all forms of government expenditures similarly or not.  Our 
results show that ERI does not seem to play significant roles in other types of government 
spending such as in economic affairs and services and in public order and safety.  These 
robustness tests once again show that ERI needs to be taken into account in explaining 
redistribution.   These results are reported in Tables 3.15 and 3.16. 
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2SLS Regressions Dependent Variable  Table 3.15. Panel Data 
Estimation, 2SLS: 
Alternative Measures of 
Democracy 
  Social Security and Welfare Expenditure 
       
  
Democracy=Freedo
m House 
Democracy=Politic
al Rights 
Democracy=Civil 
Liberties 
    
ERI 3.5635 3.8161 3.3508 
 ***2.99 ***2.94 ***2.64 
Inequality 0.2228 0.2666 0.2566 
 *1.72 *1.94 **1.87 
Democracy  2.4654 1.0587 0.9164 
 ***2.77 ***2.89 **2.00 
Log of Real GDP per capita 
PPP -3.2988 -3.4838 -2.9994 
 ***-2.9 ***-2.86 ***-2.63 
% of pop. above 65 1.4520 1.4592 1.4352 
 ***8.38 ***8.32 ***8.09 
East Asia & Pacific 1.8113 1.3367 0.9503 
 0.94 0.7 0.51 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia 5.7973 6.0289 5.1504 
 ***2.8 ***2.76 ***2.55 
Middle East & North Africa 5.0555 4.2755 4.5992 
 **2.24 *1.91 **2.04 
South Asia 2.3378 2.3065 1.5742 
 1.04 0.99 0.7 
North America -1.0824 -1.3011 -1.2392 
 -0.42 -0.49 -0.46 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.8146 -0.1911 0.0422 
 0.36 -0.08 0.02 
Latin America & Caribbean 6.6295 6.1745 5.3996 
 ***2.48 ***2.31 **2.01 
cons. 5.7757 6.6344 3.6501 
  0.64 0.71 0.41 
    
# of obs. 159 159 159 
# of coun. 62 62 62 
F Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.70 0.69 0.69 
    
Notes: (*) indicates significance at 10 %; (**) indicates significance at 5 %; (***) indicates significance at 1 %.  
Countries have unequal number of observations.  El  Salvador does not  have data on ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization.  Hence, number of countries declines to 62.  Number of observations declines also due to lack of 
data for oil export. 
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Table 3.16. Panel Data 
Estimations, 2SLS: Other 
Types of Government 
Expenditures  Dependent Variables  
  
Economic Affairs 
and Services 
Public Order and 
Safety 
Recreational and 
Cultural Services 
    
ERI -0.0041 -0.0051 -0.0005 
 -0.5 -0.97 -0.53 
Inequality -0.0024 -0.0005 -0.0002 
 **-2.15 -0.75 -1.31 
Democracy  -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0001 
 -0.73 -0.84 1.06 
Log of Real GDP per capita 
PPP 0.0040 0.0035 0.0008 
 0.43 0.59 0.84 
% of pop. above 65 -0.0028 -0.0010 0.0000 
 **-2.13 -1.16 0.24 
East Asia & Pacific -0.0272 -0.0154 -0.0002 
 *-1.85 *-1.66 -0.15 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia -0.0227 -0.0165 0.0004 
 -1.56 **-1.81 0.24 
Middle East & North Africa -0.0175 -0.0137 0.0079 
 -1.07 -1.33 ***4.32 
South Asia -0.0078 -0.0172 -0.0009 
 -0.45 -1.58 -0.33 
North America -0.0101 -0.0076 -0.0015 
 -0.48 -0.58 -0.63 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.0213 0.0020 0.0027 
 -1.2 0.18 1.33 
Latin America & Caribbean -0.0241 -0.0126 -0.0003 
 -1.36 -1.13 -0.15 
cons. 0.1510 0.0369 0.0011 
  *1.91 0.74 0.14 
    
# of obs. 162 162 162 
# of coun. 62 62 62 
F Test (p-value) 0.00 0.01 0.00 
R-squared 0.15 0.11 0.36 
Notes: (*) indicates significance at 10 %; (**) indicates significance at 5 %; (***) indicates significance at 1 %. Countries 
have unequal number of observations.  El  Salvador does not have data on ethnolinguistic fractionalization.  Hence, 
number of countries declines to 62.  Number of observations declines also due to lack of data for oil export. 
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3.5. Determinants of Efficiency of Redistributive Institutions 
 
 Our theoretical chapter suggests that ERI is endogenous.  In addition, it has 
implications for the determinants of ERI.  For example, our theoretical model shows that 
income inequality reduces ERI.  Similarly, under this framework, our model asserts that 
when the median voter has more power to set up institutions, he/she prefers higher ERI as 
compared to the case when decisive voter on institutions is richer than the median voter.  
Hence, our theoretical model implies that more democratic countries reach a higher level 
of ERI as long as more democracy indicates more political power for the median voter.  
Finally, in one of the specifications, we follow Azariadis and Lahiri (2003) and assume 
that ERI is a positive function of an average income.  These three implications of our 
theoretical model are testable with the available data sets.  In this section, we primarily 
focus on testing these predictions in addition to analyzing some other possible 
determinants of ERI.  In this regard, we also analyze the role of freedom of press on ERI. 
 In explaining ERI, we start with the reduced form specification of the previous 
section.  Later, we incorporate other potential determinants of ERI into the empirical 
estimation.  Hence, ERI is first regressed on measures of income inequality, democracy, 
log of real GDP per capita (PPP), share of population over 65 years old and on regional 
dummies44.   The first column of Table 3.17, reports the simple OLS regressions on ERI.  
The robust regression estimation when observations are weighted down with respect to 
error term is presented in Column 2.  The weighted least square estimation in Column 3 
                                                 
44 Since ERI data of ICRG are available after 1983, all the other control variables are also averaged for 
years after 1983. 
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reports the estimation results when the log GDP per capita is used as a weight, 
considering the idea that in higher income countries data quality is better.  In the last 
column, we enhance the basic model by controlling for ethnolinguistic fractionalization, 
share of oil export in merchandise export and number of years after independence.  These 
variables are justified as instruments in previous sections and constitute possible 
determinants of ERI in this section, as well. 
 In all these empirical estimations, we confirm the main predictions of our 
theoretical model.  Most interestingly, income inequality reduces ERI.  The income 
inequality coefficient is significant at a ten percent level in almost all the regressions in a 
two-tailed test.  In accordance with the theory, democratic countries reach a higher level 
of ERI and this result is highly significant at even less than one percent in all the 
regressions.  Similarly, the log GDP per capita appears to have highly positive and 
significant coefficients in all the estimations.  Chong and Calderon (2000) also reach a 
similar conclusion by empirically showing that the direction of causation is mostly from 
economic development to institutional quality (also see Paldam, 2002).  This result 
confirms one of the premises of our theoretical model that wealthier countries are 
characterized as having better ERI.  In all these regressions, the share of population over 
65 years old is not significant, while Latin American countries and Eastern and Central 
Asian countries tend to have a lower ERI.  Moreover, the last column shows that high oil 
export and ethnolinguistic fractionalization are associated with lower ERI.  Whereas, 
additional years after independence improve ERI.   
 We run these regressions on the initial sample of countries used in the previous 
section to be consistent with the earlier redistribution estimations.  However, we have 
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more data available for ERI when we do not analyze social security and welfare 
expenditures.  In this case, our sample of countries increases from 63 to 67 countries.  
The estimation results on this extended sample are reported in the Appendix.  It is 
apparent that our results in this section are fortified for the larger sample in the Appendix.   
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Dependent Variable  Table 3.17. Determinants of 
ERI: Cross-Sectional 
Regressions 
  Efficiency of Redistributive Institutions 
  OLS  Robust 
Weighted 
Least Square OLS 
     
Inequality -0.0196 -0.0215 -0.0191 -0.0183 
 *-1.8 *-1.81 *-1.73 *-1.84 
Democracy / Gastil 0.0669 0.0581 0.0640 0.0505 
 ***3.05 **2.42 ***2.9 ***2.58 
Log of Real GDP per capita 
PPP 0.7365 0.7409 0.7461 0.8445 
 ***5.23 ***4.81 ***5.16 ***6.53 
% of pop. above 65 -0.0122 -0.0081 -0.0089 -0.0371 
 -0.33 -0.2 -0.24 -1.1 
East Asia & Pacific -0.4032 -0.3268 -0.3655 -0.1519 
 -0.94 -0.7 -0.88 -0.39 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia -1.1162 -1.1483 -1.1077 -0.7599 
 ***-3.57 ***-3.36 ***-3.69 **-2.54 
Middle East & North Africa -0.3808 -0.4630 -0.3761 -0.1996 
 -0.74 -0.82 -0.74 -0.44 
South Asia -0.5596 -0.5642 -0.5181 -0.1830 
 -1.01 -0.93 -0.92 -0.36 
North America -0.1142 -0.0937 -0.1135 0.2023 
 -0.25 -0.19 -0.26 0.48 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.2627 0.2386 0.2937 0.6675 
 0.52 0.43 0.59 1.41 
Latin America & Caribbean -1.2571 -1.2303 -1.2404 -1.3602 
 ***-3.14 ***-2.81 ***-3.19 ***-3.89 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization -0.7056 
    **-2.2 
Oil export    -0.0065 
    **-2.08 
Years after independence  0.0035 
    **2.15 
cons. -4.9821 -4.9199 -5.1134 -5.8047 
  ***-3.87 ***-3.5 ***-3.87 ***-5.09 
# of coun. 63 63 63 62 
F Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.78   0.79 0.85 
     
Notes: (*) indicates significance at 10 %; (**) indicates significance at 5 %; (***) indicates significance at 1 %.  
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Figure 3.9: OLS Partial Regression Diagram
Inequality and ERI
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As a next step, we analyze whether our results survive when income inequality is 
instrumented.  In the previous sections, ethnolinguistic fractionalization and the dummy 
for tropical climate are used to instrument income inequality.  However, ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization is also significant in directly affecting ERI, we can only use a dummy 
for tropical climate as an instrument for income inequality.  There is also one more 
alternative instrument for income inequality.  We also use the past values of income 
inequality (before 1985) as an instrument for present income inequality (after 1985).  
Table 3.18 reports the results of these regressions.  Definitely, past value of income 
inequality is a more significant instrument in the first stage.  However, these alternative 
instruments ultimately generate very similar results.     
 In the first stage, past value of income inequality is highly significant in 
estimating the late income inequality at one percent level.  Whereas, a tropical dummy is 
significant at ten percent.  In the final regressions, the former results presented in this 
section remain pretty the much same, except for income inequality.  When income 
inequality is instrumented, income inequality loses its significance in explaining ERI.  
Hence, one may conclude that an adverse effect of income inequality is not robust to 
instrumentation of income inequality.  This result is also likely to stem from the choice of 
instrument for income inequality.  But, these are the best instruments that we can 
currently abide, considering the existing limitations in the literature to pinpoint strong 
instruments for income inequality.  However, other results are not altered at all.  Among 
the main predictions of the theoretical model, still higher democracy and a GDP per 
capita bring higher ERI and these results are highly significant in all the regressions.   
 128
 
Dependent Variable  Table 3.18. Determinants of 
ERI: 2SLS  Regressions 
  Efficiency of Redistributive Institutions 
  IV 
Inequality 
First Stage: 
instrument=tr
opical IV 
Inequality First 
Stage: 
instrument=past 
inequality 
Inequality -0.0095  0.0001  
 -0.27  0.01  
Democracy / Gastil 0.0453 0.5812 0.0395 0.1764 
 *1.7 **2.18 **2.09 0.77 
Log of Real GDP per capita 
PPP 0.8317 1.3836 0.8177 -1.3573 
 ***6.71 0.76 ***6.94 -0.87 
% of pop. above 65 -0.0296 -0.7487 -0.0213 0.3917 
 -0.71 -1.59 -0.67 0.89 
East Asia & Pacific -0.1254 -5.6714 -0.0964 0.2465 
 -0.35 -0.98 -0.27 0.05 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia -0.7435 -2.0488 -0.7255 1.7608 
 ***-2.76 -0.48 ***-2.69 0.5 
Middle East & North Africa -0.2253 4.0227 -0.2535 4.2596 
 -0.55 0.62 -0.62 0.82 
South Asia -0.1403 -4.7965 -0.0933 -1.3698 
 -0.29 -0.66 -0.2 -0.23 
North America 0.1909 1.0059 0.1785 2.8374 
 0.51 0.17 0.47 0.58 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.6108 3.1225 0.5484 3.0862 
 1.3 0.45 1.27 0.57 
Latin America & Caribbean -1.3866 2.1419 -1.4157 5.7493 
 ***-4.28 0.43 ***-4.46 1.42 
Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization -0.7669 7.8754 -0.8343 5.1245 
 **-2.07 *1.75 ***-2.78 1.41 
Oil export -0.0062 -0.0484 -0.0060 -0.0546 
 **-2.14 -1.06 **-2.1 -1.51 
Years after independence 0.0033 0.0130 0.0032 -0.0044 
 **2.16 0.56 **2.15 -0.23 
Instrument 4.6467  0.6864 
  *1.74  ***5.48 
cons. -6.0641 29.4118 -6.3494 18.9864 
  ***-4.26 *1.87 ***-5.88 1.48 
# of coun. 62 62 62 62 
F Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.84 0.52 0.83 0.69 
Notes: (*) indicates significance at 10 %; (**) indicates significance at 5 %; (***) indicates significance at 1 %.  
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 Given that democracy emerges as one of the major stimulus for better ERI in all 
these regressions, we attempt to analyze the various components of democracy, which are 
influential in reaching a higher level of ERI.  Hence, we employ the disaggregated 
measures of democracy by Freedom House and Polity IV.  We do not find that there 
exists significant difference between political rights and civil liberties indices of Freedom 
House in affecting ERI.  However, in Polity IV variables, constraint on the executive 
appears to be more important than the composite index of Polity IV.  Table 3.19 reports 
these results when income inequality is instrumented with its past value.  The results are 
similar when income inequality is instrumented with the tropical dummy.  These 
regression results are presented in the Appendix as well.   
Income inequality has regional characteristics. For example, Latin America is 
characterized with high income inequality due to its historical experiences which is 
briefly mentioned earlier, while East Asian countries enjoy more equal distribution of 
income.  Hence, we drop the regional dummies in ERI equation to see how our results in 
Table 3.18 change.  As expected without regional dummies, income inequality now 
emerges to be significant in ERI equation with t-statistic equal to 1.95.  Similar to initial 
results, GDP per capita is still highly significant at less than one percent level.  However, 
democracy and years after independence lose their significance.  All the other results 
remain unaltered.  
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Dependent Variable  
Efficiency of Redistributive Institutions 
Table 3.19. Determinants 
of ERI: 2SLS  
Regressions; Alternative 
Measures of Democracy 
  
  
Democracy=
Freedom 
House 
Democracy
=Political 
Rights 
Democracy
=Civil 
Liberties 
Democracy=Con
straint on 
Executive 
Inequality 0.0007 0.0002 0.0040 -0.0030 
 0.06 0.02 0.33 -0.24 
Democracy / Gastil 0.5405 0.1884 0.2531 0.1761 
 ***3.47 ***3.43 ***3.27 ***3.72 
Log of Real GDP per 
capita PPP 0.7747 0.7666 0.7334 0.8110 
 ***6.79 ***6.69 ***6.08 ***7.08 
% of pop. above 65 -0.0439 -0.0383 -0.0440 -0.0316 
 -1.41 -1.25 -1.4 -1.07 
East Asia & Pacific -0.2768 -0.1588 -0.0210 -0.0821 
 -0.81 -0.47 -0.06 -0.25 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia -0.7044 -0.6897 -0.5158 -0.7149 
 ***-2.73 ***-2.67 *-1.86 ***-2.82 
Middle East & North 
Africa -0.4021 -0.3125 -0.2162 -0.2712 
 -1.08 -0.83 -0.55 -0.73 
South Asia -0.0722 -0.1262 0.1023 -0.0857 
 -0.16 -0.28 0.22 -0.2 
North America 0.1176 0.1212 0.0842 0.1726 
 0.32 0.33 0.22 0.48 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.3177 0.4111 0.4709 0.5932 
 0.78 1.02 1.14 1.48 
Latin America & 
Caribbean -1.6393 -1.5256 -1.4926 -1.4308 
 ***-5.24 ***-4.98 ***-4.79 ***-4.77 
Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization -0.7021 -0.7028 -0.7834 -0.8426 
 ***-2.45 ***-2.45 ***-2.74 ***-3.06 
Oil export -0.0044 -0.0051 -0.0048 -0.0046 
 -1.57 *-1.85 *-1.68 *-1.69 
Years after independence 0.0038 0.0035 0.0036 0.0032 
 ***2.67 ***2.5 ***2.49 **2.18 
cons. -4.7662 -5.0674 -4.7039 -6.8530 
  ***-4.12 ***-4.54 ***-3.99 ***-6.91 
# of coun. 62 62 62 62 
F Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.86 
Notes: (*) indicates significance at 10 %; (**) indicates significance at 5 %; (***) indicates significance at 1 %.  
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Democracy definitely has certain requirements.  We then concentrate on the role 
of freedom of the press on ERI.  When the index of freedom of press by Freedom 
House45 is also incorporated into the instrumental variable regression specification, it is 
clear that freedom of the press significantly increases ERI in the first column of Table 
3.20.  On the other hand, democracy loses its significance.  This result provides evidence 
that freedom of press is one of the mechanisms to achieve a higher level of democracy.  
These findings are consistent with earlier research.  For example, Lederman et al. (2004) 
also confirm the importance of freedom of the press in lowering corruption. 
 Finally, we consider the role of trade on ERI.  Definitely, institutions are 
important in shaping the trade performance of a country.  The causality, however, is also 
likely to work from trade openness to institutions.  Trade policies may play a role in 
shaping the institutions in the long-run.  Along this line, Wei (2000) provides evidence 
that open countries are less corrupt.  Hence, we include the total share of import and 
export in aggregate GDP as an indicator of trade openness into our regression 
specification in Column 2 of Table 3.20.  Our estimation results uncover that trade 
openness increases ERI.  This result is highly significant at even less than a one percent 
level. 
                                                 
45 Freedom of House variables for democracy and freedom of the press is rescaled so that higher values 
indicate more democracy and more freedom of the press.  
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Dependent Variable  Table 3.20. Other 
Determinants of ERI: 2SLS 
Regressions 
  Efficiency of Redistributive Institutions 
  X=freedom of Press X=trade 
   
Inequality 0.0007 -0.0030 
 0.05 -0.24 
Democracy / Gastil 0.0050 0.0435 
 0.21 ***2.33 
Log of Real GDP per capita 
PPP 0.8290 0.7321 
 ***7.48 ***6.5 
% of pop. above 65 -0.0492 -0.0101 
 -1.61 -0.35 
East Asia & Pacific -0.1601 -0.1895 
 -0.48 -0.57 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia -0.6285 -0.6271 
 **-2.43 ***-2.55 
Middle East & North Africa -0.3467 0.0320 
 -0.89 0.09 
South Asia 0.0957 0.2269 
 0.21 0.51 
North America 0.0769 0.7015 
 0.21 *1.88 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.3535 0.9406 
 0.84 **2.33 
Latin America & Caribbean -1.5721 -1.3289 
 ***-5.1 ***-4.63 
Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization -0.7719 -0.8230 
 ***-2.75 ***-2.91 
Oil export -0.0055 -0.0036 
 ***-2.03 -1.34 
Years after independence 0.0035 0.0063 
 ***2.5 ***4.04 
X 0.0135 0.0069 
 ***2.6 ***3.33 
cons. -5.5559 -6.5022 
  ***-5.45 ***-5.99 
# of coun. 62 62 
F Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.85 0.86 
   
Notes: (*) indicates significance at 10 %; (**) indicates significance at 5 %; (***) indicates significance at 1 %.  
 133
3.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter empirically analyzes the role of efficiency of redistributive 
institutions on the redistribution in the form of social security and welfare spending.   
Moreover, this chapter also sheds some light on the determinants of ERI.  When 
measures of ERI are incorporated into the existing empirical specifications of income 
inequality and redistribution, cross-sectional and panel data regressions show that ERI 
significantly increases the redistribution.  This result is robust to alternative specifications 
of the empirical model as well as to alternative data sets.  However, we find weaker 
evidence for the role of income inequality on redistribution.  Income inequality does not 
appear to be strongly significant in various specifications of the redistribution equation.  
Based on this evidence, this chapter concludes that efficiency of redistributive institutions 
play an important role in redistribution but this effect does not resolve the fiscal policy 
puzzle that is emphasized in the theoretical chapter.  On the other hand, our empirical 
results in this chapter confirm our theoretical model that increase in GDP per capita and 
democracy increases ERI.  However, there is less convincing evidence for the negative 
role of income inequality on ERI.  Among the other determinants of ERI, freedom of the 
press and trade openness improve ERI substantially.     
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A. Appendices  
A.2. Appendices for Chapter 2 
 
A.2.1. Derivation of tax rate when efficiency of redistributive institutions is a 
positive function of average income 
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A.2.2.Proof of Proposition 3 
 
The equilibrium tax rate in Equation 6 depends on ∗α  and ∗α , in turn, depends on ∗T .  
Hence, one needs to do a comparative analysis in order to analyze the effects of income 
inequality on ∗T  and ∗α .  Moreover, given that ∗α is a function of y  and my , either y  
or my  needs to be kept constant while the other one changes in order to represent income 
inequality.   
 
1-When y is Constant 
When y  is kept constant, a decline in my  increases income inequality given that myy >  .  
Hence, in order to show that income inequality increases ∗T  and reduces ∗α , we need to 
show that following expressions hold: (i) 0≤∂
∂ ∗
my
T  and  (ii) 0≥∂
∂ ∗
my
α . 
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2-When my  is  Constant 
When my  is kept constant, an increase in y  increases income inequality, given that 
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Then we can rewrite 
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A.2.3. Why the Wealthy May Have More Political Power 
 
Generally, political economy models of income inequality and redistribution 
assume equal political power for each individual, regardless of his/her income.  But, in 
practice, the belief that the wealthy minority, not the poor majority, controls the political 
process is widespread.  Our model takes unequal political power into account in 
determining the redistributive institutions.   
Our model is not the first in loosening the perfect democracy assumption.  Verdier 
and Ades (1992) deviate from perfect democracy assumption and analyze the case when 
only a fraction of population is enfranchised to vote.  They assume that belonging to the 
ruling class is costly.  Membership in ruling elite requires some fixed investment 
expenditure.  When capital markets are imperfect, mean preserving increase in inequality 
pushes a greater fraction of the population into a situation of political disenfranchisement, 
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thereby concentrating political power on the wealthy.  One can find some historical 
evidence that voting franchises are restricted to citizens owning a minimum amount of 
property in Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), Pearson and Tabellini (1994) and Jack and 
Lagunoff (2004);   for example, Jack and Lagunoff state: 
 
In the 19th century, England partially expanded along lines of wealth or property ownership as 
well.  However, in Italy, the franchise was granted to citizens who passed certain educational as 
well as financial criteria in 1849.  19th century Prussia presents an interesting case: in 1849 
voting rights were extended to most citizens, but these rights were accorded proportional to 
percentage of taxes paid.  The electorate was divided into three groups, each group given equal 
weight in the voting.  The wealthiest individuals who accounted for the first third of taxes paid 
accounted for 3.5 % of the population.  The next wealthiest group-the ‘middle class’-accounted 
for 10-12 % of population.  The rest of the population (about 85 %) accounted for the remaining 
third of the power. (2004 p.3) 
 
 
In our model, instead of assuming that there is a fixed cost for political 
participation, we follow Benabou (1996, 2000) in formulating the unequal political power 
in shaping the redistributive institutions.  Benabou (1996, 2000) attributes the political 
power of individuals proportionally to their income.  Hence, higher income inequality 
also leads to greater inequality in the political arena.   
Having said that we adopt Benabou’s method in formulating political power, 
Prussian experience provides a valid historical example, revealing the political power of 
the wealthy.  In our model, the taxation is proportional to income, and therefore the 
wealthy disproportionately bear the burden of taxation.  Similar to our model, in the 
Prussian experience, the wealthy, 3.5% of the population, pay more per capita than the 
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other groups for taxation. But at the same time, their political power per person is also 
much higher than the citizens in other groups.   
One may have definite doubts in extending these historical episodes to the 
present, considering that it is rare to encounter with the cases that officially only the 
wealthy are enfranchised with certain political rights.  However, there is less contention 
for the idea that the wealthy have other means to express their political influence today, 
and most of the time, these means are very much proportional to income.  Similar to 
Benabou (1996, 2000), in this study, we do not attempt to model why the wealthy emerge 
to be more powerful to influence government’s decision.  Nonetheless one can think of 
several reasons.  For example, there is an extensive literature on how the wealthy can 
exert more political power in affecting government’s policies through lobbying activity, 
like in Estaban and Ray (2004), Bassett, Burkett and Putterman (1999).   
Another reason for greater political power of the wealthy can be related to the 
collective action problem originally formulated by Olson (1965).  For example, 
Rodriguez (2004) analyzes the political power of the wealthy in the context of income 
inequality and redistribution.  He shows that once the wealthy have lobbying power under 
uncertainty, standard positive relationship between income inequality and redistribution 
dissolves.  The most interesting aspect of his work is that Rodriguez incorporates 
collective action issues in his analysis.  The wealthy are not just more powerful because 
of their income, but at the same time they are more immune to collective action 
problems.  Hence, they can form coalitions or lobbies much more easily than the poor.  
Moreover, considering their number and greater interest at stake as factors reducing 
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collective action problem, collective action issues emerge as another plausible reason for 
the wealthy to be more powerful in influencing redistributive institutions. 
 
A.2.4.Why the Wealthy do not Directly Reduce Tax Rate 
 
The question why the wealthy do not directly reduce the tax rate but attempt to 
exaggerate inefficiency in redistributive institutions is very much related to the literature 
on inefficient redistribution.  In the inefficient redistribution literature, the central issue is 
exactly the same that why redistribution takes inefficient forms even if more efficient 
alternatives exist.  In our model, reducing the tax rates is definitely better than reducing 
the efficiency of redistributive institutions, given that disincentive effect of taxation will 
be reduced in addition to not aggravating the inefficiency in redistributive institutions.  
Then, why do the wealthy tend to reduce ERI instead of reducing tax rates directly? 
Asymmetric information and commitment problems constitute strong candidates 
for this behavior.   First, the wealthy prefer to play with ERI when people imperfectly 
observe identity of individuals in designing the ERI, but they are perfectly informed 
about the identity of the wealthy, when they attempt to reduce the tax rate.  For example, 
the wealthy may not dare to offer a cut in taxes channeled for social security spending for 
the poor directly.  Instead they prefer to make the poor think that social security spending 
does not bring much benefit to them because of the low ERI.  Hence, by reducing ERI, 
the wealthy leave the decision to the poor to reduce the tax rate and redistribution.  As 
long as their attempts to reduce ERI are observed with more imperfection than their 
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attempts to reduce taxes, the wealthy prefer to manipulate ERI instead of trying to reduce 
tax rates.  Keefer and Khemani (2003) support this idea by stating  
 
It is especially difficult for voters to assess the quality and efficiency of service provision and to 
evaluate the responsibility of specific political actors for service breakdowns. (p.2) 
 
The second reason for this inefficient policy stems from the commitment problem.  
It is not time consistent to set the equilibrium taxes at a lower rate in the first stage.  Even 
though in the first stage the wealthy and the poor agree to lower the tax rates, there is no 
guarantee that this agreement will last in the second stage.  In other words, there is no 
reason for the median voter to comply with any agreement to reduce tax rates in the 
second stage, once the ERI is already determined.    
There are definitely certain escape routes to overcome the commitment problem, 
especially when the game is repeated over time.  However, it is not easy at all to reverse 
institutions as a punishment strategy, considering the literature on the persistence of 
institutions (like in Acemoglu and Robinson 2001-a, Sokoloff and Engerman 2000).  In 
short, it is much more difficult to alter redistributive institutions in the future.  Therefore, 
in spite of the cost of increasing inefficiencies, the wealthy prefer to establish less 
efficient redistributive institutions to force the poor to commit to a lower aggregate 
redistribution scheme. 
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A.2.5. Constitutional Context of Buchanan and Tullock 
  
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) develop a theory of constitutional government.  
Their constitutional stage closely resembles the first stage in our analysis in determining 
∗α .  In their context, individuals are uncertain about their future positions and thus are 
led out of self-interest to select rules that weigh the positions of all other individuals.   
Similar to their constitutional context, in our model, individuals in the first stage 
can be assumed to have information about the future income distribution with certainty 
but have no information about their own future income.  Individuals learn their income in 
the second stage.  Then, each individual in the first stage -constitutional stage- has an 
expected income equal to average income in the economy.  The existence of uncertainty 
about the individual’s own income ensures that unanimity is obtained in the first stage.  
Hence, the decisive voter in the first stage expects to have average income, which is 
greater than the median income that will be realized in the second stage.  Again, due to 
the same reason that the decisive voter expecting mean income will not be the decisive 
voter in the second stage, each individual in the first stage agrees to set ∗α  lower than the 
median voter of the second period in order to constrain redistributive taxation desired by 
the future median voter.   Similar to the first explanation, income inequality aggravates 
the reduction in ∗α , while it increases the redistributive pressure. 
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 The decisive voter’s expected income in the first period is equal to the mean 
income46 yyE d
r=)( .  Therefore, Equation 7 becomes 
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Now, we can show how ∗α  changes with income inequality.  This change 
corresponds to the simulations above when  5.0=λ  because the decisive voter’s 
expected income becomes mean income when 5.0=λ  [ yeyE d == +
2
2
1
)(
σμ
].  Hence, one 
can also consider the above simulations when  5.0=λ  as an example in this case and 
note that  ∗α  declines with income inequality.   
 
Proposition A-1: 
Income inequality reduces the ERI when there is uncertainty about the individuals’ future income but 
has no uncertainty about the future distribution of aggregate income. 
                                                 
46 In order to convey the main message, we abstract from risk-aversion and assume linear utility function. 
The risk-aversion does not abruptly change the results as long as expected income sufficiently exceeds the 
median income in the second period. 
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A.3. Appendices for Chapter 3 
A.3.1. Appendix for the Bringing the Theory to the Data 
 
A group of experts evaluate the countries in ICRG sample and give points for each 
category based on the following explanations in this section.  These explanations of 
ICRG variables are obtained from the official manual of ICRG.  
Control over Corruption “is a measure of corruption within the political system.   
Such corruption is a threat to foreign investment for several reasons: it distorts the 
economic and financial environment; it reduces the efficiency of government and 
business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage 
rather than ability, and, last but not least, introduces an inherent instability into the 
political process”. 
 
Quality of Bureaucracy indicates that “countries where the bureaucracy has the 
strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions 
in government services.   In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be 
somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established 
mechanism for recruitment and training.   Countries that lack the cushioning 
effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government 
tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative 
functions.” 
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Investment Profile “is a measure of the government’s attitude to inward 
investment as determined by our assessment of four sub-components: the risk to 
operations, taxation and repatriation and labor costs”. 
 
Law and Order “are assessed separately, with each sub-component comprising 
zero to three points.   The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength 
and impartiality of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an 
assessment of popular observance of the law.”   
 
Government Stability “is a measure both of the government’s ability to carry out 
its declared program(s), and its ability to stay in office.   This will depend on the 
type of governance, the cohesion of the government and governing party or 
parties, the closeness of the next election, the government’s command of the 
legislature, popular approval of government policies, and so on.” 
 
Socioeconomic Conditions “is an attempt to measure general public satisfaction, 
or dissatisfaction, with the government’s economic policies.   In general terms, 
the greater the popular dissatisfaction with a government’s policies, the greater 
the chances that the government will be forced to change tack, possibly to the 
detriment of business, or will fall.”  
 
Internal Conflict “is an assessment of political violence in the country and its 
actual or potential impact on governance.   The highest rating is given to those 
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countries where there is no armed opposition to the government and the 
government does not indulge in arbitrary violence, direct or indirect, against its 
own people.” 
 
External Conflict “is an assessment both of the risk to the incumbent government 
and to inward investment.   It ranges from trade restrictions and embargoes, 
whether imposed by a single country, a group of countries, or the international 
community as a whole, through geopolitical disputes, armed threats, exchanges of 
fire on borders, border incursions, foreign-supported insurgency, and full-scale 
warfare.” 
 
Ethnic Tensions “measures the degree of tension within a country attributable to 
racial, nationality, or language divisions.   Lower ratings are given to countries 
where racial and nationality tensions are high because opposing groups are 
intolerant and unwilling to compromise.   Higher ratings are given to countries 
where tensions are minimal, even though such differences may still exist.” 
 
Religious Tensions “may stem from the domination of society and/or governance 
by a single religious group that seeks to replace civil law by religious law and to 
exclude other religions from the political and/or social process; the desire of a 
single religious group to dominate governance; the suppression off religious 
freedom; the desire of a religious group to express its own identity, separate from 
the country as a whole.” 
 150
 
Military in Politics: “The military is not elected by anyone.   Therefore, its 
involvement in politics, even at a peripheral level, is a diminution of democratic 
accountability.   However, it also has other significant implications.  The military 
might, for example, become involved in government because of an actual or 
created internal or external threat.   Such a situation would imply the distortion of 
government policy in order to meet this threat, for example by increasing the 
defense budget at the expense of other budget allocations.” 
 
Description of Construction of Polity Variable in the Manual of Polity IV 
Following explanations for the construction of Polity IV variables are directly obtained 
from the manual of Polity IV.  
 
“2. Indicators of Democracy and Autocracy (Composite Indicators) 
In an attempt to facilitate empirical analysis of these and other historical trends, Polity IV 
includes constructed annual measures for both institutionalized democracy (DEMOC) 
and autocracy (AUTOC), as many polities exhibit mixed qualities of both of these 
distinct authority patterns. The measures are composite indices derived from the coded 
values of authority characteristic component variables according to the formulas, 
originally designed by Gurr, provided below. A third indicator, POLITY, is derived 
simply by subtracting the AUTOC value from the DEMOC value; this procedure 
provides a single regime score that ranges from +10 (full democracy) to 10 (full 
autocracy). During periods of central authority interruption, collapse, or transition, the 
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DEMOC, AUTOC, and POLITY scores will be the assigned Standardized Authority 
Code. The fourth variable listed in this section, DURABLE, provides a running measure 
of the durability of the regime’s authority pattern for a given year, that is, the number of 
years since the last substantive change in authority characteristics (defined as a 3-point 
change in the POLITY score). 
 
2.1 DEMOC  
Institutionalized Democracy: Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent 
elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can 
express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the 
existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third 
is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political 
participation. Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of 
checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are means to, or specific 
manifestations of, these general principles. We do not include coded data on civil 
liberties. 
The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The operational 
indicator of democracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political 
participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints 
on the chief executive using the following weights: 
 
Authority Coding Scale Weight 
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP): 
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(3) Election +2 
(2) Transitional +1 
Openness of Executive Recruitment (XROPEN):  
only if XRCOMP is Election (3) or Transitional (2)  
(3) Dual/election +1 
(4) Election +1 
Constraint on Chief Executive (XCONST): 
(7) Executive parity or subordination +4 
(6) Intermediate category +3 
(5) Substantial limitations +2 
(4) Intermediate category +1 
Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP): 
(5) Competitive +3 
(4) Transitional +2 
(3) Factional +1 
This "institutional democracy" indicator follows a logic similar to that underlying the 
Polity I analyses. There is no "necessary condition" for characterizing a political system 
as democratic; rather democracy is treated as a variable. For example, the scale 
discriminates among Western parliamentary and presidential systems based on the extent 
of constraints on the chief executive. Charles de Gaulle as president of the French Fifth 
Republic operated within slight to moderate political limitations. Thus the early years of 
the Fifth Republic have lower Democracy scores than the United States or the Federal 
Republic of Germany, where constraints on the executive approach parity. Similarly, the 
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onset of "cohabitation" in France during the second phase of the first Mitterrand 
presidency is marked by a shift toward parity on the Executive Constraints scale and a 
concomitant increase in France's Democracy score. 
If the composite indicator of institutionalized democracy is inappropriate for some 
conceptual purposes, it can be easily redefined either by altering the constituent 
categories and weights, or by specifying some minimum preconditions. A mature and 
internally coherent democracy, for example, might be operationally defined as one 
in which (a) political participation is fully competitive, (b) executive recruitment is 
elective, and (c) constraints on the chief executive are substantial. 
 
2.2 AUTOC  
Institutionalized Autocracy: "Authoritarian regime" in Western political discourse is a 
pejorative term for some very diverse kinds of political systems whose common 
properties are a lack of regularized political competition and concern for political 
freedoms. We use the more neutral term Autocracy and define it operationally in terms of 
the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics. 
In mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political 
participation. Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection 
within the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional 
constraints. Most modern autocracies also exercise a high degree of directiveness over 
social and economic activity, but we regard this as a function of political ideology and 
choice, not a defining property of autocracy. Social democracies also exercise relatively 
high degrees of directiveness. We prefer to leave open for empirical investigation the 
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question of how Autocracy, Democracy, and Directiveness (performance) have covaried 
over time. An eleven-point Autocracy scale is constructed additively. Our operational 
indicator of autocracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political 
participation, the regulation of participation, the openness and competitiveness of 
executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive using the following weights: 
 
Authority Coding Scale Weight 
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP): 
(1) Selection +2 
Openness of Executive Recruitment (XROPEN): 
only if XRCOMP is coded Selection (1) 
(1) Closed +1 
(2) Dual/designation +1 
Constraints on Chief Executive (XCONST): 
(1) Unlimited authority +3 
(2) Intermediate category +2 
(3) Slight to moderate limitations +1 
Regulation of participation (PARREG): 
(4) Restricted +2 
(3) Sectarian +1 
Competitiveness of Participation (PARCOMP): 
(1) Repressed +2 
(2) Suppressed +1 
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The logic of this "institutionalized autocracy" scale is similar to that of the 
institutionalized democracy scale, below, and it is subject to the same kinds of 
operational redefinition to suit different theoretical purposes. Note that the two scales do 
not share any categories in common. Nonetheless many polities have mixed authority 
traits, and thus can have middling scores on both Autocracy and Democracy scales. 
These are the kinds of polities which were characterized as "anocratic" and "incoherent" 
in the Polity I studies. As a group they proved to less durable than coherent democracies 
and autocracies (see Gurr 1974, Harmel 1980, Lichbach 1984). 
 
2.3 POLITY  
Combined Polity Score: The POLITY score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC 
score from the DEMOC score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 
(strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).” 
 
Description of Construction of Gastil / Freedom House Democracy Variable from 
their web page 
“Raw Points – The ratings process is based on a checklist of 10 political rights questions 
(grouped into three subcategories) and 15 civil liberties questions (grouped into four 
subcategories). Raw points are awarded to each of these questions on a scale of 0 to 4, 
where 0 points represents the smallest degree and 4 points the greatest degree of rights or 
liberties present. The only exception to the addition of 0 to 4 points per checklist item is 
Additional Discretionary Question B in the Political Rights Checklist, for which 1 to 4 
points are subtracted depending on the severity of the situation. The highest number of 
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points that can be awarded to the political rights checklist is 40 (or a total of up to 4 
points for each of the 10 questions). The highest number of points that can be awarded to 
the civil liberties checklist is 60 (or a total of up to 4 points for each of the 15 questions).  
To answer the political rights questions, Freedom House considers to what extent the 
system offers voters the opportunity to choose freely from among candidates and to what 
extent the candidates are chosen independently of the state. However, formal electoral 
procedures are not the only factors that determine the real distribution of power. In many 
countries, the military retains a significant political role, while in others, the king 
maintains considerable power over the elected politicians. In addition, elected 
governments must exhibit levels of accountability, openness, and transparency between 
elections. 
In answering the civil liberties questions, Freedom House does not equate constitutional 
guarantees of human rights with the on-the-ground fulfillment of these rights. Both laws 
and actual practices are factored into the ratings decisions. For states and territories with 
small populations, particularly tiny island nations, the absence of trade unions and other 
forms of association is not necessarily viewed as a negative situation unless the 
government or other centers of domination are deliberately blocking their establishment 
or operation. 
Political Rights and Civil Liberties Ratings – The total number of points awarded to 
the political rights and civil liberties checklists determines the political rights and civil 
liberties ratings. Each point total corresponds to a rating of 1 through 7, with 1 
representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of freedom.  
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Status of Free, Partly Free, Not Free – Each pair of political rights and civil liberties 
ratings is averaged to determine an overall status of “Free,” “Partly Free,” or “Not Free.” 
Those whose ratings average 1.0-2.5 are considered Free, 3.0-5.0 Partly Free, and 5.5-7.0 
Not Free. [In previous years, countries or territories with a combined average score of 5.5 
could be either Partly Free or Not Free, depending on the total number of raw points that 
they received.]  
 
POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES CHECKLIST  
POLITICAL RIGHTS  
A. Electoral Process  
1. Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through 
free and fair elections? 
2. Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 
3. Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling, and honest 
tabulation of ballots?  
B. Political Pluralism and Participation  
1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other 
competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall 
of these competing parties or groupings?  
2. Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic 
possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?  
3. Are the people’s political choices free from domination by the military, foreign 
powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other 
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powerful group?  
4. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable self-
determination, self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal consensus 
in the decision-making process?  
C. Functioning of Government  
1. Do freely elected representatives determine the policies of the government?  
2. Is the government free from pervasive corruption?  
3. Is the government accountable to the electorate between elections, and does it operate 
with openness and transparency?  
Additional discretionary Political Rights questions:  
A. For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the system 
provide for consultation with the people, encourage discussion of policy, and allow the 
right to petition the ruler? 
B. Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of 
a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of 
another group?  
NOTE: For each political rights and civil liberties checklist question, 0 to 4 points are 
added, depending on the comparative rights and liberties present (0 represents the least, 4 
represents the most). However, for additional discretionary question B only, 1 to 4 points 
are subtracted, when necessary.  
CIVIL LIBERTIES  
D. Freedom of Expression and Belief  
1. Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? (Note: in 
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cases where the media are state-controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the survey 
gives the system credit.)  
2. Are there free religious institutions, and is there free private and public religious 
expression?  
3. Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free of extensive political 
indoctrination?  
4. Is there open and free private discussion? 
E. Associational and Organizational Rights  
1. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion?  
2. Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization? (Note: this includes 
political parties, civic organizations, ad hoc issue groups, etc.)  
3. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there 
effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private 
organizations? 
F. Rule of Law  
1. Is there an independent judiciary?  
2. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Are police under direct 
civilian control? 
3. Is there protection from police terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, 
whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and 
insurgencies?  
4. Is the population treated equally under the law? 
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G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights  
1. Is there personal autonomy? Does the state control travel, choice of residence, or 
choice of employment? Is there freedom from indoctrination and excessive dependency 
on the state?  
2. Do citizens have the right to own property and establish private businesses? Is private 
business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, or 
organized crime?  
3. Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage 
partners, and size of family? 
4. Is there equality of opportunity and the absence of economic exploitation?”  
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A.3.2. Appendix for the Estimation Specification and Cross-Section Regressions 
 
Table A.1 
Variance Inflation 
Factor 
   
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
   
Latin America & Caribbean 8.74 0.114428 
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.38 0.156816 
% of pop. above 65 6.28 0.159222 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia 5.83 0.171613 
Log of Real GDP per capita 
PPP 5.08 0.196772 
ERI 4.7 0.212778 
East Asia & Pacific 3.65 0.274133 
Middle East & North Africa 3.63 0.275334 
Democracy  3.58 0.279216 
Inequality 2.37 0.421323 
South Asia 2.23 0.44919 
North America 1.48 0.673583 
   
Mean VIF 4.5   
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Dependent Variable  Table A.2. Alternative 
Instrument for Income 
Inequality 
  Social Security and Welfare Expenditure 
  2SLS 
ERI First 
Stage 
Inequality First 
Stage 
ERI 2.9680   
 ***3.01   
Inequality 0.0287   
 0.42   
Democracy  -0.2433 0.0433 0.1597 
 **-1.96 ***2.64 0.81 
Log of Real GDP per capita 
PPP -2.8871 0.8327 -1.8906 
 ***-3.37 ***6.51 -1.09 
% of pop. above 65 1.1701 -0.0242 0.5012 
 ***5.78 -0.55 1.2 
East Asia & Pacific -0.4390 -0.1286 0.7202 
 -0.24 -0.32 0.18 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia 3.0584 -0.7247 1.5693 
 *1.68 **-2.41 0.55 
Middle East & North Africa 1.2196 -0.2309 4.4562 
 0.59 -0.5 1.1 
South Asia -0.1193 -0.1579 -1.0926 
 -0.06 -0.36 -0.2 
North America -1.8480 0.1256 3.4913 
 -1.44 0.26 1.24 
Sub-Saharan Africa -2.0091 0.5401 3.0402 
 -1.05 1.14 0.6 
Latin America & Caribbean 4.1566 -1.4173 5.9880 
 1.63 ***-3.66 *1.67 
Past Inequality -0.0010 0.7054 
  -0.09 ***6.01 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization -0.8245 4.9224 
  ***-2.69 1.43 
Oil export  -0.0061 -0.0516 
  **-2.04 -1.61 
Years after independence 0.0030 -0.0033 
  *1.93 -0.2 
cons. 20.3905 -6.3977 21.8364 
  ***3.13 ***-6.47 *1.75 
# of coun. 62 62 62 
F Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.82 0.84 0.69 
Notes: (*) indicates significance at 10 %; (**) indicates significance at 5 %; (***) indicates 
significance at 1 %.  
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Table A.3. Correlation Matrix of Instruments      
              
  ERI 
Inequal
ity Tropical 
Ethnolingui
stic 
Fractionaliz
ation Oil export 
Years 
after 
indepen
dence 
       
ERI 1      
Inequality -0.1001 1     
Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalizatio
n -0.2515 0.1405 1    
Oil export -0.1818 0.0404 -0.0079 1   
Tropical -0.1639 0.5217 0.1668 0.1446 1  
Years after 
independence 0.1709 0.3691 -0.4202 -0.0677 0.2022 1 
  
 
 
 
Table A.4. Summary Statistics of Instruments in Cross-Section 
            
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
ERI 63 0.007299 1.025953 -1.7296 2.354461 
Inequality 63 41.77068 8.348125 23.22143 63.65 
Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 62 0.326874 0.269083 0.0124 0.8898 
Oil export 63 15.81835 22.23446 0.029759 91.07048 
Tropical 63 0.285714 0.455383 0 1 
Years after independence 63 69.20635 55.04548 10 200 
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A.5. Countries in Regressions    
       
Code Country Years Code Country Years 
ALB Albania  95-98 MAR Morocco  84-99 
ARG Argentina  84-01 MDA Moldova  96-02 
AUS Australia  84-98 MDG Madagascar  88-99 
AZE Azerbaijan  94-99 MEX Mexico  84-00 
BGR Bulgaria  88-01 MNG Mongolia  92-01 
BHS Bahamas  84-01 MYS Malaysia  85-97 
BLR Belarus  92-01 NIC Nicaragua  90-94 
BOL Bolivia  86-01 NOR Norway  84-99 
BRA Brazil  84-98 PAK Pakistan  98-02 
CAN Canada  84-01 PAN Panama  84-00 
CHL Chile  84-01 POL Poland  94-01 
CIV Ivory Coast  84-90 PRY Paraguay  84-93 
CMR Cameroon  84-99 ROM Romania  84-01 
COL  Colombia  84-99 RUS Russia  94-01 
CRI Costa Rica  84-01 SEN Senegal  84 
CZE Czech Republic  93-01 SGP Singapore  84-01 
DNK Denmark  84-00 SLV El Salvador  98-01 
DOM Dominican Republic 84-00 SVK Slovak Republic  96-01 
EGY Egypt  84-97 SVN Slovenia  93-01 
EST Estonia  91-01 SWE Sweden  84-99 
ETH Ethiopia  84-99 THA Thailand  84-01 
GBR United Kingdom  84-99 TTO 
Trinidad and 
Tobago  93-95 
HRV Croatia  84-01 TUN Tunisia  84-00 
HUN Hungary  84-01 TUR Turkey  84-01 
IDN Indonesia  94-01 UKR Ukraine  99-01 
IRL Ireland  84-97 URY Uruguay  84-01 
IRN Iran  84-00 USA  United States  84-01 
JAM Jamaica  92-01 VEN Venezuela  84-01 
KAZ Kazakhstan  97-01 ZAF South Africa  84-99 
LKA Sri Lanka  84-01 ZMB Zambia  84-88 
LTU Lithuania  93-01 ZWE Zimbabwe  84-97 
LVA Latvia  94-01    
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A.3.3. Appendix for the Panel Data Regressions 
Dependent Variable  
Social Security and Welfare Expenditure 
Table A.6. Panel Data 
Estimation: 2SLS without 
years after independence 
  
  
Random 
effect IV ERI First Stage 
Inequality First 
Stage 
ERI 3.1293   
 **2.13   
Inequality 0.0814   
 0.51   
Democracy  -0.1697 0.0347 0.1653 
 **-2.07 ***3.35 1.49 
Log of Real GDP per capita 
PPP -2.4110 0.5960 0.4769 
 **-2.31 ***4.34 0.32 
% of pop. above 65 1.1659 -0.0443 -0.0356 
 ***7.46 -1.33 -0.1 
East Asia & Pacific 0.6321 -0.7835 -3.6619 
 0.26 *-1.68 -0.73 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia 4.8467 -1.5241 -3.8468 
 *1.66 ***-4.92 -1.15 
Middle East & North Africa 3.0967 -1.1768 3.3276 
 1.08 **-2.45 0.64 
South Asia 2.0917 -1.1101 -2.2110 
 0.64 *-1.88 -0.35 
North America -1.7205 0.1123 3.3221 
 -0.7 0.21 0.57 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.4345 -0.7534 4.4934 
 0.14 -1.39 0.77 
Latin America & Caribbean 5.0931 -1.9788 5.9471 
 1.51 ***-5.1 1.43 
Tropical  0.0619 5.4022 
  0.28 **2.26 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization -0.9694 5.8481 
  ***-2.51 1.41 
Oil export  -0.0053 -0.0322 
  *-1.66 -0.95 
cons. 12.0950 -3.2156 33.2986 
  1.43 ***-2.67 ***2.57 
# of obs. 159 159 159 
# of coun. 62 62 62 
F Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.74     
Notes: (*) indicates significance at 10 %; (**) indicates significance at 5 %; (***) indicates significance at 1 %. 
Countries have unequal number of observations.  El  Salvador does not  have data on ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization.  Hence, number of countries declines to 62.  Number of observations declines also due to lack 
of data for oil export. 
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A.7. Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects: 
      
Social Security and Welfare Expenditure[code2,t] = Xb + u[code2] + e[code2,t] 
      
Estimated results:     
Var sd = sqrt(Var)    
      
Social Security and Welfare Expenditure 30.5972 5.531473    
e 1.468747 1.211919    
u 5.599781 2.366386       
      
Test:   Var(u) = 0     
chi2(1) =    88.66     
 Prob > chi2 =     0.0000       
 
A.8. Hausman Specification Test      
                 Coefficients    
 (b) (B) (b-B) 
sqrt(diag(V_b-
V_B)) 
  fixed   Difference S.E. 
     
ERI 0.520761 0.51408 0.006681 0.217933 
Inequality -0.01577 -0.02136 0.005596 0.016513 
Democracy -0.01473 -0.0367 0.021974 0.027013 
Log of Real GDP per capita 
PPP -0.20853 -0.70292 0.494393 0.820651 
% of pop. above 65 0.708934 1.055042 -0.34611 0.233162 
     
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
     
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
     
chi2(5) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)  
             =       3.48    
Prob>chi2 =  0.6266     
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A.9. Summary Statistics Panel Data     
      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Social Security and Welfare 
Expenditure 159 6.664672 5.568962 0.073963 21.59355
ERI 159 0.157238 1.094952 -2.20162 2.381169
Inequality 159 42.47868 8.031576 21.00599 64.095
Democracy  159 4.848113 5.909831 -9 10
Log of Real GDP per capita PPP 159 8.732927 0.740231 6.319616 10.15141
% of pop. above 65 159 7.895565 4.528823 2.501251 17.87484
East Asia & Pacific 159 0.125786 0.332656 0 1
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 159 0.238994 0.427816 0 1
Middle East & North Africa 159 0.069182 0.254566 0 1
South Asia 159 0.037736 0.191159 0 1
North America 159 0.012579 0.111799 0 1
Sub-Saharan Africa 159 0.069182 0.254566 0 1
Latin America & Caribbean 159 0.339623 0.475078 0 1
Tropical 159 0.283019 0.451889 0 1
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 159 0.274382 0.240112 0.0124 0.8898
Oil export 159 13.94715 19.64685 0.000478 94.08089
Years after independence 159 73.77358 58.26532 0 195
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A.10. Correlation Matrix of Panel Data        
    1 2 3 4 5 
       
1 
Social Security and Welfare 
Expenditure 1  
2 ERI 0.3792 1  
3 Inequality -0.352 -0.1275 1  
4 Democracy  0.3322 0.387 -0.0061 1 
5 Log of Real GDP per capita PPP 0.5239 0.6665 -0.1753 0.359 1
6 % of pop. above 65 0.8643 0.4386 -0.4586 0.4085 0.6315
7 Tropical -0.4368 -0.1095 0.4121 -0.1155 -0.2592
8 Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization -0.3233 -0.2251 0.0266 -0.3328 -0.3187
9 Oil export -0.1779 -0.0907 0.0031 -0.1257 0.0808
10 Years after independence 0.0551 0.131 0.3698 0.292 0.1802
   
    6 7 8 9 10 
   
6 % of pop. above 65 1  
7 Tropical -0.4915 1  
8 Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization -0.2196 0.229 1  
9 Oil export -0.1147 0.2156 -0.0623 1 
10 Years after independence -0.112 0.1455 -0.4408 -0.0507 1
 
A.11. Data on ERI in Panel  
   
Country 
Half-
decade ERI 
   
Albania 1995 -0.9285514 
Argentina 1995 -0.2695251 
Argentina 1985 0.2294731 
Argentina 1990 0.056902 
Argentina 2000 0.0675341 
Australia 1980 1.888108 
Australia 1990 1.888108 
Australia 1985 1.888108 
Azerbaijan 1995 -1.339435 
Bahamas 1995 0.8122606 
Belarus 1995 -0.3533144 
Belarus 2000 -1.072361 
Bolivia 1985 -2.201623 
Bolivia 2000 -0.5203894 
Bolivia 1990 -1.656992 
Bolivia 1995 -0.564694 
Brazil 1985 0.8122606 
Brazil 1990 0.6972132 
Brazil 1980 0.5246421 
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Brazil 1995 0.0375197 
Bulgaria 1990 0.2294731 
Bulgaria 2000 -0.6025661 
Bulgaria 1995 0.2294731 
Cameroon 1980 -0.5138193 
Cameroon 1995 -0.4906911 
Canada 1980 2.381169 
Chile 1990 -0.2635872 
Chile 1995 0.5126638 
Chile 2000 0.750628 
Chile 1980 0.2407255 
Chile 1985 -0.2635872 
Colombia 1995 -0.4742264 
Colombia 1985 0.3192003 
Colombia 1990 0.3192003 
Costa Rica 1995 0.7225334 
Costa Rica 1985 0.7225334 
Costa Rica 2000 0.101072 
Costa Rica 1990 0.771099 
Costa Rica 1980 0.7225334 
Croatia 2000 0.3808328 
Croatia 1995 -0.7323647 
Czech Republic 1995 0.8122606 
Czech Republic 1990 0.976614 
Denmark 1985 2.381169 
Denmark 1995 2.381169 
Denmark 1990 2.381169 
Denmark 1980 2.381169 
Dominican Republic 1995 -0.2165609 
Dominican Republic 1990 -0.2635872 
Dominican Republic 1985 -0.2635872 
Dominican Republic 1980 -0.2635872 
Egypt 1990 -0.2553695 
Egypt 1995 -0.567641 
El Salvador 2000 -0.1711384 
El Salvador 1995 -0.3017285 
Estonia 2000 0.5460935 
Estonia 1995 1.305321 
Ethiopia 1995 -1.388001 
Ethiopia 1980 -0.9361018 
Hungary 1995 1.737555 
Indonesia 1990 -1.211684 
Indonesia 1995 -0.5855572 
Indonesia 2000 -0.9424523 
Iran 1980 -0.8463746 
Iran 1990 -0.3398114 
Iran 1995 0.5305799 
Iran 1985 -0.8463746 
Ireland 1985 1.596715 
Ireland 1990 1.81526 
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Ivory Coast 1985 0.3192003 
Jamaica 1995 0.3192003 
Jamaica 2000 -0.1430438 
Jamaica 1990 -0.4951628 
Kazakhstan 2000 -0.808008 
Latvia 1995 -0.2635872 
Latvia 2000 -0.336399 
Lithuania 2000 -0.2028619 
Lithuania 1995 -0.2635872 
Madagascar 1995 -0.3533144 
Madagascar 1990 -0.1201994 
Malaysia 1985 0.691202 
Malaysia 1990 0.2294731 
Malaysia 1980 1.305321 
Malaysia 1995 0.572438 
Mexico 1995 -0.1873484 
Mexico 1990 -0.2635872 
Mexico 1985 -0.5452678 
Mexico 1980 -0.2635872 
Mexico 2000 0.1034864 
Moldova 1995 -0.7566475 
Moldova 2000 -0.8901846 
Mongolia 1995 0.1555141 
Morocco 1980 -0.5138193 
Morocco 1995 -0.2635872 
Morocco 1990 -0.2635872 
Nicaragua 1990 0.1397459 
Norway 1990 2.114058 
Norway 1985 2.099488 
Norway 1995 2.036026 
Norway 1980 2.381169 
Pakistan 1995 -0.518335 
Panama 1985 -1.922222 
Panama 1995 -0.7760738 
Panama 2000 -0.5502436 
Panama 1990 -1.893083 
Panama 1980 -1.922222 
Paraguay 1990 -1.38424 
Poland 2000 0.0418539 
Poland 1990 1.219398 
Poland 1995 1.270969 
Romania 1985 -1.922222 
Romania 1990 -0.4317598 
Romania 1995 -0.7395449 
Romania 2000 -1.113449 
Russia 1995 -0.9725867 
Russia 2000 -1.832495 
Senegal 1980 -0.2635872 
Singapore 1980 2.089775 
Singapore 1985 1.793939 
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Singapore 1990 1.103654 
Singapore 1995 1.249351 
Slovak Republic 1995 0.7117975 
Slovak Republic 2000 0.4116491 
Slovenia 1995 0.8122606 
Slovenia 2000 0.5451862 
South Africa 1995 0.8309171 
Sri Lanka 1990 -0.2635872 
Sri Lanka 1995 0.0897727 
Sri Lanka 1985 -0.2635872 
Sri Lanka 2000 -0.0376012 
Sri Lanka 1980 -0.2635872 
Sweden 1985 2.381169 
Sweden 1980 2.381169 
Sweden 1990 2.381169 
Thailand 1990 0.610594 
Thailand 1985 0.4211881 
Thailand 2000 -0.8901846 
Thailand 1980 0.0278065 
Thailand 1995 -0.0117717 
Trinidad and Tobago 1990 -0.2635872 
Trinidad and Tobago 1980 -0.7566475 
Tunisia 1990 -0.2635872 
Tunisia 2000 -0.5203894 
Tunisia 1980 -0.2635872 
Tunisia 1995 -0.2635872 
Tunisia 1985 -0.2635872 
Turkey 1990 0.2257857 
Turkey 2000 -0.582022 
Turkey 1985 -0.3539816 
Ukraine 1995 -0.8463746 
Ukraine 2000 -1.565421 
United Kingdom 1990 1.888108 
United Kingdom 1985 2.233251 
United Kingdom 1995 1.830585 
United Kingdom 1980 2.381169 
United States 1980 2.09355 
Uruguay 1980 -0.8463746 
Uruguay 1995 -0.3704316 
Uruguay 2000 -0.2635872 
Uruguay 1985 -0.8463746 
Venezuela 1985 -0.2635872 
Venezuela 1980 -0.5512056 
Venezuela 1995 -0.5452678 
Zambia 1980 -1.967013 
Zimbabwe 1990 0.3819215 
Zimbabwe 1995 -0.0857454 
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A.3.4. Appendix for the Determinants of Efficiency of Redistributive Institutions 
Dependent Variable  
Efficiency of Redistributive Institutions 
 
Table A.12. Determinants 
of ER;  Extended Sample 
of Countries: Cross-
Sectional Regressions 
  
  OLS  Robust 
Weighted Least 
Square OLS 
     
Inequality -0.0218 -0.0253 -0.0213 -0.0206 
 *-2.1 **-2.24 **-2.01 **-2.12 
Democracy / Gastil 0.0728 0.0653 0.0694 0.0600 
 ***3.54 ***2.93 ***3.35 ***3.2 
Log of Real GDP per 
capita PPP 0.7007 0.6980 0.7123 0.7783 
 ***5.36 ***4.92 ***5.3 ***6.43 
% of pop. above 65 -0.0119 -0.0082 -0.0087 -0.0329 
 -0.33 -0.21 -0.24 -0.98 
East Asia & Pacific -0.3970 -0.3245 -0.3574 -0.1113 
 -0.96 -0.72 -0.89 -0.29 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia -1.1279 -1.1705 -1.1197 -0.7891 
 ***-3.73 ***-3.57 ***-3.86 ***-2.67 
Middle East & North 
Africa -0.2521 -0.3268 -0.2598 -0.0302 
 -0.52 -0.62 -0.54 -0.07 
South Asia -0.5147 -0.5198 -0.4691 -0.0333 
 -1.03 -0.96 -0.93 -0.07 
North America -0.0927 -0.0630 -0.0933 0.2439 
 -0.21 -0.13 -0.22 0.58 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.2662 0.2528 0.2970 0.7014 
 0.55 0.48 0.62 1.51 
Latin America & 
Caribbean -1.2754 -1.2544 -1.2570 -1.3769 
 ***-3.28 ***-2.98 ***-3.33 ***-3.96 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization -0.7806 
    **-2.58 
Oil export    -0.0053 
    *-1.75 
Years after independence  0.0031 
    **1.96 
cons. -4.6043 -4.4195 -4.7528 -5.1769 
  ***-3.92 ***-3.47 ***-3.92 ***-4.91 
# of coun. 67 67 67 66 
F Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.79   0.80 0.84 
Notes: (*) indicates significance at 10 %; (**) indicates significance at 5 %; (***) indicates significance at 1 %. 
Guatemala, India, Peru and Yemen are also included this extended sample.   El Salvador is dropped due to lack of 
data on ethnolinguistic fractionalization in the last column.  
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